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Abstract
Essays on International Trade and Political Economy
Thomas Zylkin
My graduate research has been organized around two main themes: (i) the causes and
consequences of trade integration and (ii) the strategic nature of armed conflict. The expan-
sion of international trade over the past sixty years has played a major role is determining
the fates of nations, both for better and for worse, and likewise has the potential to shape
our futures in ways we need to be able to anticipate. Similarly, the death, destruction,
and diversion of productive resources associated with violent conflict continue to present
a critical obstacle to shared prosperity. The papers I am presenting as the chapters of my
dissertation are representative of the contributions I am interested in making in these im-
portant research areas.
My research on trade integration spans both the micro-level of what forms trade inte-
gration may take as well as higher level concerns about how freer trade will affect both the
world economy as well as the individual economies within it. Two chapters of my disserta-
tion, “Beyond Tariffs: Quantifying Heterogeneity in the Effects of Free Trade Agreements”
and “Finding the Influence of Communication on Trade” are devoted to this subject. In
“Beyond Tariffs”, for example, I show, using NAFTA as an empirical case study, that the
effects of free trade agreements on individual nations may not be what we might expect
to observe ex ante based on tariffs. Relying solely on tariffs to project NAFTA’s effects not
only greatly underestimates the overall welfare increases for all three NAFTA countries—
Mexico’s in particular—but also overstates the positive effects of NAFTA on U.S. producer
prices. It follows that “heterogeneity” in the effects of free trade agreements, both within
and across agreements, may not be well-understood.
In “Finding the Influence of Communication”, I investigate whether the sharing of a
common language promotes trade in a way similar to trade policy and, if so, what the
consequences of increased language learning will be for global trade. Most notably, I find
the effect of communication in native languages on trade tends to be underestimated in
the absence of controls for communication in non-native languages. Surprisingly, while
ix
I find strong evidence for the causal impact of foreign language acquisition on manufac-
turing trade, I do not find similarly strong evidence for services trade. I also find that,
unsurprisingly, adding to the world’s population of English speakers has by far the largest
impact on trade of any major world language. Interestingly, however, when I remove all
non-language barriers to trade, I find the forces of geography and history may have greatly
impeded the relative appeal of Chinese as a competing global language.
The third chapter of my dissertation, “The Problem of Peace: A Story of Corruption,
Destruction, and Rebellion”, joint with Constantinos Syropoulos, deals with a different
kind of question: what are the economic incentives that drive the emergence of destruc-
tive conflicts, and of intra-state conflicts (“civil conflicts”) in particular? Specifically, we
investigate how the central presence of state (fiscal) institutions in civil conflicts generates
unique explanations for the emergence of conflict itself. International trade plays an im-
portant role in this chapter as well, but mainly as a backdrop for illustrating the unique
trade-offs between “peace” and “welfare” that may arise in this context. It is possible for
changes in international prices to move in favor of promoting settlements, but such settle-
ments can be associated with (socially wasteful) increases in arming and/or taxation. We
also explore, among other things, how limiting the government’s fiscal capacity may tilt
the balance towards peaceful settlement.

1Part 1
Beyond Tariffs: Quantifying Heterogeneity in
the Effects of Free Trade Agreements
1.1 Introduction
We do not really understand the mechanisms by which free trade agreements (FTAs) im-
pact trade barriers between member nations. How much will the proposed Trans-Atlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the U.S. and E.U. increase trade relative
to other FTAs? How will the consequences be different for individuals living in Bulgaria as
opposed to those living in the U.K. or in the U.S.? Despite the trade literature’s longstand-
ing, consistent interest in the general equilibrium welfare effects of trade integration,1 the
answers to these questions remain elusive. There is no consistent way of characterizing
how successful other FTAs with similar provisions to TTIP have been at promoting trade,
let alone how a given FTA might affect trade barriers differently for different members.
This chapter works towards addressing these issues by offering a tractable method-
ology by which general “heterogeneity” in the effects of FTAs, both within and across
agreements, can be identified and analyzed. Using a structural estimation of changes in
trade costs over time, I am able to infer directly from the trade data, ex post, what effects a
particular FTA has had on trade barriers for each of its member countries. Similar ex post
approaches, starting with seminal empirical work by Baier & Bergstrand (2007), have illus-
trated many new facts about FTAs in recent years, with an increasing focus on identifying
sources of heterogeneity. These contributions have included findings on how average FTA
effects differ across industries (Anderson & Yotov, 2012), how the average effect differs
based on the type of agreement (Baier, Bergstrand, & Feng, 2014), and how FTAs with
1Viner (1950) originates the current literature on the welfare analysis of trade integration. This literature is
not small. Bhagwati, Krishna, & Panagariya (1999) summarize many of the major theoretical developments
since Viner. Current trends in quantitative welfare analysis have roots in two major papers, Eaton & Kortum
(2002) and Anderson & van Wincoop (2003). Head & Mayer (2014) and Costinot & Rodrı´guez-Clare (2014)
survey more recent developments in quantitative methods.
2different provisions may affect trade differently (Kohl, Brakman, & Garretsen, 2013).
This literature has not yet considered the substantial directional heterogeneity that may
exist within the very same agreement, however—i.e. cases where one member country
receives more access to another country’s market than it grants in return. Using NAFTA
as my illustrating example,2 I show that this latter source of heterogeneity in particular
may not be well understood. Even within a given FTA, there can exist significant asymme-
tries in implied trade barrier reductions which have not been studied and have important
implications for the gains from trade.
Specifically, I use the case of NAFTA to ask two broad questions about the implications
of allowing for asymmetries in FTA effects. First, how much might directional heterogeneity
in the effects of free trade agreements differ from what we might expect to observe? It turns out
that, in the specific example of NAFTA, the answer is “a lot”. The idea that a free trade
agreement may have different effect on trade barriers for different countries is not neces-
sarily surprising; we know offhand that some countries can often have very different trade
barriers ex ante and thus we would expect them to be affected differently by an agreement.
The typical perspective in the literature for analyzing the effects of individual agreements,
and the effects of NAFTA in particular, has been to assume these differences can be sum-
marized by differences in the agreed-upon ex ante tariff reductions.3 I show, however, that
the ex post realization of effects associated with NAFTA differs substantially from expecta-
tions based on tariffs; I also observe some suggestive evidence from the broader data on
FTAs that a plausible, under-appreciated source of asymmetries within NAFTA may be
the difference in the level of development between the U.S. and Mexico.
Second, I also wish to know: how important are these asymmetries? Or, more specifically,
what insights into the gains from trade integration are we missing out on by not incorporating
them? Using a series of simple simulation experiments, I show that prevailing approaches
to identifying the welfare benefits of FTAs (and the welfare benefits of NAFTA in particu-
lar) would tend to mischaracterize NAFTA’s benefits in large, important ways.
2The North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) entered into force between the U.S., Mexico, and
Canada on January 1st, 1994.
3Shikher, 2012a is an important exception, as noted below.
3For my empirical approach, I estimate FTA effects using a “structural gravity” model,4
which in plain terms is a very general structural trade model which accounts how changes
in trade costs affect supply and demand conditions in every industry in every country.
The key for my purposes is that structural gravity provides a clear logic for identifying the
role of trade barriers in determining trade between countries, which generalizes across a
very wide range of trade models. This logic is as follows: suppose that country A trades
with two other destinations, B and C, that are similar in every respect—same distance from
country A, same size economy, etc. If A is observed to trade relatively more with B than
with C, the logic goes, it must be the case that trade is more costly between A and C than
between A and B. Time-variation in relative trade flows between countries can then be
used to identify how an FTA affects trade costs. In this context, my innovation is that I
allow the effect of an FTA to vary both at the level of the individual agreement (such that
NAFTA affects trade differently from other FTAs) and at the level of the direction of trade
(such that NAFTA does not, for example, affect the U.S. imports from Mexico the same
way it does U.S. exports to Mexico).5
My empirical findings for NAFTA confirm the presence of substantial heterogeneity in
FTA effects, both between NAFTA and other FTAs and within NAFTA itself. For exam-
ple, I find strong evidence that NAFTA has promoted trade significantly more than other
FTAs have.6 Furthermore, I establish that NAFTA has had strongly asymmetric effects
on trade barriers, both for aggregate trade and within individual industries, and I cleanly
distinguish these observed asymmetries from notions of comparative advantage or any
other tendency towards trade not directly related to trade costs.7 To name two examples:
Mexico’s Metals producers have received substantially more access to Canadian and U.S.
import markets than U.S. and Canadian Metals producers have received in return; whereas
4“Gravity” is a general empirical model for estimating trade frictions that is ubiquitous in both the empir-
ical trade literature and in current general equilibrium analyses of “gains from trade”. Head & Mayer (2014)
provide a comprehensive background.
5Kohl (2014) has previously considered heterogeneity in FTA effects at the level of the individual agree-
ment. I introduce some small innovation relative to Kohl (2014) on this point because I allow for general
differences between NAFTA and other FTAs to differ across industries.
6Cipollina & Salvatici (2010) and Kohl (2014) each document similar findings for NAFTA versus other
FTAs.
7In the estimation, these considerations are controlled for explicitly through the use of time-varying
exporter- and importer- fixed effects.
4in the Food sector, the opposite has occurred. Lastly, I document that these asymmetries
differ significantly from what would have been expected to happen based on observed
tariff reductions.
In addition, evidence from the broader universe of FTAs strongly suggests that NAFTA
is not a unique outlier in this context. Contrary to expectations, FTA pairings between
highly developed and less developed economies (such as the U.S. and Mexico in the case of
NAFTA) generally favor the exports of the less developed partner, despite the fact that less
developed countries tend to have higher initial tariffs. It follows that so-called “non-tariff
barriers” have played a large, under-appreciated role in determining how FTAs shape the
pattern of global trade (and how NAFTA specifically has shaped North American trade).
This last set of findings is particularly notable in light of current trade debates. Other
work that has tried to evaluate each country’s benefits from NAFTA has tended to place too
much emphasis on pre-NAFTA tariff differences between the U.S. and Mexico. Whereas
projections based on tariffs alone would have suggested that U.S. producers should have
gained much more access to Mexican import markets than they received in return, the ac-
tual changes in trade frictions I identify tell a different story. Overall, NAFTA coincided
with sizable 63.1% decrease in barriers to U.S. import markets for Mexico’s exporters, com-
pared with a 45.9% decrease in barriers against U.S. products headed in the other direction.
This under-appreciated growth in imports from Mexico may be contributing to current
skepticism towards free trade deals in the U.S. “In all the time I’ve been in Congress, I’ve
never seen a trade bill that benefits the American producer or the American worker,” U.S.
Congresswoman Louise Slaughter (D-NY) recently declared. “People are sick and tired of
the one way trade deal.”8 My results do not support these complaints of “one way trade”
per se, but they do strongly suggest that the realization of NAFTA has differed substantially
from the prevailing narratives available at the time.
For my welfare analysis, I adhere to a highly general modeling perspective. I assume a
simple multi-sector endowment economy setting, such that all welfare effects occur strictly
through first-order effects on prices for both buyers and sellers. These first-order price ef-
fects I obtain in turn have direct implications for additional welfare channels in many more
8“Specter of NAFTA hurts Obama’s trade dreams”, Politico, February 19th, 2014.
5elaborate trade models that share the same essential structure.9 The endowment econ-
omy setting reveals the following: i) implied welfare gains for all three NAFTA members
are 50% to 100% as large as would be implied by an average FTA effect and three times
as large as would be found using tariff reductions; ii) the size of Mexico’s implied gains
from NAFTA in particular (3.63% vs. 12.32%)10 are underestimated using tariffs; iii) tariff
changes tend to obscure the nature of the U.S.’s gains from NAFTA: the U.S. has benefited
mostly from an increased ability to buy goods from Canada and Mexico (i.e. lower buyer
prices), not from being better able to sell its own goods to the other two markets (i.e. higher
producer prices).
Because NAFTA has long remained controversial in North American politics, it has
motivated a substantial literature dedicated to analyzing its effects on trade, welfare, and
other outcome variables. The following section will touch specifically on how this chap-
ter fits within and informs this literature. In subsequent sections, I present the empirical
analysis, offer some discussion of how to explain the patterns of asymmetry I observe in
NAFTA’s effects, and demonstrate implications for welfare analysis. The last section adds
concluding remarks.
1.2 Looking Back at NAFTA and Looking Ahead to Future FTAs
Due to my focus on NAFTA in particular, my findings resonate with the recent literature
that has tried to re-evaluate the policy impact of NAFTA using progressively more up-
dated tools for analyzing gains from trade. Caliendo & Parro (2015) for example simulate
the effects of NAFTA in a calibrated model with cross-sectoral input linkages that explains
9Table 1 in Head & Mayer (2014) provides a (non-exhaustive) overview of these “more elaborate” models.
These frameworks include allowances for monopolistic competition and increasing returns (Krugman, 1980;
Wei, 1996), endogenous firm-level export entry (Melitz, 2003; Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein, 2008), trade in
intermediates (Eaton & Kortum, 2002; Caliendo & Parro, 2015), and variable firm mark-ups (Melitz & Otta-
viano, 2008; Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, & Rodrı´guez-Clare, 2012; Behrens, Mion, Murata, & Su¨dekum,
2014). Costinot & Rodrı´guez-Clare (2014) demonstrate how many of these elements can be combined within
a single framework.
10As is often discussed in the trade literature (see Arkolakis, Costinot, & Rodrı´guez-Clare, 2012), the mag-
nitudes obtained for “gains from trade” are highly sensitive to the assumptions used for the “trade elasticity”
(i.e. the sensitivity of trade to changes in trade costs). I use values from Broda, Greenfield, & Weinstein (2006)
for these elasticies. Using other elasticity values would affect absolute magnitudes of welfare gains but would
not significantly affect relative magnitudes across the different ways of measuring NAFTA’s effects. I stand on
the latter as my main result.
6a significant portion of the aggregate changes in country-level exports and imports that
occurred post-NAFTA. Their work builds on the analyses performed by Anderson & van
Wincoop (2001), Romalis (2007), Shikher (2012a), and others to try to characterize NAFTA’s
imprint on each member’s welfare. These papers generally do not look at how bilateral
frictions between members may have been affected along other dimensions besides tar-
iffs.11
One feature of the trade data that cannot easily be explained based on tariffs alone is
how the U.S.’s trade balance with respect to Mexico changed during the mid-1990s. Agama
& McDaniel (2002) document this curiosity in their overview of the data: despite the pres-
ence of already-existing U.S. tariff preferences on imports from Mexico (on the order of
about 3% pre-NAFTA), the large growth in U.S.-Mexico trade in the mid-90s and early-
2000s tended to favor imports from Mexico to the U.S. rather than U.S. exports to Mexico
(though both increased substantially). The surprisingly large increase in U.S. imports from
Mexico in particular invites consideration of how NAFTA may have affected trade barriers
beyond tariffs.12
Nevertheless, there are valid reasons why simulations of FTA effects have continued to
limit their attention to tariffs. Tariff changes associated with FTAs are known ex ante and
easily observable ex post. Pure econometric estimates of changes in trade cannot necessar-
ily disentangle the direct effects of an FTA from other concurrent factors that may have
affected trade barriers. In the case of NAFTA, Krueger (1999) and Agama & McDaniel
(2002) each cite Mexico’s peso devaluation in the mid-1990s as an important difficulty in
identifying NAFTA’s effects ex post. Notably, Krueger (1999) provides a useful reasoning
by which these two competing narratives can be evaluated. In the discussion following
my results, I describe how my econometric design incorporates this reasoning and discuss
how and why I reach a different conclusion than that of Krueger (1999).
Naturally, other competing explanations also need to be discussed in this context, some
11Shikher (2012a)is an important exception in that he infers tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers using the
Nicita & Olarreaga (2007) “Trade, Production, and Protection” database. However his estimates still show
much higher initial liberalization for Mexican imports than for Mexican exports, which is contrary to the
results I obtain for NAFTA’s trade impact ex post.
12Agama & McDaniel (2002) offer as a possible explanation for these findings the idea that import markets
for the U.S. and Mexico may have featured very different elasticities of demand.
7of which can be incorporated in the structural model and some of which cannot. In addi-
tion to the discussion of currency volatility, I also discuss how the model accounts for the
effects of comparative advantage across industries as well as for trade in intermediates
along global supply chains. The extent that the actual behavior of individual firms within
the supply chain may differ from the assumed behavior implied by this class of models is
a possible concern that needs to be highlighted, however.
The choice to focus on NAFTA reflects the usefulness of NAFTA as a representative
example for illustrating issues that are important for characterizing the impact of modern
FTAs. Since NAFTA, FTAs have been becoming increasingly expansive with regards to
hard-to-quantify non-tariff provisions. An appraisal of “NAFTA at 20” earlier this year
by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (Villareal & Fergusson, 2014) reserves special
praise for the lasting influence NAFTA has left on a “new generation of trade agreements”
as a model for how to incorporate, among other things, guarantees on freedom of invest-
ment, intellectual property rights, and investment property rights, and increased coopera-
tion on the setting of regulatory standards and customs procedures.
In these terms, the major planned FTAs of the near future, TTIP and TPP, will likely
mark even bolder landmarks. CEPII’s recent study on TTIP (Fontagne´, Gourdon, & Jean,
2013), for example, notes that average tariffs between the U.S. and E.U. are currently only
around 2%-3% to start with; clearly both entities envision considerable gains from reduc-
ing “unnecessary regulatory differences”, “restrictive licensing”, barriers to trade in ser-
vices (especially financial services), and other non-tariff barriers to trade.13 Anticipating
what these stated goals may mean for trade requires more focused tools for analyzing trade
integration: Egger, Francois, Manchin, & Nelson (2014) and Felbermayr, Heid, Larch, &
Yalcin (2014) have each recently made headway in this direction by explicitly considering
how the effects of future FTAs may reflect those of similar agreements signed in the past.
What my findings suggest in relation to this emerging literature is that there also exists
important, under-appreciated variation in how the same agreement may affect different
countries differently.14
13See USTR (2014) for a full list of these and other stated objectives for the U.S. with respect to TTIP.
14Ongoing work in the same vein as this chapter continues this suggested line of research by considering
how FTA effects may vary depending on the characteristics of the countries that sign them.
81.3 Estimation Approach
1.3.1 Methodology
The “structural gravity” equation, as generalized by Head & Mayer (2014), naturally mo-
tivates a panel fixed effects estimation strategy for identifying the impact of free trade
agreements on trade. Fixed effects gravity models of this type have been widely used in
the literature for estimating the effects of FTAs. The general framework assumes an R
country world with K sectors and costly trade in differentiated goods within each sector.
Exports from i to j in sector k (Xkij) then can be expressed via the following gravity equation,
which will explicitly motivate the estimation that follows:
Xkij =
Yki
Ωki
·
Ekj
Φkj
· φkij. (1)
Ekj and Y
k
i here are, respectively, j’s expenditure on industry k and the value of i’s produc-
tion in k. The longstanding logic of “gravity”, which dates back to Tinbergen (1962), is
that trade is increasing in the size of the two countries (i.e. E and Y) and decreasing in the
trade costs between them, which here would be reflected in the bilateral parameter φkij. To
complete the analogy to Newtonian gravity, φkij can be said to vary inversely with how far
apart i and j are geographically.
Also playing an important role in (1) however are Φkj and Ω
k
i , which themselves have
the following structural interpretations:
Φkj =∑
i
φkij
Ωki
·Yki (2)
Ωki =∑
j
φkij
Φkj
· Ekj . (3)
Intuitively, these so-called “multilateral resistance” terms index the total incidence of trade
costs on an individual country’s ability to access world markets, both on the buyer side (in
the case of Φkj ) and on the seller side (in the case of Ω
k
i ). The more easily a producer in
i is able to sell to world markets in general, the less inclined he will be to sell to any one
9particular destination j for any given level of bilateral trade costs φkij. A similar logic ap-
plies for buyers: better access to sellers around the world all else equal makes them less
likely to buy from any one particular exporter i. These structural terms were originally in-
troduced in Anderson & van Wincoop (2003), but are common to a surprisingly wide class
of models that fall under the heading “structural gravity” and have different structural
interpretations in each case.15
The advantage of presenting the trade model in this way is that it is very general; thus
it will allow me to make claims about both identification and welfare implications that
will generalize across many different theoretical settings. In particular, I will use a multi-
sector “Armington” model (with nationally differentiated products) in order to simulate
general equilibrium outcomes. However, the system defined by (1)-(3) can also be used
to describe other gravity models founded on (for instance) within-industry comparative
advantage (Eaton & Kortum, 2002), monopolistic competition (Krugman; Wei), or variable
firm productivity and endogenous export entry (Melitz, 2003).16
For empirical purposes, my main parameter of interest is φkij, the parameter reflecting
how trade costs directly affect trade between i and j. Without loss of generality φkij∈ (0, 1)
can be thought of as the amount of “market access” that sellers in i enjoy when attempting
to sell their variety of good k to import market j: when trade integration lowers trade
barriers, φkij increases and trade in turn increases proportionately with the change in market
access, all else equal. The empirical question I am looking to examine is how bilateral
market access depends on the presence of a free trade agreement between i and j, and how
these market access effects may vary within the same agreement. I will refer continually
in this chapter to %∆φkij − 1 as the “amount by which market access increased” in industry
k as the result of an agreement. Without loss of generality, I can also call 1−%∆
(
1/φkij
)
as the “amount by which barriers to market access fell”.
An important point about estimating values for φkij in this setting is that the combined
15The expression for Ωkj , (3), is usually not shown in the presentation of these other models. Nonetheless,
Head and Mayer (2014) show it is a general result that follows from an accounting identify for any model
where (1) and (3) already hold.
16The derivation of “gravity” from the Melitz (2003) theoretical model was first shown in Arkolakis, Demi-
dova, Klenow, & Rodrı´guez-Clare (2008). Chaney (2008) and Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein (2008) have each
offered alternative gravity frameworks drawing on key elements of Melitz’s theory.
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system (1)-(3) is “modular” (or “separable”). That is, even though the values for produc-
tion and expenditure for each sector Yki and E
k
j depend on what occurs across all sectors
in general equilibrium, if I simply take these terms as given, it follows from (1)-(3) that
I can treat the φkij’s in each individual industry k as an independent set of parameters to
be estimated separately, with no cross-equation restrictions across industries. That is not
to say that I am in any way restricting values for Y and E to be fixed, only that the mod-
ularity of these structural gravity models allows for production and budgeting decisions
to be made at an “upper level” of the model, such that decisions over where and how to
source varieties within an industry can take those values as given. I explain how the use of
time-varying exporter- and importer- fixed effects allows me to focus on this “lower level”
of the purchasing problem in my development of the econometric specification below.
Let φkij,t indicate the value of φ
k
ij at time t. Following Baier & Bergstrand (2007), I assume
φkij,t can be specified in the following manner for each sector:
φkij,t = e
δkZij+βk FTAij,t , (4)
where FTAij,t is an indicator variable (or set of indicator variables) reflecting whether i
and j have an FTA at time t and Zij is a set of controls for inherent bilateral characteristics
assumed to have some effect on trade (e.g. the distance between i and j, whether they
share a common language, whether they have a prior colonial relationship, presence of a
common border, etc.). Together, (1) and (4) specify my baseline estimating equation for
trade in each industry k:
Xkij,t = exp
(
ξki,t + ψ
k
j,t + η
k
ij + β
kFTAij,t
)
+ ekij,t. (5)
ξki,t and ψ
k
j,t are exporter and importer fixed effects that control for all market-level vari-
ables that affect trade in industry k through channels other than through the amount of
direct bilateral market access. Note that these terms need to be time-varying: as noted,
the Φkj and Ω
k
i terms in the structural model depend endogenously on the system of φ
k
ij
terms in equilibrium via (2)-(3). Furthermore, since these terms reflect buyer and seller
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prices, they in turn will have implications for Ekj and Y
k
i as well.
17 It is important then
that changes in φkij are identified not just by changes in bilateral trade flows, but rather by
changes in bilateral trade flows relative to changes in each country’s unilateral tendency
towards exporting and importing goods of type k. When a country shifts resources to-
wards production of good k for example, that shift should generate increased exports of k
to all destinations, not to any one destination in particular.
The (symmetric) pair-specific fixed effect term ηkij is meant to capture all time-invariant
bilateral relationships between i and j that influence trade (effectively absorbing δkZkij in
(4)).18 In panel estimation terms, due to the presence of ηkij, β
k essentially serves as a
“within” fixed effects estimator for the effect of an FTA on exports from i to j for goods
of type k.19 As Baier & Bergstrand (2007) demonstrate—adapting the panel identification
methods discussed in Wooldridge (2002)—the use of pair-specific fixed effects in a panel
gravity setting is a simple-to-apply procedure for identifying the average treatment effect
of FTAs and this approach has become standard in the literature. In accordance with San-
tos Silva & Tenreyro’s (2006) recommendations for minimizing bias in gravity estimations,
I will use the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator to estimate (5).20
Breaking with the Baier and Bergstrand approach, however, for my main results I will
allow FTAij,t to vary by agreement and, subsequently, by the direction of trade flows.
Specifically, I focus on NAFTA as a suitable example to show that the effect of an FTA be
conditional on the direction of trade. To do this, I split the single FTAij,t term in (5) into a
set of variables, as shown below:
Xkij,t = exp
(
ξki,t + ψ
k
j,t + η
k
ij + β
0,kFTA0ij,t + β
N,kNAFTAij,t
)
+ ekij,t. (6)
17I characterize these linkages in more detail when I discuss welfare implications later in the paper.
18Baier & Bergstrand specifically motivate ηkij as controlling for the propensity of i and j to “select endoge-
nously” into an FTA. The key point however is that cross-sectional estimates of FTA effects are biased because
i and j’s propensity to form an FTA may be correlated with unobservable aspects of the trade costs between
them. ηkij resolves the endogeneity problem by explicitly controlling for these unobservable trade costs.
19By construction, these pair fixed effects are symmetric. I relax this restriction later when I introduce
direction-specific effects.
20A more natural approach would seemingly be to estimate (5) via OLS. Santos Silva & Tenreyro however
show that log-linearizing (5) introduces an important source of bias due to heteroskedasticity in eij and mea-
surement error in trade flows, which PPML estimation helps to minimize. Furthermore, as shown in Fally
(2014), the PPML estimator is especially suitable for “structural” gravity estimation in particular, since using
PPML to estimate (5) implicitly imposes that the structural equations (2) and (3) hold with equality.
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Here, the superscript “0” on FTA0ij,t is meant to indicate that β
0,k is now measuring the
average effect of all FTAs aside from NAFTA. βN,k is then measuring all FTA effects that are
associated specifically with NAFTA. I can then split the NAFTAij,t variable even further
in order to isolate directional effects. For example, I will allow NAFTACANMEX,t to be
a single dummy for post-NAFTA exports from Canada to Mexico and NAFTAMEXCAN,t
to be a separate dummy for post-NAFTA flows in the other direction. NAFTA is a three
country agreement, so there will be 6 directional NAFTA effects to measure in all for each
sector, plus the FTA0ij,t term to control for the average effect of all other FTAs in effect.
The directional asymmetries in trade barrier reductions these ~βN,k terms reveal can then
be compared with what one might expect to observe based on tariff reductions associated
with NAFTA.
In this last case, I need to be careful. The pair-wise fixed effect ηkij is intended to iden-
tify the average effect of an FTA on average trade barriers in industry k for a given pair.
However when I allow NAFTA’s effects to be directional I am now (for example) interested
in the specific effect of NAFTA on trade frictions for Canadian Food producers trying to
sell in US markets, and vice versa. If trade barriers for Canadian Food producers selling
in the US are different than those faced by US producers trying to sell in Canada, then
βN,FoodUSCAN and β
N,Food
CANUS will in part reflect this initial difference in trade barriers, rather than
identifying the differences in how the FTA played out.
As such, I write down this last empirical model as follows,
Xkij,t = exp
(
ξki,t + ψ
k
j,t + η
k
ij +~η
k
ij + β
0,kFTA0ij,t + ~β
N,k ~NAFTAij,t
)
+ ekij,t, (7)
where the “arrow” superscript indicates a set of effects that is allowed to vary by direction.
The additional (asymmetric) pair effects ~ηkij are only in play for flows between the US,
Canada, and Mexico. ~βN,k, the set of directional NAFTA effects, by definition also varies
with the direction of flows.
This same simple procedure could be easily repeated for any FTA or set of FTAs in
order to identify direction-specific effects. NAFTA is an especially useful illustrating ex-
ample for my purposes however, not just because of its continuing notoriety in current
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trade policy debates, but also because its three country structure will offer the opportunity
to make unique inferences about the observable patterns of FTA effects within industries.
Furthermore, as we will see, NAFTA serves as a useful example for demonstrating how
asymmetric effects within FTAs may differ from what we might expect to observe.
1.3.2 Data
The data used here builds on the data set used in Anderson & Yotov (2012). This data
set spans the period 1990 until 2002 for a sample of 40 individual countries plus an ag-
gregate “Rest of the World”, for a total of 41 trading regions in all. The main source for
trade flows is the CEPII “TradeProd” data base, supplemented with data on exports from
UN COMTRADE accessed using the WITS World Bank trade service. The original data
uses observed trade flows from every 4 years only—that is, 1990, 1994, 1998, and 2002. I
then add additional data—referring to the original sources and construction methods, and
using the Anderson & Yotov (2012) data to interpolate missing and unreasonable values
where possible—for the years 1992, 1996, and 2000, such that the full data set is for every
two years. The reason why I do not include every year is because, as Cheng & Wall (2005)
point out, performing fixed effects gravity estimations over consecutive years may fail to
address the fact that trade patterns may not adjust right away to changes in trade costs.21
The number of observations for each of the main results shown then is 11,765—i.e. 1,681
trading pairs (the square of the number of regions) times 7, the number of years in the
data.
The level of aggregation for the sectoral results is the ISIC (Revision 2) 2 digit level,
which is comprised of 9 2 digit manufacturing industry classifications: 31. Food and Bev-
erages, 32. Textiles, 33. Wood Products, 34. Paper Products, 35. Chemicals, 36. Minerals,
37. Metals, 38. Machinery, and 39. Other Manufacturing. However since some countries
report some Machinery products under Other Manufacturing and vice versa in their out-
put data, these two sectors are combined into a single “Manufacturing” category in the
final trade data.
21For this reason, it is worth mentioning that the results I show in this chapter are robust to using four year
intervals.
14
A key feature of this data is the inclusion of internal trade flows. The inclusion of inter-
nal trade values is crucial for my purposes because one cannot perform a true general equi-
librium analysis without some form of accounting for how domestic sales will respond to
changes in trade costs. These flows are constructed as the difference between total sectoral
output and total sectoral exports to all trading partners. Because exports are measured
on a “gross” (rather than value-added) basis, the data likewise uses gross output data for
these purposes. Like the trade data, the output data is mainly taken from TradeProd and
then supplemented with another source, in this case the United Nations UNIDO Indus-
trial Statistics (“IndStat”) database. Missing internal trade values have been extrapolated
by comparing the share of internal trade with respect to output in non-missing sectors and
non-missing years.22 Each country’s total expenditure on a given industry, which plays a
role in the welfare analysis, can then be calculated by adding together internal trade and
total imports.
The data on FTAs is based mainly on the original Baier & Bergstrand (2007) data set,
which is updated with some data on additional agreements taken from the WTO’s web
site. Because the trade data begins in 1990, only FTAs that entered into effect after that
year are coded. NAFTA, which went into effect in 1994, is obviously included, but the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1988 (which preceded NAFTA) is not.23 Overall,
there are 252 country pairs in the data that entered into either a free trade agreement or
customs union during the period under study.24
1.4 Empirical Findings
1.4.1 Industry-Level Analysis
I present my main evidence in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. First, in Table 1.1, Panel A, I estimate
average sectoral FTA effects using equation (5) in order to document how the effects of
FTAs generally vary significantly across industries.25 Notably there are two sectors, Wood
22Anderson & Yotov (2010b) describe how to impute missing internal trade values.
23See Table 1 in Anderson & Yotov (2012) for details on the FTAs included.
24Customs Unions are included as FTAs for these purposes.
25Qualitatively, the results are virtually identical to Anderson & Yotov’s (2012) results for this same specifi-
cation, and differ only because I include additional years in the data.
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Table 1.1: Industry-Level Results: NAFTA vs. Other FTAs
Food Textile Wood Paper Chemicals Minerals Metals Machinery
A. Sectoral FTA Estimates
All FTAs 0.451 0.713 0.006 -0.017 0.228 0.192 0.447 0.467
(0.076)∗∗ (0.120)∗∗ (0.072) (0.057) (0.041)∗∗ (0.065)∗∗ (0.062)∗∗ (0.118)∗∗
B. Individual FTA Estimates (NAFTA vs. All Other FTAs)
NAFTA 0.504 1.166 0.140 0.371 0.462 0.604 0.339 0.613
(0.067)∗∗ (0.063)∗∗ (0.095) (0.032)∗∗ (0.030)∗∗ (0.051)∗∗ (0.136)∗ (0.144)∗∗
All Other FTAs 0.465 0.646 -0.038 -0.050 0.183 0.133 0.405 0.371
(0.082)∗∗ (0.118)∗∗ (0.068) (0.052) (0.032)∗∗ (0.056)∗ (0.060)∗∗ (0.082)∗∗
C. Significance Tests (NAFTA vs. the Average FTA)
NAFTA vs. Average 0.040 0.520 0.177 0.422 0.280 0.471 -0.067 0.242
(0.103) (0.107)∗∗ (0.117) (0.062)∗∗ (0.038)∗∗ (0.076)∗∗ (0.150) (0.125)+
Sectoral trade for 41 trading regions from 1990-2002, every 2 years (412 · 7 = 11, 765 observations per sector.)
Robust standard errors, clustered by pair, are reported in parentheses. + p < 0.10 , * p < .05 , ** p < .01 .
All estimates are obtained with Santos-Silva and Tenreyro’s (2006) Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), pair fixed effects are used to account for FTA endogeneity.
Time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects are used to control for the multilateral resistances.
and Paper, where it does not seem like FTAs have impacted trade significantly. These
initial results serve as a useful baseline for establishing how much variation is missed out
on by looking solely at average FTA effects.
Panels B and C then explore the implications of allowing for more specific FTA effects.
In Panel B, following equation (6), I separate out the individual effect of NAFTA from all
other FTAs. In both cases I control for the presence of all other FTAs. The estimates from
Panel B reveal that the effects of NAFTA are quite different from both the average sectoral
FTA estimates from Panel A and from the estimates of effects of all other FTAs, excluding
NAFTA (the “All Other FTAs” term in Panel B). For example, I find that NAFTA has led
to a significant increase in trade in Paper products among the three NAFTA members,
while the effect of all other FTAs is still negative, small, and marginally significant. Panel
C confirms the significance of these differences. These results support the hypothesis that
individual FTAs can have very different effects across industries.
Then, in Table 1.2, I allow for country-specific and directional differences in the effects
of NAFTA, as in (7). Based on these estimates, I conclude that FTA effects can indeed be
strongly directional. For example, my estimates for Food reveal that NAFTA had strong
positive effects on Canadian exports to Mexico (NAFTA Can-Mex= 1.614, std.err 0.165)
and on U.S. exports to Mexico (NAFTA U.S.-Mex=1.000, std.err 0.163). However, I do not
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Table 1.2: Industry-Level Results: Directional NAFTA Effects
Food Textile Wood Paper Chemicals Minerals Metals Machinery
Directional FTA Estimates (NAFTA)
NAFTA Can-Mex 1.614 1.725 1.850 0.517 1.163 1.806 0.587 1.400
(0.165)∗∗ (0.125)∗∗ (0.211)∗∗ (0.116)∗∗ (0.091)∗∗ (0.163)∗∗ (0.114)∗∗ (0.133)∗∗
NAFTA Mex.-Can. -0.249 1.544 0.754 1.769 1.931 1.472 1.674 1.291
(0.164) (0.115)∗∗ (0.231)∗∗ (0.122)∗∗ (0.088)∗∗ (0.164)∗∗ (0.115)∗∗ (0.200)∗∗
NAFTA Can-U.S. 0.595 1.348 0.209 0.081 0.412 0.643 0.330 0.441
(0.069)∗∗ (0.108)∗∗ (0.181) (0.080) (0.086)∗∗ (0.100)∗∗ (0.098)∗∗ (0.064)∗∗
NAFTA U.S.-Can 0.510 0.832 -0.197 0.767 0.457 0.667 -0.028 0.481
(0.067)∗∗ (0.104)∗∗ (0.182) (0.079)∗∗ (0.078)∗∗ (0.101)∗∗ (0.095) (0.045)∗∗
NAFTA Mex.-U.S. -0.445 1.592 0.768 0.371 0.536 0.620 1.098 1.235
(0.162)∗∗ (0.128)∗∗ (0.176)∗∗ (0.104)∗∗ (0.064)∗∗ (0.153)∗∗ (0.104)∗∗ (0.207)∗∗
NAFTA U.S.-Mex 1.000 0.938 0.123 0.293 0.512 0.395 0.415 0.727
(0.163)∗∗ (0.132)∗∗ (0.148) (0.099)∗∗ (0.060)∗∗ (0.152)∗∗ (0.102)∗∗ (0.119)∗∗
All Other FTAs 0.478 0.645 -0.041 -0.050 0.186 0.130 0.405 0.377
(0.081)∗∗ (0.118)∗∗ (0.068) (0.052) (0.032)∗∗ (0.056)∗ (0.060)∗∗ (0.079)∗∗
Sectoral trade for 41 trading regions from 1990-2002, every 2 years (412 · 7 = 11, 765 observations per sector.)
Robust standard errors, clustered by pair, are reported in parentheses. + p < 0.10 , * p < .05 , ** p < .01.
All estimates are obtained with Santos-Silva and Tenreyro’s (2006) Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), pair fixed effects are used to account for FTA endogeneity.
Time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects are used to control for the multilateral resistances.
obtain statistically significant estimates of the effects of NAFTA on Mexico’s exports to
Canada; Furthermore, Mexico’s exports to the U.S. actually seem to have been negatively
affected.26
The estimates for Food in Table 1.2 are also useful for pointing out a broader regularity
in the data that I wish to focus on. The NAFTA effects for U.S.-Mexico and Canada-Mexico
trade are much larger in magnitude than the effects for U.S. exports to Canada and vice
versa. This pattern suggests a loose correspondence between how much market access a
country has gained as exporter vs. how much access to its own markets it offers in return.
Here, the U.S. and Canada both realize generally strong gains in market access on the
export side, while we cannot say NAFTA has done much for Mexican Food exporters.
Estimates from several other sectors suggest the same sort of regularity, with different
orderings. Mexican Paper exports to Canada increase a prodigious amount, whereas other
countries’ exports expand more modestly. We also see this same kind of pattern where one
country seems to generally gain the most access to the other two markets in Metals and
26Trade barriers for Food are often dealt with separately and given special exemptions in the negotiation of
free trade agreements and NAFTA is no exception. See Avery (1998) for an overview of the bargaining process
that went on between negotiators and agricultural special interests in solidifying the agreement.
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Machinery (again Mexico in both cases).
I focus on illustrating these patterns to make an important point regarding the iden-
tification: one might be tempted to call the differences in how much trade increases I am
identifying as reflecting some measure of “comparative advantage”. Maybe these results
are due to the U.S. and Canada having comparative advantage in Food, Mexico having
comparative advantage in Machinery, and so on, the reasoning might go. Again, however,
I call attention to the presence of time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects in my
empirical specification. There is little question that trade liberalization impacts relative
prices across industries and that changes in relative prices in turn cause factors of produc-
tion to be re-allocated. But the structural model in (1) explicitly controls for the endogene-
ity of production and prices with respect to trade costs. Furthermore, the modularity of the
model allows me to separate the estimation of trade costs from these endogenous cross-
sectoral linkages. These estimates I am showing are indeed changes in market access as
defined in the structural model, controlling for all endogenous responses to trade within
each country. This includes notions of comparative advantage.27
1.4.2 A “One Way” Trade Deal?
What can we say then about the possibility of “one way” effects in general? The industry-
level data is suggestive of certain patterns at a high level—Mexico seems to have had
especially strong gains as an exporter for instance (especially in the Textiles, Wood, Metals,
and Machinery sectors). However, to really make concrete statements one way or the
other, it is necessary to examine results for aggregate trade. In Table 1.3, I show a number
of specifications meant to highlight the broad heterogeneity in FTA effects both between
NAFTA and other FTAs and within NAFTA itself.
In column 1, I document that the average effect of FTAs on trade in my sample, across
27Note that this same argument also rules out any other type of general equilibrium response to trade cost
reductions as the source of these particular variations. Take Caliendo & Parro’s (2015) model with cross-
sectoral input sourcing linkages as an example. In such a model, a trade shock affects prices, which in turn
feeds back into the quantity demanded for products of a certain type. Once again, these linkages are captured
in the structural model through the explicit representation of production, expenditure, and prices, with all
of these factors in turn being absorbed in the econometric model via the use of time-varying exporter and
importer fixed effects. The empirics do not distinguish between trade flows in intermediates versus trade in
final goods, however; such distinctions require a more detailed structural model.
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Table 1.3: NAFTA Effects, Aggregate Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average FTA Effect 0.401 0.320
(0.065)∗∗ (0.042)∗∗
All Other FTAs 0.319 0.318 0.317 0.321
(0.042)∗∗ (0.042)∗∗ (0.042)∗∗ (0.042)∗∗
NAFTA 0.580 0.261
(0.095)∗∗ (0.100)∗∗
NAFTA Can-Mex 1.182
(0.073)∗∗
NAFTA Mex.-Can. 1.099
(0.074)∗∗
NAFTA U.S.-Can 0.470
(0.044)∗∗
NAFTA Can-U.S. 0.451
(0.044)∗∗
NAFTA Mex.-U.S. 0.999
(0.071)∗∗
NAFTA U.S.-Mex 0.615
(0.069)∗∗
NAFTA (Canadian exports) 0.443
(0.042)∗∗
NAFTA (Mexican exports) 1.076
(0.066)∗∗
NAFTA (U.S. exports) 0.507
(0.044)∗∗
NAFTA (Canadian imports) 0.417
(0.064)∗∗
NAFTA (Mexican imports) 0.845
(0.103)∗∗
NAFTA (U.S. imports) 0.586
(0.080)∗∗
Aggregate manuf. trade for 41 trading regions from 1990-2002, every 2 years (412 · 7 = 11, 765 observations.)
Robust standard errors, clustered by pair, are reported in parentheses. + p < 0.10 , * p < .05 , ** p < .01 .
All estimates obtained with Santos-Silva and Tenreyro’s (2006) Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), pair fixed effects are used to account for FTA endogeneity.
Time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects are used to control for the multilateral resistances.
19
all industries combined is 0.401, which corresponds to an average increase in market access
of e0.401 − 1 = 49.3%. Column 2 then replicates the specification from Table 1.1 Panel B.
Unsurprisingly, NAFTA appears to have promoted trade much more overall than the other
FTAs in my sample—about twice as much in fact.28 Furthermore, as I show explicitly in
Column 3, the difference between NAFTA and the average FTA is itself significant at the
5% level.
Columns 4 to 6 then isolate the directional impact of NAFTA on aggregate trade flows.
The patterns seen here for combined trade feature less pronounced asymmetries than we
saw in the industry-level results. While there is some definite variation across pairs (trade
between Mexico and Canada vs. trade between the U.S. and Canada), the asymmetry seen
within pairs is muted. In columns 5 and 6, we see for instance that each country gener-
ally tended to receive more or less the same amount of access to its import markets that
it offered to its partners in return. One exception here—where we are able to say there
have been some asymmetric effects—is the effect of NAFTA on trade between the U.S. and
Mexico. The results in column 4 show that Mexico overall has received a e0.999− 1 = 171%
increase in access to U.S. markets, whereas the U.S. has received an e0.615 − 1 = 85.0% in-
crease in return.29 This last result is particularly interesting because it goes directly against
what would have been predicted to happen based on tariffs. As was well-publicized by
the pro-NAFTA campaign at the time,30 Mexico’s tariffs on U.S. products were about two-
and-a-half times those on products shipped in the other direction. It would seem then that
focusing on tariff provisions does not necessarily do a good job of explaining how much
market access will change in response to the signing of a free trade agreement; I return to
this theme in the ensuing discussion in section 1.5.
To summarize, the key finding from comparing average FTA effects with average NAFTA
effects, and then in turn with directional NAFTA effects, is not so much that any one coun-
try experienced one way effects overall (although the U.S. did indeed grant more market
access to Mexico than it gained). Really, what is more useful to observe here is that in-
28e0.580 − 1 = 78.6%; e0.319 − 1 = 37.6%.
29These increases in market access can also be described as a 63.2% decrease in US import barriers for
Mexican products vs. a 45.9% decrease in Mexican import barriers for U.S. products, as stated in the opening
remarks.
30See for instance “NAFTA: Good for America”, Washington Post, July 4th, 1993.
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dividual FTAs can have their own unique effects on trade, and that even within a given
FTA, there are widespread directional asymmetries, especially at the industry-level. We
also saw some evidence that what we would expect to happen ex ante based on tariffs is
not always what actually occurs when the FTA goes into effect. The following sections
will discuss the possible causes of the asymmetries as well as their implications, both for
further work on trade agreements, and for how we estimate the welfare impact of FTAs.
1.5 Discussion
I wish to consider various intuitive explanations for why one might expect to observe
asymmetric effects from an FTA. It is important to verify, for example, that my results
are not simply reflecting pre-existing patterns of comparative advantage within NAFTA
countries. A particularly important competing narrative in this context of course is the
currency volatily that occurred within Mexico during this period. The question of what
role trade in intermediate inputs may play in the analysis also needs to be examined.
Fortunately, the use of time-varying exporter and importer- fixed effects motivated by
the structural model ensures a strong degree of control over these issues. It follows then
that a reasonable interpretation of my estimates, especially in light of discrepancies with
the tariff data, is that they imply a large, relatively unexplored role for so-called “non-
tariff barriers” in explaining NAFTA’s effects. It also follows that broader definitions of
these barriers may be needed in order to explain the magnitude of these effects.
1.5.1 Some Competing Narratives
Comparative Avantage. I have already discussed how the use of time-varying country-
level fixed effects already controls for the endogenous response of prices and overall pro-
duction patterns in each country to trade liberalization. Thus, econometrically speaking,
I can safely say my results do not reflect comparative advantage in the classical sense.31
The structural model instead suggests that these coefficients are instead capturing direct
31See Costinot, Donaldson, & Komunjer (2012) for a thorough illustration of how comparative advantage
contributes to gains from trade in a structural gravity setting.
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Table 1.4: Measures of Revealed Comparative Advantage, NAFTA countries
Country Food Textiles Wood Paper Chemicals Minerals Metals Machinery
Leromain and Orefice (2013) RCA index, 2010 trade
Canada 1.07 0.88 1.21 1.07 0.85 1.14 1.03 1
Mexico 1 0.86 0.78 1.07 0.98 0.82 0.98 0.9
U.S. 1.02 0.86 1.13 1.07 1.06 1.02 0.98 1.07
The index values for the Leromain and Orefice (2014) RCA measure are based on the
Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012) structural estimation procedure. Values > 1 indicate
better than average productivity in a given sector relative to the rest of the world.
reductions in bilateral trade frictions that seem to favor certain countries over others across
different sectors.
Nonetheless, it still might conceivably be the case that having comparative advantage
in a particular sector somehow also directly benefits that sector on a bilateral basis relative
to an FTA partner country. I examine this hypothesis by comparing my estimation results
with empirical estimates of “revealed comparative advantage” for the three NAFTA coun-
tries taken from Leromain & Orefice (2014).32 I show these latter estimates in Table 1.4.33
The evidence for this possibility is mixed. To illustrate, let us focus on the cases I noted
in reviewing the directional results in Table 1.2. For the Food sector, we saw the U.S.
and Canada realizing large market access gains with Mexico not seeming to make any.
Interestingly, the U.S. and Canada do indeed seem to have genuine comparative advantage
over Mexico in Food.34 My results for Wood are contrary however: Mexico clearly does not
have comparative advantage over the U.S. in Wood, as might be suggested based on Table
1.2. The RCA numbers also fail to predict Mexico’s large gains in Metals and Machinery.
Overall, I fail to find robust correspondence between RCA and my directional estimates
in Table 1.2 in seven out of the eight sectors, with Food as the only convincing exception. A
32Leromain & Orefice (2014) adapt their methodology from a structural estimation approach devised by
Costinot, Donaldson, & Komunjer (2012). The main advantage of this method is its consistency with Ricar-
dian theory. As Leromain & Orefice explain, comparative advantage is an ex ante characteristic of a country,
whereas the Balassa formula is based on ex post realizations of trade flows, which may depend on other fac-
tors besides comparative advantage. Costinot, Donaldson, & Komunjer’s procedure corrects this issue by
recovering revealed measures of Ricardian productivity from a structural model.
33An equivalent comparison can be performed using Balassa’s (1965) original methodology for computing
RCA.
34It is important to note that neither of these measures take into account the influence of agricultural policy,
which most likely plays a role in these figures (as well as in my own results for Food). Rather they are inferred
from trade data.
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Figure 1.1: Revealed Comparative Advantage vs. Estimated NAFTA Effects
plot of these RCA estimates directly against my industry-level NAFTA estimates, shown
in Fig. 1.5.1, does reveal a (slight) positive correlation, albeit a noisy one. I conclude that
my findings of discrepancies in bilateral trade gains from NAFTA do not merely reflect
patterns of comparative advantage, though comparative advantage could still have some
meaningful correlation (perhaps via the design of the agreement).
Exchange rate volatility. Another important factor that comes to mind in the case of
NAFTA is the sharp devaluation of the Mexican peso that began in December 1994. How
can NAFTA’s effect be separated from the dramatic change in U.S.-Mexico exchange rate?
Krueger (1999) also considers this question in her own ex post analysis of NAFTA. By
comparing changes in Mexican export shares to U.S. and Canadian markets vs. changes
in its share as exporter to non-NAFTA import markets, she observes that NAFTA did
not significantly promote Mexican exports to the U.S. moreso than it did its exports to
non-NAFTA destinations; she concludes that Mexico’s currency devaluation was the main
contributing cause of the increase in Mexico-U.S. exports during the period.
In my approach, which directly incorporates the reasoning of Krueger (1999), the use of
time-varying exporter- and importer- fixed effects again plays a crucial role. It is undeni-
able that overall Mexican exports grew strongly during the period, likely in no small part
due to the peso. Other countries’ currencies likewise fluctuated in value during the pe-
riod. The time-varying country fixed effects in the specification should be absorbing how
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these fluctations would generally change each country’s disposition toward trade, both as
an importer and as an exporter (and across the different industries for the industry-level
analysis). Even in the presence of these controls, I still find an asymmetry within NAFTA
that favors Mexico.
Trade in intermediate inputs. Even at the industry-level, the data used in this study does
not provide substantial information regarding trade in “intermediate inputs” versus trade
in “final output”. Given the well-known production-sharing arrangements between the
U.S. and Mexico (and Canada for that matter) across certain industries (automobiles for
instance), it is important to consider how the segmentation of production is accounted for
by the model.
Structural gravity frameworks which incorporate trade in intermediates, beginning
with Eaton & Kortum (2002),35 can be used to account for how different types of trade
may analyzed together based on aggregated data. The structure of these models (which
is embedded in the empirical design described above) dictates that cheaper access to in-
termediate inputs, regardless of their origin, should generally lower production costs for
importing firms and therefore promote more exports to all destinations, not just the origi-
nal supplier of their inputs.
Admittedly, however, firm-to-firm relationships in reality may not always adhere to
the structure imposed on aggregated trade flows by current modeling approaches. Firms
who operate within well-defined bilateral production-sharing relationships could conceiv-
ably benefit from liberalization of imported inputs moreso than other firms who serve as
general export platforms.
Under this alternative perspective, reducing tariffs on imports of intermediates from
an original supplier could (seemingly paradoxically) show up in the data as promoting
a country’s exports back to the original supplier moreso than imports from that supplier.
This logic would follow because the goods being returned to the original supplier of inter-
mediates are presumably higher in the value chain and therefore represent a larger nomi-
nal quantity of trade in the data. Further consideration of this interesting possibility using
35For more recent examples of structural gravity models with trade in intermediates, see Redding & Ven-
ables (2004), Shikher (2012b), Caliendo & Parro (2015), and Costinot & Rodrı´guez-Clare (2014).
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Table 1.5: Tariffs, before and after NAFTA
Exporter Importer Food Textiles Wood Paper Chemicals Minerals Metals Machinery Aggregate
A. 1989-1991 Import Tariffs (ad valorem, Effectively Applied)
Canada Mexico∗ 10.02 15.29 14.95 5.17 10.09 13.72 7.14 14.08 9.62
Canada U.S. 2.40 7.52 1.11 0.28 3.79 1.56 1.93 0.38 0.96
Mexico Canada 5.32 13.67 13.18 3.14 6.39 3.32 0.71 4.14 3.88
Mexico U.S. 6.20 13.16 4.05 3.57 5.07 5.83 3.38 3.81 4.31
U.S. Canada 5.24 16.5 6.98 3.19 7.50 6.44 4.31 5.40 5.55
U.S. Mexico∗ 10.81 16.98 14.91 6.46 10.13 14.44 10.03 13.99 11.74
B. 1999 Import Tariffs (ad valorem, Effectively Applied)
Canada Mexico 27.47 8.05 4.80 4.43 5.06 3.44 3.97 3.54 5.87
Canada U.S. 2.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51
Mexico Canada 11.78 5.82 0.10 0.27 0.48 0.23 1.37 0.33 4.03
Mexico U.S. 3.41 1.08 0.01 0.00 0.31 1.43 1.01 0.14 0.34
U.S. Canada 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51
U.S. Mexico 20.19 4.22 3.98 5.03 4.77 3.76 4.41 2.93 4.47
Weighted average tariffs computed by World Bank WITS software using UNCTAD TRAINS tariff database.
∗Mexican tariffs only available for 1991 in Panel A. All other Panel A tariffs from 1989.
more disaggregated data is reserved for future work.
1.5.2 Tariffs Before and After NAFTA
A standard expectation is that asymmetries in NAFTA’s effects on trade barriers should
broadly reflect the underlying patterns of tariff liberalization associated with NAFTA.
In Table 1.5, I show representative ad valorem “effectively applied” tariff levels for each
country pair from before and after NAFTA, using data from the UNCTAD TRAINS tariff
database, accessed using the World Bank WITS interface. These tariff changes are shown
both at the industry-level and for aggregate trade. For pre-NAFTA tariffs (Panel A), all
values shown are from the year 1989, with the exception of Canadian exports to Mex-
ico, which use 1991 tariffs because of missing data for 1989. The “after NAFTA” tariffs
(Panel B) are all from 1999. While it is not appropriate to use raw tariff changes to com-
pare implications for trade across sectors—because different sectors have different trade
elasticities—within a given sector, one might expect larger tariff changes to correspond
with larger trade increases.
The first point to document concerns the aggregate tariff levels in the right-most col-
umn of Table 1.5. Based on these tariffs, we would have expected, if anything, trade barri-
ers to fall the most for Mexico’s import markets, since Mexico had by far the highest tariffs
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to start with and also reduced its tariffs by the largest amount amount overall.36 Clearly,
however, this expectation is not borne out in my estimates.
Turning to the industry-level tariffs, one can find some cases where tariffs line up more
closely with the estimates reported above. In the Wood sector, for example, the U.S. only
had a 1.11% tariff on Canadian Wood products before NAFTA—whereas Mexico’s was
14.95%—and indeed Canada’s Wood exports to Mexico increased by more than its exports
to the U.S. did. The Wood example is by no means representative, however. Most interest-
ingly, in the Food sector, In the Food sector, for instance, the incidence of Mexican import
tariffs actually increased in the post-NAFTA period,37 yet these increases have failed to de-
ter the flow of Food imports into Mexico overall. A close reading of the tariffs in other
sectors helps explain some of the overall discrepancies at the aggregate level.
Indeed, generally speaking, there is major variation in the effects of NAFTA that cannot
be explained based on tariffs. In the Metals sector, for instance, we cannot however ratio-
nalize Mexico’s large gains in market access as an exporter of Metals (βN,MetalsMEX,CAN = 1.674
in Table 1.2) based on tariffs alone. There is no likewise no clear reason to be gleaned
from Table 1.5 why the magnitudes for NAFTA’s effects on Textile trade would be as large
as they are, or why Canada’s import markets for Minerals seemed to open up more than
Mexico’s did. As noted above, competing interpretations exist for these results exist that
cannot be ruled out completely. If we take structural gravity seriously, however, we are
left with one conclusion: free trade agreements can influence trade along other channels
besides tariff liberalization and the majority of the variation in directional NAFTA effects
I observe would seem to be occurring along these “other” channels.38
36This second point is less obvious, since Mexico has the largest tariffs in both panels of Table 1.5. But since
these are AVE tariffs, a reduction from 11.74 to 4.47, for example, should be considered larger than a reduction
from 4.31 to 0.34 (in the case of U.S.-Mexico trade).
37As documented in Carlberg & Rude (2004), Mexico actually raised tariffs on meat products significantly
just before the signing of NAFTA. If anything this should have downward-biased the estimates for Mexican
Food imports in Table 1.2. Effective increases in tariff incidence can also occur when newly traded products
appear in the data post-NAFTA along the highest tariff lines. Krueger (1999) also notes these phenomena in
the NAFTA tariff data.
38Powers (2007) explicitly tests (and generally confirms) the hypothesis that FTAs may have additional
positive effects on trade beyond their underlying tariff reductions.
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1.5.3 Broader Implications
An interesting puzzle remains: what might be the sources of this directional variation in
NAFTA effects we are seeing in the data? Generally, when we find impediments to trade
other than tariffs that could still be influenced by policy, we invoke the term “non-tariff
barriers”, but what is the nature of these barriers?
Data on quantifiable non-tariff measures does exist and can potentially be applied us-
ing estimated tariff equivalents; Shikher (2012a) demonstrates how this data can be ap-
plied in the case of NAFTA specifically. However, again, this additional data still supports
the general conclusion that Mexico should have experienced the largest trade barrier re-
duction of the three NAFTA countries. To reconcile these discrepancies, I argue that it is
necessary to appreciate that what we consider “trade costs” in the empirical trade litera-
ture is actually a very expansive category with a large, difficult-to-quantify “conceptual”
dimension. As a second recent paper by Head & Mayer (2013) has documented, trade costs
in depend majorly on abstract concepts such as information asymmetries, cultural biases,
lack of common legal institutions, and general difficulties forming cross-border business
relationships.
Indeed, this latter potential source of non-tariff barriers to trade (institutional and cul-
tural frictions) has been known at least since Deardorff & Stern (1985) to be “especially
difficult to measure”. Using ex post analysis of the effects of FTAs that share particu-
lar provisions may offer a promising opportunity for making informed statements about
this hard-to-measure component of non-tariff barriers.39 Several recent findings suggest
these institutional frictions weigh particularly on exports from less-developed countries.
Levchenko (2007) shows that countries with weak legal institutions tend to specialize in
exporting goods which are less dependent on strong contract enforcement. Manova (2013)
demonstrates a similar result for countries with weak financial institutions. Waugh (2010)
also notes that less-developed nations generally face higher trade costs as exporters than
developed nations.
39Recent work by Egger, Francois, Manchin, & Nelson (2014) and Felbermayr, Heid, Larch, & Yalcin (2014)
has made progress in exactly this direction. Relative to these new approaches, what my findings for NAFTA
suggest is that we should also consider how the same sets of provisions may have different effects on non-tariff
barriers for different countries.
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Drawing on these findings, and motivated by my own findings for NAFTA’s effect on
U.S./Mexico trade, a plausible hypothesis to test in this context then is that countries with
less-developed institutions (in this example, Mexico) may benefit relatively more as ex-
porters, on a bilateral basis, when they sign FTAs with highly developed nations (such as
the U.S.). To briefly explore this hypothesis, I estimate an additional specification for ag-
gregate trade flows along the lines of (5), only with an added interaction term between the
FTAij,t dummy and the difference in (log) 1990 GDP/capita for the exporter and importer
countries.40 The results of this basic test are shown in Table 1.6, column 1.
Table 1.6: FTA Effects for Developed/Less Developed Pairs
Average FTA Effects on Aggregate Trade (PPML)
FTA dummy 0.412 0.766
(0.069)** (0.048)**
FTA dummy * (ln yi − ln yj) -0.103 -0.199
(0.018)** (0.027)**
FTA dummy * (ln τi − ln τj) 2.051 -0.543
(0.632)** (0.442)
N obs. 11,765 5,887 5,887
Fixed Effects (i, t); (j, t); (~i, j)
Standard Errors robust; clustered by pair
yi: exp. GDP/capita; yj: imp. GDP/capita
τi, τj: “1+ tari f f ” for exp. and imp. respectively.
+ p < 0.10 , * p < .05 , ** p < .01 .
Strikingly, the results for all FTAs in my sample are very much consistent with my re-
sults for NAFTA. The negative and (strongly) significant coefficient on the interaction term
confirms that FTAs between developed/less-developed pairs tend to favor exports more
for less-developed partners. Furthermore, it is notable that this result again contradicts
what we would expect based on the logic of tariffs, since the degree of tariff protection is
known to vary inversely with the degree of development.
Drawing on this interesting contradiction, Column 2 then explicitly considers how the
difference in initial tariffs between FTA partners may lead to asymmetric effects within
agreements.41 Intriguingly, I find that the FTA partner with the higher tariff actually gains
40GDP/capita data is taken from the CEPII “gravity” dataset made available in conjunction with Head &
Mayer (2014).
41Again, I use “effectively applied” tariffs from the TRAINS database. Unfortunately, the tariff data is only
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more access to the import market of the country with the lower tariff than vice versa. This
finding in isolation is puzzling. Again, however, controlling for differences in develop-
ment provides an important clue. In column 3, the significance of the tariff interaction term
disappears when I re-introduce the interaction between the FTAij,t dummy and the differ-
ence in GDP/capita. Furthermore, this latter variable remains significant at the p < .01
level. Collectively, these results suggest very general forces at work when less-developed
countries partner with developed economies that tend to confound expectations based on
tariffs.
This basic analysis obviously could be extended to explore richer interactions between
institutional indicators and specific features of FTAs (how Investor Settlement Dispute
mechanisms may affect the enforcement of contracts, for example). My intent here though
is to document some suggestive evidence for why the effects I observe in NAFTA differ
from expectations based on quantifiable policy measures; sharper characterizations of how
FTAs interact with institutions to produce asymmetric effects are reserved for future work.
I also wish to explore how important accounting for directional asymmetries in FTA
effects may be for quantifying the welfare gains from trade integration. In general, the
models we use to simulate the general equilibrium effects of trade policy shocks are so-
phisticated enough to give us very detailed answers regarding what effect a given shock
will have throughout the broader economy. Caliendo & Parro (2015) for instance combine
notions of comparative advantage, inter-firm trade, input utilization differences across sec-
tors, and non-traded goods within a structural general equilibrium gravity model to con-
struct a very comprehensive, yet very coherent, picture of the different channels by which
trade liberalization can affect welfare in a static setting. Taking things a step further, com-
putational general equilibrium (CGE) models, such as the ones used by both Fontagne´,
Gourdon, & Jean (2013) and Egger, Francois, Manchin, & Nelson (2014) to forecast the ef-
fects of TTIP, are widely regarded for their deep complexity and ability to analyze a wide
range of outcome vectors in general equilibrium.
However, as I will try to make as clear in my welfare analysis that follows, the results
these richly-featured general equilibrium models can produce will tend to be significantly
available for 29 countries, hence the decline in the number of observations.
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constrained by how one models the underlying trade shock, i.e. what initially happens to
trade costs to set off the endogenous responses implied by the model. Caliendo & Parro
(2015) for instance use tariff changes to simulate NAFTA’s effects. Fontagne´, Gourdon,
& Jean (2013) acknowledge that tariffs are likely to be a small component of TTIP’s trade
gains, but mainly deal with non-tariff barriers by assuming an across-the-board 25% re-
duction. Egger, Francois, Manchin, & Nelson (2014) and Felbermayr, Heid, Larch, & Yalcin
(2014) each draw inferences for non-tariff barrier reductions from U.S./E.U. past experi-
ence from signing FTAs, but this approach again implies uniform effects on such barriers
across partner countries. As the following section demonstrates, better accounting for
these asymmetries in FTA effects can be important for how we project and assign the wel-
fare benefits from FTA formation.
1.6 Welfare Analysis
In this section, I illustrate that these large directional differences in direct FTA effects in
turn can also have important implications for general equilibrium welfare analysis of FTA
formation. The simulation structure I use here is the same as in Anderson & Yotov (2012),
where welfare effects occur strictly through changes in buyer and producer prices and ac-
cordingly may be thought of as “terms of trade effects”. This particular simulation method
is especially suitable for demonstration purposes here for two main reasons: (i) because
the impact of trade agreements on domestic producers specifically is often a key issue in
trade policy debates, and (ii) because the first-order price effects it identifies would hold
important implications for the additional welfare channels addressed in other quantitative
models.
1.6.1 Model
I start by specifying a multi-sector Armington (1969) trade model where all products are
differentiated based on the country of origin. Each industry in each country possesses an
endowment of a differentiated good qki , which it sells to the world at factory gate price
p∗ki . Consumers have common CES preferences over the set of nationally-differentiated
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varieties within each industry, with elasticity parameter σk. It follows that nominal exports
from i to j of goods of type k can be written as
Xkij =
(
βki p
∗k
i t
k
ij
Pkj
)1−σk
· Ekj , (8)
with tkij the standard “iceberg cost” of transporting goods of type k from i to j and P
k
j ≡
∑i(βki p
∗k
i t
k
ij)
1−σk the CES price index for buyers in j. βki is the standard “Armington” de-
mand shifter for products from a certain origin.42
It is straightforward to re-write the CES Demand function in (8) in the form of a struc-
tural gravity equation as in (1) by adjusting the notation. Let φkij ≡ (tkij)1−σ
k
serve as the
parameter measuring of bilateral market access and letΦkj ≡ (Pkj )1−σ
k
. It follows then from
an accounting identity that (βki p
∗k
i )
1−σk = Yki /Ω
k
i , as in (1), with Ωi still defined as in (3) as
a measure of access to world markets for sellers in i.43 The structural interpretation for Φkj
in (2) likewise follows from the same accounting identity.
Furthermore, using the fact (βki p
∗k
i )
1−σk = Yki /Ω
k
i —with Y
k
i = p
k
i q
k
i —enables me to
write:
βk
1−σk
i p
∗k1−σk
i =
p∗ki q
k
i
Ωki
=⇒ p∗ki =
(
βki
) 1−σk
σk
(
qki
)− 1
σk
(
Ωki
) 1
σk
=⇒ p∗ki = β˜ki
(
Ωki
) 1
σk , (9)
where β˜ki = (β
k
i )
1−σk/σk(qki )
−1/σk is a combined parameter describing how prices reflect the
quantity and quality of i’s endowment in industry k, varying negatively with the size of
its overall supply, qki , but positively with its embedded demand shifter, (β
k
i )
1−σk .
Note that, by the duality betweenΦkj and the buyer price index, and by the dependence
of wages onΩki in (9), we have the following intuitive relationships between price changes
42βki is typically interpreted as (an inverse measure of) the “embedded quality” of i’s production technology
for products of type k.
43Specifically, if Yi = ∑Xij = Si
(
∑j φijEj/Φj
)
, then Si = Yi/Ωi follows directly.
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and access to world markets:
∆ ln p∗ki =
1
σk
∆ lnΩki ∆ ln P
k
j =
1
1− σk∆ lnΦ
k
j
That is, sellers face higher aggregate demand for their products when they are more able
to reach world markets (higher Ωki ) and, by σ
k > 1, buyers likewise enjoy lower prices
when there is more competition in their import markets (higher Φkj ). Regarded separately,
these two effects allow for a simple decomposition of how trade integration affects buyers
vs. producers in each economy. Regarded together, the combined effect provides a useful
notion of the “terms of trade” effects from liberalization.
Adapting Anderson & Yotov’s method, I generate a solvable R-by-K system of equa-
tions for factory gate prices {p∗ki } by summing (8) over j and dividing by world output.
The resulting expression is
Yki
Yk
=∑
j
(
βki p
k
i
)1−σk
φkij
Φkj
·
Ekj
Yk
, (10)
where Yki , E
k
j , Y
k, and Φkj are each themselves functions of prices. To close the model, I
assume that each country’s expenditure on manufacturing goods is a constant share δj of
its total manufacturing income ∑k Yki and that buyers in each country allocate expenditure
across sectors according to a Cobb-Douglas function with common share parameters {αk}.
To simulate general equilibrium FTA effects within this structure, I impose the normal-
ization that all initial seller prices p∗ki are equal to one, such that all endowments
{
qki
}
are
given by initial 1990 output levels; that is, qki = Y
k
i,1990. By then introducing a new system of
φkij’s reflecting NAFTA, I can recover changes in buyer and producer prices, terms of trade,
and welfare using the linkages implied by the structural model.44 Specifically, I solve (10)
44For the initial φkij’s, I follow Anderson & Yotov (2012) in using the pair fixed effects from gravity estimation
(ηkij’s). Specifically, I use the η
k
ij’s recovered from estimating equation (7).
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for {p∗ki } subject to the following:
Yki
Yk
=
p∗ki q
k
i
∑k pki q
k
i
(11)
Ekj
Yk
=
δj ∑k p∗ki q
k
i
∑j δj ∑k pkj q
k
j
(12)
Φkj =∑
j
(
βki p
∗k
i
)1−σk
φkij. (13)
In practice, I solve (10)-(13) twice: once with 1990 trade costs and all p∗ki = 1 in order
to recover initial values the combined {(βki )1−σ
k} terms, and then again for new wages
using new post-NAFTA φkij’s. In addition, I take values for elasticity parameters {σk} from
data compiled by Broda, Greenfield, & Weinstein (2006). I also construct expenditure share
parameters {δj} and {αk} from 1990 trade and output data.45
Finally, I construct aggregate measures for changes in buyer prices, seller prices, and
welfare in each country i. Aggregate buyer prices in i (“Pi”) are simply a function of
aggregate access to world markets in each individual industry, aggregated by expenditure
shares. That is, Pi ≡ ∏k(Φki )α
k/1−σk . Country i’s welfare, Wi ≡ P−1i ∑k p∗ki qki , is then
directly analogous to its real income. Intuitively, national welfare increases with seller
prices (as the price of one’s own endowments increases) and decreases with buyer prices
(as access to other countries’ endowments improves). To compute aggregate changes in
national supplier prices (“pi”), I simply compare ∑k qki with ∑k p
∗k
i q
k
i .
46 The overall change
in welfare can thus be neatly decomposed into buyer- and seller-side effects on domestic
prices: ∆ ln Wi = ∆ ln pi − ∆ ln Pi.
1.6.2 NAFTA’s Terms of Trade Effects
The first three panels of Table 1.7 then show the simulation results for the effects of NAFTA
on price indices and welfare for each of the three specifications shown in Tables 1.1 and
1.2 for each NAFTA country and for an aggregate non-NAFTA group. All changes shown
45Note that all αk terms cancel out of (12). However these terms will still be needed for constructing aggre-
gate buyer prices and welfare.
46Note that one last normalization is needed when we endogenize Y and E because the system in (10) is
homogeneous of degree zero. So I impose ∑i pki q
k
i = Y
k
1990 both pre- and post-NAFTA, such that total nominal
production in each sector stays the same over time.
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Table 1.7: Initial Terms of Trade Effects (NAFTA only)
A. Average FTA effect B. Average NAFTA effect
%∆Supplier Prices %∆Buyer Prices %∆Welfare %∆Supplier Prices %∆Buyer Prices %∆Welfare
Canada 1.54 -0.69 2.24 2.08 -1.30 3.42
Mexico 3.15 -1.96 5.21 3.86 -3.87 8.04
U.S. 0.08 -0.15 0.23 0.12 -0.22 0.34
ROW -0.10 -0.09 -0.01 -0.14 -0.12 -0.02
C. Directional NAFTA effects D. Using Tariffs
%∆Supplier Prices %∆Buyer Prices %∆Welfare %∆Supplier Prices %∆Buyer Prices %∆Welfare
Canada 1.62 -1.09 2.74 -0.64 -1.48 0.85
Mexico 7.47 -4.32 12.32 0.97 -2.56 3.63
U.S. 0.12 -0.21 0.33 0.18 0.08 0.10
ROW -0.15 -0.13 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01
Supplier prices and welfare for the ROW region aggregated by output shares.
Buyer prices for ROW aggregated by expenditure shares.
All changes relative to 1990 price and welfare levels, assuming fixed supply quantities.
are relative to the 1990 baseline year. Price and welfare changes for the non-NAFTA group
are aggregated by expenditure shares. To establish a baseline, I first note the main features
of Panel A, which assumes NAFTA has been no different than any other FTA. Notably,
Mexico and Canada show larger net positive benefits from NAFTA than the U.S. This result
is intuitive because Canada and Mexico are both relatively small countries compared with
the U.S., with Mexico seeing the largest gains because it is the smallest of the three. The
Rest of the World, which is also very large, only suffers very mildly from trade diversion.
When I allow for NAFTA to have its own distinct effect on trade costs however (Panel
B), we see favorable differences for both buyers and sellers in all three NAFTA countries,
with each country realizing roughly 50% larger implied gains than in the baseline case.
These results not only re-affirm the message of Panel B in Table 1.1—that NAFTA has been
significantly more effective than the average FTA in promoting trade—but also quantify
that message in terms of real income effects. What this approach reveals is that using the
simplifying assumption of a single average FTA effect across all agreements can greatly
distort the true welfare gains from trade liberalization for individual countries, even large
ones. NAFTA, of course, is just one example; focusing on other agreements instead would
likely reveal further large differences, both positive and negative.
Panel C displays price and welfare results implied by the asymmetric NAFTA effects
from Table 1.2. Noting that Mexico had the largest gains in both exports and imports in
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Table 1.3, it is unsurprising that the differences in welfare changes between Panels B and
C heavily favor Mexico, and that these gains are especially large for Mexican sellers in
particular. Clearly, Mexico has benefited the most from NAFTA out of the three countries.
It is also reasonable that these gains have come largely at the expense of Canada, who
has had the smallest overall increase in market integration from NAFTA, again going by
columns 5 and 6 of Table 1.3.
Outcomes for the U.S. and the Rest of the World, however, are much less sensitive to
these asymmetries. In part, this lack of an effect is simply due to the fact that the U.S. and
ROW are both very big regions. But given the politicization of NAFTA as a supposed “one
way” trade deal, the lack of an apparent difference across Panels B and C for either U.S.
buyers and U.S. sellers overall is notable. Clearly, as one can infer from Table 1.2, asym-
metries within NAFTA work in favor of U.S. seller prices in some industries (e.g. Food,
Paper, Chemicals), but fall for others (e.g. Textiles, Wood, Metals). That the differences in
the overall price indices turn out to be negligible reflects the observation made in Section
1.4.2 that analyzing asymmetries at the aggregate level understates the heterogeneity in
FTA effects that occurs across different industries.
The more interesting comparison, though, is with what would have been expected to
happen based on tariff changes. The last panel of Table 1.7 shows the counterfactual for
prices and welfare if changes in trade costs were driven solely by the tariff changes shown
in Table 1.5.
As we can see, estimating welfare effects based on tariff changes not only greatly un-
derestimates the the magnitudes of the overall gains from NAFTA for all three countries, it
also tends to mischaracterizes the composition of each country’s gains. As Panel D shows,
estimates based on tariffs alone would suggest U.S. producers benefited from NAFTA at
the expense of producers in the other two countries, as well as at the expense of U.S. buy-
ers. Based on Table 1.5, the reason for the large difference in the results between Panel
D and the other three panels (particularly Panels B and C) is straightforward: projections
based on tariffs alone would suggest that, contrary to the econometric estimates, the U.S.
sellers should have gained a relatively large increase in access to the other two NAFTA
markets (not just Mexico’s import market, but Canada’s as well).
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Thus, welfare benefits from NAFTA, and the attribution of those benefits, unsurpris-
ingly turn out to be very sensitive to the underlying trade cost changes used to estimate
them. The asymmetries I have identified in NAFTA’s effects have generally favored Mex-
ico’s terms of trade at the expense of Canada’s, while not necessarily having much of an
affect (on average) on either buyers or sellers in the U.S. A particularly dramatic difference
can be seen between the price and welfare effects implied by the tariff changes associated
with NAFTA versus those implied by ex post estimates. It follows that tariffs may do a
poor job of predicting how FTAs shape the gains from trade and that more work should
be done understanding other means by which FTAs can affect trade.
1.7 Closing Remarks
The question of how much free trade agreements actually increase trade between countries
remains an important, actively studied topic in the trade literature. While most empirical
work has focused on identifying how different types of agreements affect trade on aver-
age, my refined approach makes it plain that some FTAs increase trade more than others
and furthermore that the effects of FTAs are not necessarily symmetric between partners
within a particular sector. Accounting for NAFTA’s particular effects on trade in a general
equilibrium simulation setting reveals quantifiably large implications for welfare: ignoring
these variations both understates the overall gains from trade and also misses important
differences in the incidence of price effects for buyers vs. sellers in each country.
A particularly notable empirical finding is that the patterns of market liberalization I
identify within NAFTA do not correspond with what would have been expected to hap-
pen based on tariffs. This finding turns out to be quite general; differences in the level
of development between partner countries have played an important, overlooked role in
determining asymmetric effects within FTAs. It is not surprising then that basing welfare
predictions on tariff reductions seems to fundamentally mischaracterize NAFTA’s first-
order effects on prices. In particular, I show that US sellers did not realize the benefits that
would be predicted based on tariffs; these predicted benefits for the U.S. instead accrued
(and then some) to U.S. buyers.
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I envision there being significant potential for future work both expanding on the ap-
proach I have pursued in this chapter and examining the reasons for the differences I
obtain. My findings for trade within NAFTA motivate a larger-scale project geared to-
wards characterizing how FTAs with particular provisions tend to affect trade differently
for countries with different observable characteristics. For example, further work may
consider how FTAs with strong investment provisions may affect trade barriers differently
depending on differences in the level of financial development across member countries.
It is also worth knowing whether some countries simply tend to gain more market access
as a result of FTAs than others, all else equal. These unsettled issues aside, the main mes-
sages that this chapter intends to communicate are: (i) directional heterogeneity in FTA
effects may differ substantially from what we might expect based on tariffs alone; and
(ii) accounting for heterogeneity in FTA effects, especially directional heterogeneity within
FTAs, can have important implications for how we quantify the gains from trade.
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Part 2
Finding the Influence of Communication on
Trade
2.1 Introduction
How much weight should we place on the ability to communicate in a common language
as a pre-requisite for economic exchange? Common sense says “a lot”, yet, by and large,
empirical studies of the determinants of international trade have traditionally failed to
assign much importance to the sharing of common languages. As summarized in Egger
& Lassmann (2012), traditional gravity estimates have generally found that not having
a shared official language in common can explain about 12% of existing trade frictions
between countries.47
More recent work, epitomized by contributions from Melitz (2008) and Melitz & Toubal
(2014, henceforth “Melitz & Toubal”) has explored how introducing more specific data
on common spoken languages might reveal a more important role for communication.
Melitz (2008), for example, augments the traditional specification of language effects—
usually a single dummy variable for the sharing of a “common official languge”—with
a continuous measure of the combined size of shared native language populations across
countries. Melitz & Toubal take this approach one step further by adding further continous
measures for communication in all spoken languages (including non-native languages) as
well as for linguistic similarities across non-shared languages. Both studies succeed in
finding substantially larger roles for language communication in promoting trade than
has been typically estimated using the traditional dummy variable approach.
Nonetheless, other findings in the related literature have given reason to call the in-
terpretation of these findings into question. In another recent paper, Egger & Lassmann
47As explained in Section 5, this calculation assumes that the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs
equals−4. Egger & Lassmann (2012) specifically find that the partial elasticity of trade with respect to sharing
a common lanuage is usually measured to be about 0.44.
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(2013) conclude that longstanding cultural frictions between different historical language
groups in Switzerland can explain a large portion of the observed effect of language shar-
ing on Switzerland’s choice of trade partners. In addition, Ginsburgh, Melitz, & Toubal
(2014) offer evidence that it may be exposure to trade that spurs language acquisition,
rather than the other way around. Other recent findings in the more general literature on
shared culture and trade—see, for example, Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales (2009) and Fel-
bermayr & Toubal (2010)—find that sharing a common language maintains its significance
in presence of controls for cultural biases in some cases, but not in others.
In light of this ambiguity, this chapter seeks to lay out some basic experiments meant
to clarify the relationship between language communication and trade using the grav-
ity model. Using data on trade and language sharing between 40 countries, I examine
whether estimates of language effects generally behave in a way consistent with the idea
that sharing a common language directly promotes trade through improved communica-
tion channels. In the case of manufacturing trade, I find evidence that shared language ties
do indeed promote trade by facilitating communication. For services trade, however, the
evidence is mixed.
These distinctions may matter significantly for the future of trade. Survey results ob-
tained by the European Commission show that multilingualism in Europe is increasingly
found in, and valued by, younger cohorts in their 20s and 30s relative to the general popu-
lation.48 As these younger generations come of age, the potential improvement in spoken
language communication across countries could affect trade in ways quantifiably similar
to changes in trade policy. Indeed, to the extent a country may choose its language edu-
cation policies strategically, acquiring languages spoken in other countries may actually
be a relatively unique form of trade policy, in that one country may essentially be able to
opt for freer trade without the consent of the other (unlike with, for instance, the bilateral
process usually needed to mutually lower tariffs).
To explore the policy implications of language acquisition, I consider the question of
how language affects the growth of global trade in general equilibrium. This general equi-
48This finding comes from a special edition of Eurobarometer called “Europeans and their Languages”, pub-
lished in 2006. This edition of Eurobarometer is also a primary source for data on spoken language knowledge,
as discussed below.
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librium perspective grants me the opportunity to confirm a natural hypothesis that other
empirical studies have not quite managed to find evidence for, that English is by far the
language that seems to promote trade the most of any other language. Interestingly, I also
find evidence that the ranking of other world languages in this context—and of Chinese in
particular—might be greatly influenced by the presence of other, non-language barriers to
trade having to do with geography and history.
In the remainder of this section, I describe the two main exercises performed in this
chapter in more detail. I start by developing my empirical strategy; I then turn to summa-
rizing my findings from the related simulations.
Three hypotheses to test. If we take seriously the idea that sharing common languages
promotes trade through the facilitation of communication, there are some natural patterns
we should expect to observe in the data. Specifically, I test—and find evidence for—the
following three hypotheses regarding how estimates of different combinations of lanugage
variables should behave, and under what circumstances.
1. The measured importance of native language ties should increase in the presence of foreign
language ties. A key focus of this chapter is how the presence or absence of shared foreign
language communication as an additional language regressor fundamentally changes how
we should interpret standard variables for measuring common language ties.
Consider, for the sake of illustration, the typical single “common official language”
dummy often used in gravity estimation to proxy for the trade-facilitating effects of com-
munication. The standard interpretation of this variable is that it captures the difference
between pairs of countries that are able to communicate in native languages versus those
that are not. But what does it really mean in this context to not share a common native
lanuguage? In the absence of a control for shared non-native languages, it may not neces-
sarily mean that much; surely, it is not the case that native English speakers in Australia
find it significantly more difficult to understand the English spoken in highly multilingual
societies like Denmark or the Netherlands.
When additional controls for the possibility of non-native language communication are
present, however, the original dummy representing shared native language communica-
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tion suddenly takes on a more concrete interpretation. In this case, the original native
language dummy now captures the difference between being able to communicate in na-
tive languages and not being able to communicate at all, in any language. Accordingly, if it
really is the importance of communication that drives the observed relationship between
shared language ties and trade, it is natural to expect that adding foreign language ties to
the specification should result in the following: (i) the variable representing foreign lan-
guage ties itself should be a significant predictor of bilateral trade; (ii) the original variable
representing the sharing of a native language should increase in magnitude.49
My benchmark estimates confirm this basic pattern in the data, using the continuous
measures for native and spoken language introduced in Melitz (2008) and Melitz & Toubal.
The effect of native language communication increases in magnitude in the presence of for-
eign language communication, in accordance with the idea that both variables do indeed
represent the importance of communication. The increase in the magnitude of native lan-
guages is especially pronounced when I allow for the possibility of diminishing returns
to communication in manufacturing trade. The presence of these diminishing returns also
seems to have an intuitive explanation, as I discuss in the context of point 2 below.
2. The degree of communication should be associated with trade in tangible goods versus trade in
services in very different ways. As Timmer (2012) discusses, trade in manufactured goods is
fundamentally different from trade in services in that, among other things, trade in services
often require a much more intimate relationship between the producer in one country
and the end-consumer in another. Put another way, typical service transactions—such
as doctor’s visits, patronizing a hotel or restaurant, or attending a university—are much
more likely to be characterized by one-on-one interactions rather than the firm-to-firm
interactions that typically characterize manufacturing trade.
Indeed, my empirical results suggest several important differences how common lan-
guges affect manufacturing trade vs. services trade. For example, my benchmark esti-
mations show that sharing a common language, native or otherwise, seems to exhibit a
49Obviously, the process of foreign language acquisition itself is likely subject to cultural influences.
Nonetheless, I would argue that, since foreign language ties across countries are much more recently formed
than native language ties, they should be more likely to reflect the direct, practical benefits of benefits of com-
munication. Furthermore, the category “foreign language communication” also includes many cases where
two countries happen to coordinate independently on acquiring the same language (usually English).
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stronger relationship overall with services trade than manufacturing trade. At the same
time, I also find that the effect of shared language communication in the data tends to ex-
hibit “diminishing returns” for manufacturing, but not for services. That is, the marginal
effect of common language ties for manufacturing seems to be large initially, but dimin-
ishing in magnitude as the degree of language ties becomes stronger. For services trade,
however, the relationship between common spoken languages and trade seems to be much
more linear by comparison.
A seemingly intuitive explanation for this latter difference is that manufacturing trade
exhibits what Melitz (2008) calls “translation effects”. In other words, trade in goods might
benefit disproportionately from the presence of relatively small bilingual populations who
can specialize in the intermediation of cross-border relationships. Services trade, by its
own nature, would seem to offer fewer opportunities for specialization and intermedia-
tion.
3. The relationship between shared foreign languages and trade should be robust to concerns about
reverse causality and omitted variable bias. An important issue with the cross-country data on
foreign language knowledge is that it is mainly cross-sectional; thus it is difficult to observe
how trade has evolved over time in response to the acquisition of foreign languages.
Using a set of instruments inspired by the recent literature—linguistic proximity, past
cold war divisions, and shared exposure to the native languages of third countries—I find
mixed evidence for the causal effect of foreign language communication on trade.50 On
the one hand, my IV estimates for manufacturing trade do tend to find significant causal
effects for shared languages; indeed, they actually suggest that estimates that treat foreign
languages as exogenous tend to exhibit a downward bias, rather than an upward bias.
Interestingly, my IV estimates for services do not identify a significant causal effect for
communication. Drawing on the discussion underneath point 2 above, a potential expla-
nation is that, because services trade is more dependent on individual consumer decisions,
it also may be especially sensitive to individual cultural biases, which may be an especially
50Ku & Zussman (2010) use the combined linguistic similarity with English for non-English speaking pairs
as an instrument for English proficiency. Fidrmuc & Fidrmuc (2014) consider an experiment where they esti-
mate language effects only for trade flows that cross between Eastern and Western Europe. Both find signif-
icant causal effects for language proficiency on manufacturing trade. The question of whether causal effects
can be identified for services trade has not been explored.
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important omitted variable for services trade relative to manufacturing trade.
In addition, there is an important corrollary worth noting that follows directly from
the first point emphasized above: the magnitude of the coefficient obtained for native lan-
guage ties should generally move in sympathy with the coefficient obtained for foreign
language ties. If the effect of foreign language communication on trade is downward bi-
ased due to trade, estimates of the native language effect should exhibit that same bias.
My IV estimates for manufacturing do indeed exhibit this same general pattern, as does
the specification with diminishing returns discussed above.
Total Language Effects. A related question that comes up frequently in this literature is,
“which languages promote trade the most?” Or, more narrowly, “does English promote
trade the most of any language?”
A standard approach to answering these questions is to focus on how communication
in English (or in other major European languages) might reduce bilateral trade frictions
moreso than communication in other languages. Melitz (2008), for example, finds some
evidence that native language communication in European languages promotes bilateral
trade more strongly than in non-European languages; Melitz & Toubal, however, find that
the evidence is mixed when non-native language communication is taken into account.51
In contrast to these existing studies, I try to adopt a complementary approach. I start
from the general principle that, in the abstract, the ability to communicate in a common
language should generally reduce trade frictions between two countries in more or less the
same way, regardless of the underlying language. Because the countries of the world differ
both in economic size and in the languages they already speak, motivations for learning
different languages can be divined simply based on which ones offer the largest increases
in overall access to world markets.
To determine these “Total Language Effects”, I examine how increasing the world’s
language knowledge promotes overall openness to trade via reduced trading frictions in
general equilibrium. Unsurprisingly, English is reasonably unchallenged as the language
that promotes trade the most in general equilibrium; this result follows directly from the
51Also see Fidrmuc & Fidrmuc (2014) for a comparison of the effects of different European languages on an
individual basis and Ku & Zussman (2010) for detailed examination of English in particular.
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number and size of the countries that already speak English, natively or otherwise.
What is surprising, however, is the degree to which the ranking of other languages is
conditional on the existence of large non-language trade barriers having to do with the
forces of history and geography (e.g. bilateral distance between countries, the presence of
a former colonial relationship, etc.). In simulations based on my gravity estimates for trade
costs, the other major non-English languages I consider seem to have more or less the same
overall effects on globalization. When I remove all non-language barriers, however, Chi-
nese suddenly figures much more prominently as a competitor to English as a competing
language for promoting world manufacturing trade. It follows that the forces of geogra-
phy and history that have forged trade ties over time have also likely had the effect of
limiting Chinese’s appeal as a global language. Perhaps in the future, as these other barri-
ers fade with time, foreign language learning in non-European languages besides English
may fade in favor of Chinese.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the empirical imple-
mentation of the structural gravity model, which will be applied to esimate trade costs
both for manufacturing trade and for services trade. Section 2.3 describes data sources and
construction methods for trade, language, and other co-variates. In Section 2.4, I present
and discuss the empirical results. Section 2.5 explores Total Language Effects. Section 3.5
then concludes.
2.2 Gravity estimation
The general theoretical gravity model assumes an N country world with costly trade in
differentiated goods and countries that differ in their productive abilities. Exports from
exporting country i to importing j (denoted Xij) can be written simply as
Xij =
S˜i pθi t
θ
ij
Φj
· Ej, (14)
where S˜i is a country-specific productivity parameter, pi is the supply price for producers
in i, and Ej denotes aggregate expenditure in j. The trade elasticity, θ, is assumed to be less
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than−1, such that tθij ∈ (0, 1] is decreasing in the degree of “trade costs”, tij. Φj ≡ ∑i S˜i pθi tθij
then aggregates country j’s ability to access world markets in general as a buyer of goods
(and therefore doubles as a notion of j’s overall price index).52
To make more explict the analogy with Newtonian gravity (such that both country
sizes enter directly), (14) can be re-written as
Xij =
Yi
Ωi
Ej
Φj
tθij, (15)
where Yi = ∑j Xij gives total production by country i across all destinations and Ωi ≡
∑j Ejtθij/Φj, an analogue to Φj, aggregates country i’s access to world markets as a seller of
goods.53 Following Anderson & van Wincoop (2003), the structural terms Ωi and Φj are
commonly referred to as “multilateral resistances”, in that they collectively describe how
trade between any pair of countries is influenced not only by the direct cost of trade with
one another, but also by each country’s ability to access world markets in general.
For estimation purposes, tθij is the clear parameter of interest. When two countries have
stronger shared language ties with one another, all else equal, tθij should be larger, such
that inferred trade costs are effectively smaller.54 The remainder of this section is devoted
to developing the empirical methodology used to test this general hypothesis, as well as
the more specific hypotheses highlighted in the introduction. As explained below, I will
proceed by using Poisson PML estimation as a benchmark and by also then considering
various instrumental variables approaches.
52The generalized presentation of the gravity model used here is adapted from Head & Mayer (2014). Pre-
senting gravity in this way is intended to emphasize that many different theoretical motivations for gravity
converge to this same essential structure. For example, in Anderson & van Wincoop (2003), “S˜i pθi ” is written
instead as “(βi pi)1−σ”. More generally, the tθij term could be replaced with φij ≡ tθ1ij f θ2ij , in recognition of the
idea that bilateral trade costs can have variable as well as fixed cost components, as in gravity models based
on Melitz (2003).
53This substitution—S˜i pθi = Yi/Ωi—follows directly from the accounting identity Yi = ∑j Xij.
54In this way, I am abstracting from the distinction between “intensive” and “extensive” margins of trade
emphasized in Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein (2008). The two empirical approaches are equivalent provided
that the (Pareto) distribution of firm productivities is unbounded, as in Chaney (2008).
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2.2.1 Implementing gravity
As is standard in the gravity literature, I assume that the trade cost term tθij can be specified
as an exponential function of a set of covariates of interest. Let dij denote a typical set
of controls for geographical, historical, and/or cultural influences on trade costs and let
LANGij be a vector of language-specific variables. To anticipate concerns regarding bias
due to endogeneity, as well as due to other estimation issues, I also assume the presence of
a (multiplicative) error term, ωij, which follows an unknown distribution and may or may
not contain omitted regressors correlated with LANGij.
The trade cost term tθij can thus be parameterized as
tθij = exp
(
dijβ+ δLANGij
) ·ωij, (16)
where the exact contents of dij and LANGij will be specified shortly. To fix ideas, consider
that geographic distance between pairs (which is exogenous) is an important component
of dij and that communication in learned foreign languages (which may or may not be
endogenous) is an important component of LANGij.
Combining (14) and (16), and also introducing exporter- and importer- fixed effects
terms, yields the following estimating equation for trade as a function of dij and LANGij:
Xij = exp
(
FEi + FEj + dijβ+ δLANGij
) ·ωij, (17)
which can also be expressed as
Xij = exp
(
FEi + FEj + dijβ+ δLANGij
)
+ νij (18)
under the (more common) assumption of an “additive” error term νij ≡ (ωij− 1) · exp(FEi +
FEj + dijβ+ δLANGij). In either presentation, note that the fixed effects terms FEi and FEj
effectively absorb all influences on trade not directly related to bilateral trade costs in (14)
(and likewise in (15)). Therefore, the correct interpretation of δ—noting that FEi and FEj
both depend endogenously on tθij—is as the partial effect of LANGij on Xij, via its direct
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effect on tθij.
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Suppose for now that LANGij can be treated as exogenous. Consistent estimation of δ
(and β for that matter) can still depend non-trivially on the behavior of the error term νij.
As Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) point out, if there is heteroskedasticity in the data, a
log-linearized OLS estimation equation based on (17) will only give consistent parameter
estimates under certain restrictions on the distribution of the error. Specifically, OLS is
only consistent if the variance of νij is proportional to the square of the conditional mean.
Put another way, just because E(ω|x) = 1 does not necessarily imply that E(lnω|x) = 0.
As an alternative to OLS, Santos Silva and Tenreyro recommend the use of Poisson
Pseudo-maximum Likelihood (or “PPML”) for obtaining gravity estimates.56 The idea be-
hind PPML is to estimate the nonlinear expression in (18) directly, under the assumption
that the variance of νij is directly proportional to the conditional mean, rather than to its
square. Because PPML is a nonlinear estimator, it will produce consistent estimates even
if this assumption is not met. Furthermore, Santos Silva and Tenreyro show that PPML is
relatively robust to small-sample bias when the distribution of the error term is misspeci-
fied, as well as when the dependent variable features systematic rounding errors (such as
those found in trade data).57 Accordingly, I follow their recommendations in using PPML
to obtain benchmark estimates.
Of course, the adoption of PPML does not fully address concerns related to consistency
when one or more of the regressors is endogenous. In the discussion that follows, I develop
an instrumental variables strategy that should obtain consistent estimates of the nonlinear
gravity model in the presence of endogenous regressors. Later in the paper, I also take
the opportunity to compare my benchmark PPML estimates with those that would be
obtained using OLS, in addition to those that would follow from both linear and nonlinear
instrumental variables approaches.
55In order to obtain the full effect of LANGij on trade in a given pair, it is necessary to re-constitute its
influence on the whole system of pi, Ej, and Φj terms using the structural model. Section 5 adds discussion
on these general equilibrium linkages.
56Further arguments in favor of PPML have been put forward in recent years by Santos Silva & Tenreyro
(2011), Fally (2014), and Egger & Staub (2014). Head & Mayer (2014) offer a dissenting view.
57Another motivation that is often given for using PPML is the prevalance of “zeros” in the trade data,
especially for trade data featuring many small countries or highly disaggregated industry-level flows. While
the services trade data I use does feature some zeros (roughly 1.2% of the observations), the manufacturing
trade data does not feature any.
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2.2.2 IV estimation
To simplify discussion of the potential endogeneity to trade of shared non-native lan-
guages, I will treat all such potential endogeneity as occurring due to an “omitted vari-
able” problem. Obviously, the possibility of “reverse causality” is one logical reason why
estimates of δ in (18) may be biased. Indeed, a recent paper by Ginsburgh, Melitz, & Toubal
(2014) finds that trade may have an important causal effect on language learning. Put in
terms of omitted variables, there may exist unaccounted-for historical and/or cultural de-
terminants of trade relationships which have promoted foreign language acquisition in the
past through increased exposure to trade. Since these unmodeled determinants of trade
appear in the error term, positive association between ωij and LANGij would cause bench-
mark estimates of δ to exhibit an upward bias.
On the other hand, if foreign language does indeed have its own independent causal
effect on trade, it could conceivably be the case that LANGij might be negatively corre-
lated with the error term; in which case, benchmark estimates of δ would actually exhibit
a downward bias. That is to say, countries that face higher omitted trade barriers may be
more likely to invest in language learning as a way of gaining better access to world mar-
kets. For example, Slovenia and Australia can be fairly said to have minimal cultural or
historical ties, yet they have very strong shared language ties because of the large number
of Slovenians that speak English non-natively. This latter type of argument is standard in
the empirical trade policy literature; Baier & Bergstrand (2007), for instance, find that the
causal effects of free trade agreements tend to be underestimated for a very similar reason.
Because the series on language data is purely cross-sectional, it is necessary to intro-
duce an instrumental variables (IV) estimator, with well-chosen instruments, in order to
obtain consistent estimates of δ. Specifically, I adopt the “IV-T” Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Mullahy (1997) for use with non-linear models of
the type shown in (17).58 Essentially, the IV-T estimator requires that a set of instruments
58The “T” in IV-T stands tor “transformation”. It is so called because the standard (additive) residual must
first be transformed into a multiplicative term (as in (17)) before moment conditions are imposed in order to
obtain consistent estimates.
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Z must be chosen such that
E [ω|Z] = 1, (19)
where ω again represents the multiplicative residual from (17) and may be thought to
obtain omitted regressors.59 Standard moment conditions based on (19) can then be used
to construct a GMM estimator which will give consistent inferences for both β and δ.60
The IV-T estimator has two primary advantages in this context. First, it preserves
the nonlinear structure of (17), without requiring linear transformations which may in-
troduce additional sources of bias. Second, it specifically addresses the possible presence
of an omitted regressor contained within the multiplicative error term ω. Other nonlinear
IV-GMM strategies based on the assumption of an additive error term, as in (18), are by
construction less suited to deal with omitted regressors that enter the model in the same
fashion as the included regressors.61
For comparison’s sake, I also wish to consider the canonical two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimator as an alternative IV strategy. Obviously, 2SLS requires a linear model;
thus the original model in (17) must be transformed and expressed instead as
ln Xij = FEi + FEj + dijβ+ δLANGij + lnωij,
Given a set of instruments Z, the relevant orthoganality condition for identification in this
case is
E [lnω|Z] = 0. (20)
59In general, consistent estimation could follow from requiring E [ω|Z] be equal to any constant. I follow
Mullahy (1997) in using 1 as a normalization.
60In practice, the IV-T estimator can be easily computed in Stata, as of Stata v. 13, using the -ivpoisson gmm-
command with the “multiplicative” option specified. The weighting matrix needed to construct the GMM
objective function is constructed using the standard “two step” procedure, with (Z′Z)−1 as the initial weight-
ing matrix. As with all GMM estimators, consistency follows from a standard set of regularity conditions; see
Davidson & MacKinnon (1993), ch. 17, for a reference.
61Another gravity paper that deals with a similar issue is Egger, Larch, Staub, & Winkelmann (2011), who
use a special estimator devised by Terza (1998) for nonlinear regressions with a binary endogenous variable (in
their case, the presence of a preferential trading agreement). The unique challenge here is that the endogenous
variable of interest is treated as continuous. Thus, as far as I am aware, this work is the first to apply the IV-T
estimator specifically to gravity estimation.
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At this point, it is worth emphasizing that, conditional on the existence a set of instru-
ments Z such that (20) can be satisfied, the 2SLS estimator will indeed deliver consistent
parameter estimates, despite the linear transformation of the original model. This argu-
ment simply follows from the standard motivation for using 2SLS when there is expected
correlation between the error term and one of the regressors, and where valid instruments
are in place.
In practice, however, regardless of the “instruments” chosen specifically to control for
the endogeneity of LANGij, the full instrument set Z will typically also include the “ex-
ogenous” regressors dij. The inclusion of dij is potentially problematic here since, by the
argument described above, the linear transformation of (17) may result in unwanted cor-
relation between dij and lnωij (on top of the presumed correlation between LANGij and
lnωij due to endogeneity). Therefore, one would not generally expect 2SLS to give con-
sistent inference of δ, except under the special circumstances noted above. Nonetheless,
comparing IV-T and 2SLS results, and in turn comparing each with their respective coun-
terparts (PPML and OLS) should provide an informal ranking of the different potential
sources of bias (i.e. endogeneity vs. specification error).
Naturally, regardless of the underlying IV estimator, valid parameter inference fun-
damentally requires the selection and verification of appropriate instruments for foreign
language acquisition. I defer this discussion as part of the next section, which describes all
data to be included in estimation.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Trade
For trade data, I use trade values from the 2006 World Input-Output Table from the World
Input-Output Database (henceforth, “WIOT”).62 WIOT features production, expenditure,
and trade flow patterns for 41 trading regions across 35 ISIC rev. 2 sectors (summarized
below). The underlying raw data for trade in manufactured goods is taken from UN
62See Timmer (2012) for a complete reference on the contents of the WIOT data set. Also see the WIOD
website, www.wiod.org, for examples of recent trade papers that have used WIOT data for empirical gravity
analysis.
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COMTRADE, supplemented with additional data from both the OECD and from national
sources. For trade in services, WIOT combines independent data sets from the UN, the
IMF, the OECD, as well as Eurostat.63
The 2006 WIOT data has three main advantages for these particular purposes. First, it
notably includes values for each country’s “internal trade” (a.k.a. “domestic sales”, con-
structed as gross output less total exports). As argued in Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003, 2004), it is relative trade barriers (rather than absolute trade barriers) that deter-
mine the pattern of trade; the inclusion of internal trade observations thus provides a basis
against which the determinants of international trade flows can be isolated. Furthermore,
the inclusion of internal trade is required for performing general equilibrium simulation
exercises, such as those performed in Section 5.
Second, the countries included in the data notably cover all 29 countries surveyed in
the 2006 Eurobarometer study on foreign language knowledge among European citizens
(described more below). The emphasis on this particular data source is warranted because
it is arguably the most comprehensive source of foreign language knowledge among the
different sources consulted by Melitz & Toubal. Naturally, I choose to work with 2006
trade flows in order for the trade data to be contemporaneous with the data collected for
this study.
Third, the inclusion of trade in services is also worth emphasizing because, as argued at
the outset, shared language ties could conceivably have different effects on services trade
than on other types of trade. In addition, because data on services trade has only been
made available relatively recently, the potential effects of shared languages specifically on
services have not been thoroughly studied.
Manufacturing vs. services. To draw a fundamental distinction between trade in “manu-
facturing” and trade in “services”, I group the different industries in the data according to
the breakdown shown in Table 2.1.
As can be seen from the different groupings, international flows in services are concep-
63As noted in Timmer (2012), these different data sources frequently suffer from inconsistencies. The trade
data for services thus reflects “extensive adjustments” should therefore be thought of as a “best possible ap-
proximation”, especially relative to the manufactured goods trade data, which is mainly drawn from a stan-
dard source.
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Table 2.1: WIOT Industry Groups
Industry group Included industries
Manufacturing Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Food, Beverages, and Tobacco;
Textiles and Textile Producgts; Leather, Leather and Footwear; Wood and Cork Products;
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing; Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel;
Chemicals and Chemical Products; Rubber and Plastics; Other Non-Metallic Minerals;
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal; Machinery, n.e.c.; Electrical and Optical Equipment;
Transport Equipment; Manufacturing, n.e.c. (incl. Recycling)
Services Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply; Construction;
Sale, Maintenance, and Repair of Motor Vehicles (incl. Retail Sale of Fuel);
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade (exc. Motor Vehicles);
Retail trade (exc. of Motor Vehicles, includes Repair of Household Goods); Hotels and Restaurants;
Inland Transport; Water Transport; Air Transport; Other Transport Activities (incl. Travel Agencies);
Post and Telecommunications; Financial Intermediation; Real Estate Activities;
Renting of Machinery and Equipment; Public Administration; Education; Health and Social Work;
Other Social Services; Private Households with Employed Persons.
WIOT industry classifications are based on standard CPA and NACE rev. 1 (ISIC rev. 2) industry classifications.
tually very different than trade flows in manufactured goods. A given country’s “exports”
of a service can include services provided within one’s own borders to foreign nationals,
such as the patronage of that country’s hotels and restaurants, as well as the provision of
services by its own nationals within another country’s borders, such as financial services
and the establishment of local retail operations. Naturally, they can also include direct
cross-border services as well, such as transportation and telecommunications.
The “manufacturing” industry grouping, by contrast, can be more clearly characterized
by the movement of physical goods from a producing party in one country to a purchasing
party in another country. Traditionally, gravity estimation of “trade flows” has focused
mainly on goods of this type, with the exception of agriculture and mining, which are not
always included.
Finalizing the number of countries. Explicitly, the 41 trading regions in the WIOT data
are: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Cyprus, the Czech Re-
public, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, India, In-
donesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Malta,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, Tai-
wan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and an aggregate “Rest of the World” region.
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Since Melitz & Toubal combine Belgium and Luxembourg into a single region in their
language data (“Belgium-Luxembourg”), I do the same here. I also omit the “Rest of the
World” (RoW) since, once internal trade has been imputed for every country in the data,
the key variables of interest can be identified without including it based on variation across
the remaining countries in the sample.64 The resulting sample is a square block of 39
countries by 39 countries (= 1, 521 observations) each for both manufacturing and services
trade. As noted above, the estimation will include both language covariates as well as
other standard gravity controls; I now turn to describing the origin of these variables.
2.3.2 Language variables
Data on the languages of each country (both natively spoken and non-natively spoken) are
taken mainly from Melitz & Toubal’s appendix, augmented in some special cases as noted
below. Melitz & Toubal’s language data draws on several different sources, which are
of different utility depending on whether the variable of interest is the number of native
language speakers or the number of non-native language speakers. I also follow Melitz &
Toubal’s characterization of each country’s “official” languages.
Spoken language data. Data on foreign language speaking is generally more difficult
to obtain than data on the prevalence of native languages. The best source for foreign
language knowledge, prominently used in both Melitz & Toubal as well as Fidrmuc and
Fidrmuc (2014), is a special edition of Eurobarometer published by the European Commis-
sion in 2006 with explicit survey data on language speaking (for both native and foreign
languages) for 29 different European countries.65 An important contribution of Melitz &
Toubal then is to augment the Eurobarometer survey with other sources to develop a fuller
data set for foreign language knowledge. These sources are mainly studies and encyclo-
pedia entries that focus on the prevalence of particular major European languages (e.g.
64Nonetheless, it is possible to obtain estimates for trade costs between the Rest of the World and any other
region using fixed effects for RoW-trade in the estimation. This fixed effects approach does not affect the
estimates of the covariates of interest, nor does it add any degrees of freedom. It does allow me to include
RoW in my general equilibrium experiments, however.
65The actual survey data was collected in November and December of 2005. The specific question asked
for the survey is “Which languages do you speak well enough to have a conversation, excluding your mother
tongue?” (Multiple answers are permitted.)
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English, French) in countries that do not speak these languages natively.66
However, a notable limitation of these data sources is that they do not provide infor-
mation on the number of English speakers for several countries where English is known to
be a commonly-pursued second language. For this particular sample, the affected coun-
tries are Brazil, China, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan. To address this shortcoming, I
follow Ku & Zussman (2010) in using a country’s TOEFL scores as an indication of its over-
all English speaking ability. Comparing TOEFL scores for countries with data on English
speakers versus those without then allows me to infer the number of English speakers for
these remaining countries.67
For native language speaking, reliable data sources do exist for the number of native
language speakers of many different languages across many different countries, most no-
tably Ethnologue (2009) and the CIA World Factbook.68 Melitz & Toubal’s native language
data combines additional survey data from Eurobarometer (“What is your maternal lan-
guage?”) with these other sources, as well as the same supplemental sources used for
foreign language knowledge.69 Adding together the percentage of a country’s population
that speaks a particular natively with those that speak it non-natively then gives the total
percentage of speakers in that country.
Construction of language variables. An ideal index for communication in spoken lan-
guages should reflect the probability that two people chosen randomly from different
countries both speak the same language. Melitz (2008) establishes a protocol for obtain-
ing such an index for native language communication, which I will abbreviate as “NL”, by
summing the products of the percentage of speakers of each language that is spoken by at
least 4% of the population in each country.
66See the data appendix included with Melitz & Toubal for a full description of their sources and methods.
67Specifically, I use the TOEFL Test Score and Data Summary, made available by ETS, for tests taken between
July 2005 and June 2006. To construct fitted values, I performed a regression of the percentage of each country’s
population that speaks English (using Melitz & Toubal’s data) on country-level TOEFL scores (weighting by
the number of test-takers in each country). The resulting values are as follows. Brazil: .2; China: .13; South
Korea: .13; Indonesia: .12; Taiwan: .11. I would still obtain qualitatively similar results without including the
number of English speakers for these countries; their inclusion does noticeably improve the fit of the model,
however.
68Melitz (2008)relies principally on these two sources.
69I also update the native language data from these same sources in some isolated cases. For example, Melitz
& Toubal leave out the percentage of Estonians who report Estonian as a maternal language on the basis that
it is not widely spoken outside of Estonia.
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This indexing method generally gives values between 0 and 1 for native language com-
munication. For spoken language communication, however (which includes communica-
tion in learned foreign languages), the double-counting of multilingual populations be-
comes an issue and the Melitz (2008) method thus may result in values greater than 1 for
some country pairs (such as the Netherlands and Belgium, for example).
Accordingly, Melitz & Toubal devise an updated method for indexing the degree of
spoken language communication between two countries. Let Sli be the percentage of the
population in country i that speak languge l (either natively or non-natively). In addition,
define αlij ≡ Sli · Slj as the product of population shares that speak language l for country
pair (i, j), such that αij ≡ ∑l αlij gives the communication index that would be computed
under the Melitz (2008) indexing method. The Melitz & Toubal “common spoken lan-
guage” index, which I will refer to as “SL”, is then given by
SLij = max
l
(
αlij
)
+
(
αij −max
l
(
αlij
))(
1−max
l
(
αlij
))
. (21)
Intuitively, whenever spoken language communication is predominantly through one lan-
guage, maxl(αlij) and αij will be similar and there will be very little difference between
the Melitz (2008) and Melitz & Toubal indexing methods. The Melitz & Toubal method
operates by placing more weight on secondary language ties if maxl(αlij) is significantly
different than 1; if it is not, these additional language ties are assumed to reflect the com-
mon presence of multilingual speakers in each country. In practice, this method succeeds
at providing a full range of values for SL that fall between 0 and 1.
However, my main object of interest is not actually “spoken language communication”
as in Melitz & Toubal, but rather “foreign language communication” specifically. To con-
struct this latter variable, I construct series for both native language ties (NL) and spoken
language ties (SL) using the Melitz & Toubal method described above.70 I then construct
a new variable for foreign language communication, which I term “FL”, as the difference
between these two series (that is, FL ≡ SL− NL.)71
70This approach differs slightly from Melitz & Toubal, who stick with the original Melitz (2008) methodol-
ogy for constructing their native language communication index. I use the same method for both NL and SL
so that the decomposition of SL into NL and FL is consistently defined.
71As such, FL reflects cases where one country has learned the native language of the other as well as cases
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Finally, in addition to NL and FL, I also include a dummy variable for the sharing of
a “common official language”. This variable is again sourced from Melitz & Toubal. As
the inclusion of a common official language dummy is standard in the gravity literature,
I will generally place more emphasis on the results regarding the continuous measures of
shared language ties, NL and FL. A reasonable expectation regarding these three variables
collectively is that NL and FL should serve as more specific measures of the effect of shared
languages on trade; therefore, “common official language” should diminish in importance
in the presence of the other two variables.
2.3.3 Other controls
For the non-language controls, I have again tried to adhere closely to the same empiri-
cal design found in Melitz & Toubal. The resulting set of covariates thus includes several
standard controls for both geographical ties between countries—i.e. the log of bilateral
distance and a dummy variable the sharing of a common border—as well as for past his-
torical ties between countries—i.e. dummy variables for a former colonial relationship as
well as for the sharing of a common colonizer. These standard covariates are taken from
the CEPII Gravity database, which was first established in a paper by Head, Mayer, & Ries
(2010).
In addition, Melitz & Toubal also carefully construct several additional variables to
help proxy for other potential sources of historical and/or cultural ties between countries
that might be correlated with language ties. These additional variables include the follow-
ing:
• A dummy variable for the sharing of a common legal system (in this case either
Common Law or Civil Law), constructed using the JuriGlobe database.72
• A continuous variable for the sharing of similar religions. Melitz & Toubal construct
this variable in a similar fashion to their language variables (i.e. using common pop-
where both countries speak the same language non-natively. I use the terms “foreign” or “non-native” to refer
to both types of language sharing throughout the paper. See Mack, Martı´nez-Garcı´a, & Martı´nez-Garcı´a (2014)
for an example of a paper which examines a more detailed decomposition of FL communication.
72The WIOT sample includes mainly Common Law or Civil Law countries. The exceptions are China,
Cyprus, Japan, Malta, and South Korea, which each have their own idiosyncratic designations.
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ulation shares) using a variety of sources for religious populations across different
countries.73
• A continuous variable indexing the amount of time two countries have spent at war
with one another since 1823. This variable is constructed using the Correlates of War
Project (COW) Inter-State War database v. 4.0.
Lastly, I also include a dummy variable for internal trade (i.e. for a country’s sales in its
own market). Including this variable is a useful way of recognizing that countries tend
to exhibit strong “home bias” in production; that is, relatively little of what they produce
actually crosses international borders. The inclusion of this dummy is also relatively stan-
dard for gravity estimation with square datasets; see, for example, Anderson & Yotov
(2010a).
Drawing on (18), I can describe a detailed specification of the gravity equation as fol-
lows:
Xij = exp(FEi + FEj + β1Log o f distanceij + β2Common borderij + β3Ex colonizer/colonyij
+ β4Common religionij + β5Common legalij + β6Years at warij + β7 Internal tradeij
+ δOLCommon o f f icial languageij + δNLNLij + δFLFLij) + νij (22)
As noted above, I estimate (22) using PPML in order to obtain benchmark estimates for
both the language and non-language covariates. Addressing the potential endogeneity
of FL (using the IV-T estimator) requires selecting good instruments for FL which not
otherwise related with trade, which here is not an easy task; I discuss the difficulties of
finding good instruments in the discussion that follows.
2.3.4 Instruments
It cannot be helped that language ties and trade relationships have each formed over a
long period of time through closely-intertwined historical processes. The nature of the
data is strictly cross-sectional; thus, the ideal goal of finding instruments which are purely
73These sources are: The CIA World Factbook, the International Religious Freedom Report (U.S. Department
U.S. Department of State, 2007), the World Christian Database (Spomer, 2014), and the Pew Forum (2009).
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exogenous to trade, such that one can perform a true “natural experiment”, most likely
is not feasible.74 Instead, I focus on finding instruments that meet the (weaker) standard
of partial exogeneity. That is, I am interested in additional bilateral covariates whose own
direct influence on trade seems to be reasonably controlled for by the existing controls
already included in the baseline regression (including the exporter- and importer-specific
fixed effects).
Take the degree of similarity between differing national languages, which I consider be-
low as a possible instrument. Several studies have found “linguistic proximity” (or “LP”)
to be significant as an independent predictor of trade frictions; see, for example, Hutchin-
son (2005), Isphording & Otten (2013), as well as Melitz & Toubal. I do not intend to argue
that trade does not vary with linguistic proximity. Rather, the relevant argument is that
linguistic distance itself may be sufficiently correlated with the non-language covariates
specified above such that linguistic distance’s partial effect on trade barriers (other than
through their effect on foreign language ties) may be negligible.75
In addition to lingustic proximity, the other two instrumental variables I consider in-
volve past cold war divisions as well as common spoken language ties with outside coun-
tries. Below, I describe the construction of each of these variables. I also describe the
approach I take to examining instrument validity.
Linguistic proximity. Alongside their new data on shared languages, Melitz & Toubal also
introduce an innovative new series on linguistic proximity across languages, constructed
using similarities of individual words scored by the Automated Simulated Judgment Pro-
gram, or ASJP.76 As Melitz & Toubal argue, the effect of LP on trade should reflect the ease
74Fidrmuc & Fidrmuc (2014) propose focusing on pairs that were formerly on opposite sides of the cold
war as a possible “natural experiment” in this context. Accordingly, I adopt cold war divisions as a possible
instrument in this context and discuss its merits below.
75It may be reasonable to expect, for example, linguistic distance’s independent effect on trade could be
partially controlled for by the geographic distance between countries and/or the presence of a common border.
I do show in the results that follow that the independent effect of linguistic proximity is very nearly zero in
my PPML regressions, both for manufacturing and for services.
76See Brown, Holman, Wichmann, & Velupillai (2008). Basically, for any two languages, the ASJP pro-
gram selects a list of 100 words with similar pronunciations across both languages and registers whether the
similarly-pronounded word pairings also tend to have similar meanings. An alternative approach, which
Melitz & Toubal also consider, is to calculate LP based on whether or not two languages belong to the same
“language tree” (and, in turn, to the same branch within that tree) according to the Ethnologue classification of
language families.
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of translating from one language to another, which in turn should imply that LP and FL
should be at least somewhat related.
Cold war divisions. For cold war divisions, I try to exploit the idea that language educa-
tion programs in “East”-aligned countries were subject to fundamentally different influ-
ences during the cold war vs. after the cold war.77 As Fodor & Peluau (2003) document,
Soviet-influenced governments in Eastern and Central Europe deliberately undermined
language education in Western European languages in favor of promoting Russian as a
compulsory second language. With the decline of communism in the 1990s, however, these
countries again began to invest heavily in educating their pupils in Western languages. It
follows then that, despite the post-1989 resurgence in diversified language education in
these countries, language ties between East and West countries should be systematically
lower than for other trading pairs.
For the instrument itself, I generate a dummy called EWij which equals 1 for trade
between countries that were aligned with different blocs during the cold war. In addition
to Eastern and Western Europe, I also include other countries in the sample that took sides
one way or the other. Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the U.S. are
considered part of the “West”, for example, and China are India are considered part of the
“East”.
Common language ties with outside countries. I also wish to capture the idea that two
countries that are each independently exposed to third countries that speak a particular
language will themselves tend to speak that same language. Denmark and Estonia, for
example, have strong foreign language ties through both English and German. As Gins-
burgh, Melitz, & Toubal (2014) might argue, these ties have likely arisen because trade
with English- and German-speaking countries has driven language acquisition choices in
each of these countries. Alternatively, it could instead be that opportunities for trade with
these outside countries have guided these choices. Either way, it would seem unlikely that
either country acquired these languages specifically with the other in mind.
77Fidrmuc & Fidrmuc (2014)have recently argued that, because past trade between Eastern and Western
Europe was significantly dampened by the cold war, the observed effects of language ties on trade specifically
between “East” and “West” countries should be less subject to concerns about “reverse causality” than other
pairs. My identification strategy considers past cold war divisions from a different perspective than theirs.
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To incorporate this logic, I construct an additional instrument as follows: for each lan-
guage l, I compute a weighted sum of each country’s exposure to outside countries that
speak that language, using the inverse of distance (a natural, exogenous proxy for lan-
guage exposure) as a weighting parameter. Multiplying these weighted sums together
then gives their predicted level of communication in lanuage l. For each pair of countries
(i, j), the resulting variable is
αˆlij =
(
∑k 6=j Slk · e− ln distik
∑k 6=j e− ln distik
)(
∑k 6=i Slk · e− ln distjk
∑k 6=i e− ln distjk
)
,
where αˆlij is a “predicted” analogue for the α
l
ij term used in (21) and S
l
k is the share of the
population in outside country k that speaks language l.
I then in turn construct a predicted version for SLij, which I call ŜLij, via the same pro-
cedure described in (21), only using the predicted αˆlij values instead of the actual α
l
ij’s from
the data. To proxy for foreign language ties specifically, rather than for spoken language
ties generally, the variable I ultimately use as an instrument is F̂Lij ≡ max(ŜLij − NLij, 0).
To verify the validity of these instruments, I try to adopt a conservative approach. The
IV-T estimator described above will produce a standard Hansen (1982) J-statistic to test
for overidentification. However, an important caveat regarding such tests is that they
implicitly presume (in the case of a single endogenous variable) that at least one of the
instruments used is already valid. Therefore, to err on the safe side, I also verify that “just-
identified” IV-T results (i.e. estimates using any any one instrument) are similar to the
results using the overidentified model and that the instruments used do not enter signifi-
cantly into the benchmark PPML model in the presence of the other regressors.
For concerns regarding underidentification, I perform a simple “first stage” linear re-
gression with FL as the dependent variable, as is standard.78 I also include 2SLS estimates
as an additional basis for comparison, as discussed above.
78Note that since IV-T is a GMM estimator, it does not actually require that the instruments be associated
linearly with the endogenous variables as in a two stage estimator.
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2.4 Estimation Results
In this section, I estimate the effects of language ties on trade according to the gravity
estimation approaches described above. PPML results are shown first, followed by a con-
sideration of IV-based estimators and their implications for causal inference. All results
are computed differently for “manufacturing” vs. “services” trade.
2.4.1 Preliminary Estimates
Table 2.2 presents results for a PPML estimation of the model given by (18), using different
ways of specifying the included language variables. Columns 1-4 show results for man-
ufacturing, whereas columns 5-8 are for services trade. In both cases, I build up a full
specification of language effects on trade in incremental steps, paying close attention both
to how introduing foreign language ties affects the estimates for native languge ties as well
as how language effects for manufacturing trade differ from those for services trade.
I start by considering the effect of NL, in combination with the controls described
above, which include the standard “common official language” dummy variable. Notably,
NL is not significant in either column 1 (for manufacturing) or for column 5 (for services).
It would seem based on this initial specification that “Common official language” per-
forms adequately in capturing the effects of shared languages on trade; introducing Melitz
& Toubal’s preferred variable for direct native language communication does not seem to
add useful information here.79
With regards to the other controls, I mostly observe findings that are in accordance with
typical expectations, albeit with some notable exceptions. The estimates of these controls
differ somewhat for manufacturing vs. services trade, so I will summarize the findings
for manufacturing first and then provide a brief comparison with those for services. For
manufacturing, the effect of distance on trade is negative as expected and in the neigh-
borhood of about −0.9 (again as one might expect to observe). The positive coefficients
on the presence of a common border and on that of a shared colonizer are not surprising.
Nor is the (large) positive coefficient for the “Internal trade” dummy, reflecting the strong
79Indeed, results for these same controls when excluding NL (ommitted to save space) are virtually identical
in both cases.
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Table 2.2: PPML Results for Language Effects
Manufacturing trade Services trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of distance -0.895*** -0.877*** -0.858*** -0.852*** -0.512*** -0.466*** -0.438*** -0.437***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.053) (0.051) (0.072) (0.065) (0.061) (0.061)
Common official language 0.545*** 0.552*** 0.315** 0.285** 0.782*** 0.830*** 0.493*** 0.493***
(0.150) (0.146) (0.157) (0.134) (0.174) (0.158) (0.156) (0.156)
Common border 0.388*** 0.392*** 0.357*** 0.365*** 0.118 0.136 0.119 0.120
(0.120) (0.116) (0.120) (0.101) (0.153) (0.143) (0.134) (0.134)
Common colonizer 0.766*** 0.888*** 0.876*** 1.025*** -1.347** -1.181** -1.272*** -1.269***
(0.236) (0.232) (0.237) (0.240) (0.613) (0.547) (0.488) (0.488)
Ex colonizer/colony 0.085 0.223 0.204 0.322 0.615*** 0.821*** 0.748*** 0.750***
(0.246) (0.248) (0.246) (0.256) (0.215) (0.230) (0.246) (0.245)
Common religion 0.337** 0.145 0.160 0.028 0.416** 0.087 0.118 0.116
(0.150) (0.152) (0.136) (0.142) (0.169) (0.183) (0.184) (0.186)
Common legal system -0.026 -0.046 0.004 -0.053 -0.100 -0.108 -0.018 -0.019
(0.086) (0.083) (0.089) (0.075) (0.102) (0.097) (0.086) (0.087)
Years at war 0.245* 0.264** 0.278*** 0.344*** 0.024 0.005 0.088 0.087
(0.127) (0.121) (0.106) (0.084) (0.152) (0.141) (0.139) (0.139)
Internal trade 1.999*** 1.993*** 2.000*** 1.949*** 4.762*** 4.814*** 4.874*** 4.874***
(0.161) (0.158) (0.143) (0.142) (0.242) (0.228) (0.213) (0.213)
NL -0.095 0.060 0.381* 2.674*** 0.201 0.446* 0.888*** 0.945
(0.215) (0.215) (0.223) (0.494) (0.251) (0.250) (0.248) (0.609)
Linguistic proximity (LP) 0.110*** -0.008 -0.023 0.201*** 0.011 0.011
(0.036) (0.032) (0.031) (0.040) (0.038) (0.037)
FL 1.197*** 2.839*** 1.505*** 1.549***
(0.219) (0.351) (0.159) (0.423)
SL2 -2.102*** -0.052
(0.426) (0.473)
The number of observations in all cases is 392 = 1, 521.
Exporter and importer FEs are used to control for Yi/Ωi and Ej/Φj (respectively) in (15).
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 , *** p < .01 .
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preference to make purchases from one’s own domestic suppliers. The observed positive
coefficient on “years at war” contradicts expectations, however. As we will see later, this
seemingly puzzling result seems to be particular to the PPML estimation approach; the IV
specifications discussed above do not find this variable to be significant.
Turning to services trade, I again note a negative coefficient for distance, only here it
is smaller in magnitude than for manufacturing (−0.512 vs. −0.895). This finding should
not be interpreted to mean services trade is in any way more “open” than manufacturing
trade, however; the effect of one’s own borders (through the “Internal trade” variable) is
more than twice as large for services than it is for manufacturing (which itself was already
“large” to begin with). The most surprising finding in this case is the negative coefficient
on “common colonizer”. A possible interpretation is that pairs of smaller, less-developed
countries may face harder challenges in establishing trade in services than other types
of pairs. Again, however, as with the number of years at war, this finding seems to be
particular to the PPML estimates.
In Columns 2 and 6, I continue to follow Melitz & Toubal by considering the effect of
“Linguistic proximity” (LP) alongside that of NL. LP is significant in both cases. We also
see a (small) positive change in NL in columns 2 and 6 compared with columns 1 and 5,
with NL becoming marginally significant for services trade. According to Melitz & Toubal,
countries with more closely related languages face lower costs of “translation” from one
language to another and therefore lower costs of trading. The significance of linguistic
proximity disappears, however, upon the introduction of the FL variable in columns 3 and
7. These results support the logic that lower translation costs via LP do not affect trade
independently of the ability to communicate in shared spoken languages; this finding thus
would seem to help validate the use of LP as an instrument for FL communication in the
IV estimation analysis that follows.
Columns 3 and 7 also reveal that the FL variable itself is strongly significant and posi-
tive for both manufacturing and services. Furthermore, in accordance with the argument
laid out in the introduction, the magnitude of the estimated NL coefficient increases in the
presence of the FL variable. The NL coefficient for services trade (0.888) is now measured
as strongly significant (p < .01). However, while the NL coefficient exhibits the same
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general pattern of increasing across columns 1-3, it remains only marginally significant.
We do find some confirmation then that, as hypothesized, estimates for NL are biased
downward in the absence of FL. We also find, intuitively enough, that the magnitude
of “common official language” falls mildly when more importance is assigned to the NL
variable, which is presumed to be a more specific measure of native language ties. These
encouraging findings are somewhat tempered, however, by the observation that FL’s effect
on trade is measured to be stronger than that of NL. This discrepency seems odd, espe-
cially for manufacturing trade, where FL is associated with strong statistical significance
and NL is not. Why would communication in foreign languages (seemingly) promote
trade moreso than communication in native languages?
One attractive explanation, explored in columns 4 and 8, is that the effect of spoken
language communication on trade might subject to “diminishing returns”. Melitz (2008),
for example, finds (using a threshold dummy variable) that the effect of native language
communication on trade falls off after a certain level. Intuitively speaking, the sharing of
common languages will have a larger effect on trade initially if multilingual speakers in
the population are able to specialize in the intermediation of transactions. I test for these
possible “translation effects” by adding the square of “spoken language communication”
(SL2) to the previous specification.80 Surely enough, manufacturing trade does appear
to exhibit diminishing returns with respect to language ties. Furthermore, we not only
again see a jump in the magnitude of the NL coefficient, but we also observe that NL
and FL are very similar in magnitude. Taken at face value, these results suggest native
language communication and foreign language communication affect trade through the
same channel and that much of the earlier discrepancy in magnitudes in column 3 is due
to the presence of diminishing returns to spoken language communication.
For services trade, however, we do not find evidence of diminishing returns. The re-
sults for the nonlinear specification of shared language ties in column 8 seem to strongly
reject this possibility. I also note again that the strong significance of NL in column 7 (for
services trade without diminishing returns) makes the difference between these variables
80I have also experimented with including higher order polynomial terms for SL; the quadratic form seems
to be the best fit to the data.
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for services trade not as concerning as the corresponding difference seen in column 3.81
Building on the discussion laid out in the introduction, it is plausible this stark contrast
in results reflects the fundamental differences that exist between trade in manufacturing
and trade in services. The argument for diminishing returns relies on the idea that firms
are more easily able to do business with foreign partners so long as there exist sufficient
bilingual speakers to serve as intermediaries. The nature of services is different, however.
For many service industries (e.g. hospitality, air travel, retail, tourism, etc.), the most likely
“customers” for service providers are not organized firms with the ability to hire special-
ized intermediaries, but rather individual consumers of those services. Since individuals
are far less likely to employ bilinguals to act on their behalf, it is reasonable to suppose that
their purchases of services would be significantly more dependent on their own ability to
communicate than on the presence of others who could serve as intermediaries.
To summarize, the PPML results exhibit a reasonable amount of the consistency with
the first two of the three main conjectures underlying the argument made in the introduc-
tion. The omission of non-native language ties from the estimation of language effects does
induce an apparent downward bias in the magnitude of the coefficient for native language
ties. I also find that, for manufacturing trade at least, the native language coefficient again
moves in sympathy with the FL variable when I explore the possibility of diminishing re-
turns. That these diminishing returns seem to be present only in manufacturing trade, and
not in services trade, is again in accordance with the priors that have been set out. Collec-
tively, these results seem to support the general hypothesis that native language ties and
non-native language ties affect trade through the same channel.
Stronger confirmation of this interpretation of course also requires a more careful con-
sideration of the last of the three points made in introduction, that estimates of non-native
language ties be robust to causal inference methods. As I have discussed, opposing ar-
guments exist for why standard estimates of language effects may exhibit either upward
or downward bias due to endogeneity. In the following subsection, I explore the valid-
ity of my instruments for causal inference and attempt to characterize the role played by
81A simple reason for why FL might be measured with a larger effect might be due that the Melitz & Toubal
method for eliminating double-counting in the construction of SL could be systematically underestimating
the “true” value of shared FL ties.
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endogeneity bias.
2.4.2 IV Estimation
Table 2.3 presents results for the IV-T estimates, using different combinations of the three
candidate instruments for both manufacturing and services trade, as well as benchmark
estimates using the PPML estimator.82 For both manufacturing and services, I have tried
to single out a set of at least two instruments such that the computed J statistic falls within
a tolerable range. For manufacturing, the set of instruments that meets this standard is
LP and EW; for services, I use EW and F̂L.83 I have also verified that none of the instru-
ments enter significantly in the associated PPML regressions, either jointly or separately.
Furthermore, standard “first stage” linear regressions show all three instruments to be
strongly associated with FL.84
Interestingly, the IV-T estimator suggests very different conclusions for the sign of the
endogeneity bias for manufacturing trade vs. services trade. By Column 2 of Table 2.3,
which shows main IV-T estimates for manufacturing trade, the coefficient on FL is, if any-
thing, underestimated when treated as an exogenous regressor. Furthermore, I again note
that NL rises in sympathy with FL as the importance assigned to foreign language ties
increases; the coefficient on NL is now large (1.005) and significant at the 1% level. This
co-movement of the NL and FL variables continues to support the interpretation that these
variables reflect the value of being able to communicate in a common language. The mea-
sured effect of FL remains larger than NL, however (in fact, the gap seems to have grown
slightly.)
In stark contrast, the IV-T estimates for services trade do not find FL to be signifi-
cant. At first blush, this finding seems surprising: the PPML estimations for services
indicated relatively larger effects for shared languages ties; furthermore, several of the
industries categorized under “services” would seem particularly likely to directly benefit
from strong two-way communication (such as “Education” and “Post and Telecommuni-
82These PPML estimates differ only slightly from those in Table 2.2 in that I do not include LP as a regressor.
83In both cases, including the third instrument would lead to a rejection of the null for overidentification.
84The “UnderId” test shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 is the F test from the standard first stage model. The
values reported are p values.
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Table 2.3: IV Results for Language Effects (PPML and IV-T)
Manufacturing trade Services trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PPML IV-T IV-T IV-T PPML IV-T IV-T IV-T
Log of distance -0.858*** -1.162*** -1.152*** -1.177*** -0.439*** -0.703*** -0.704*** -0.701***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.061) (0.064) (0.067) (0.072)
Common official language 0.320** -0.023 -0.071 0.023 0.484*** 0.050 0.054 0.048
(0.154) (0.202) (0.214) (0.202) (0.156) (0.223) (0.229) (0.226)
Common border 0.357*** 0.164 0.145 0.189* 0.118 0.722*** 0.725*** 0.719***
(0.120) (0.109) (0.113) (0.110) (0.134) (0.144) (0.155) (0.157)
Common colonizer 0.883*** 0.654** 0.535 0.776** -1.278*** 0.962* 0.977* 0.948*
(0.235) (0.307) (0.332) (0.345) (0.489) (0.503) (0.563) (0.562)
Ex colonizer/colony 0.211 0.495* 0.451* 0.505** 0.740*** 0.796*** 0.804*** 0.786**
(0.246) (0.256) (0.270) (0.241) (0.246) (0.268) (0.297) (0.324)
Common religion 0.150 0.131 0.129 0.123 0.130 0.319** 0.320** 0.319**
(0.138) (0.105) (0.107) (0.103) (0.176) (0.138) (0.141) (0.138)
Common legal system 0.002 0.335*** 0.360*** 0.311*** -0.017 0.141 0.138 0.144
(0.088) (0.095) (0.101) (0.098) (0.086) (0.138) (0.148) (0.150)
Years at war 0.279*** 0.129 0.145 0.125 0.090 -0.268 -0.269 -0.267
(0.106) (0.135) (0.140) (0.133) (0.139) (0.187) (0.188) (0.189)
Internal trade 1.999*** 2.475*** 2.442*** 2.468*** 4.872*** 6.145*** 6.146*** 6.147***
(0.143) (0.304) (0.313) (0.298) (0.214) (0.435) (0.436) (0.435)
NL 0.383* 1.005*** 1.165*** 0.856** 0.889*** 0.879** 0.874** 0.889**
(0.222) (0.380) (0.434) (0.400) (0.249) (0.409) (0.418) (0.448)
FL 1.175*** 2.103*** 2.412*** 1.737*** 1.533*** -0.392 -0.426 -0.356
(0.199) (0.521) (0.646) (0.651) (0.155) (0.629) (0.864) (0.887)
Instrument(s): - LP/EW LP EW - F̂L/EW F̂L EW
OverId - 0.378 - - - 0.954 - -
UnderId - 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exporter and importer FEs are using to control for Yi/Ωi and Ej/Φj (respectively) in (15).
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 , *** p < .01 .
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cations”). Nonetheless, it also seems reasonable to suggest that, on the whole, ommitted
cultural affinities may be especially important for understanding services trade. Indeed,
the fact that the IV-T estimates for Services find NL to be significant, but not FL, makes it
difficult to argue otherwise.
The results for both types of trade are backed up (in columns 3-4 and 6-7) by additional
IV-T regressions in which I experiment with using only a single instrument. In all cases,
the results are very close to the original estimates and support their validity.
Table 2.4: IV Results for Language Effects (OLS and 2SLS)
Manufacturing trade Services trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Log of distance -1.175*** -1.121*** -1.126*** -1.114*** -0.688*** -0.680*** -0.647*** -0.698***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.055) (0.058) (0.088) (0.090) (0.100) (0.092)
Common official language 0.188 0.030 0.043 0.010 0.052 0.027 -0.074 0.082
(0.175) (0.183) (0.189) (0.188) (0.340) (0.335) (0.362) (0.339)
Common border 0.301*** 0.210* 0.217** 0.198* 0.555*** 0.540*** 0.479*** 0.573***
(0.103) (0.108) (0.110) (0.114) (0.162) (0.169) (0.162) (0.185)
Common colonizer 1.177*** 0.942*** 0.961*** 0.912*** 0.440 0.398 0.223 0.492
(0.358) (0.310) (0.323) (0.309) (0.815) (0.795) (0.778) (0.827)
Ex colonizer/colony 0.470 0.262 0.279 0.235 0.963*** 0.929*** 0.789** 1.004**
(0.291) (0.282) (0.288) (0.292) (0.327) (0.349) (0.334) (0.392)
Common religion 0.024 -0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.474** 0.470** 0.451** 0.480**
(0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) (0.195) (0.189) (0.191) (0.189)
Common legal system 0.285*** 0.379*** 0.372*** 0.391*** 0.410** 0.424** 0.483*** 0.393**
(0.103) (0.107) (0.110) (0.112) (0.165) (0.166) (0.180) (0.171)
Years at war 0.056 0.053 0.053 0.053 -0.186 -0.185 -0.182 -0.187
(0.129) (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.233) (0.227) (0.229) (0.227)
Internal trade 2.324*** 2.399*** 2.393*** 2.409*** 6.232*** 6.239*** 6.269*** 6.223***
(0.361) (0.358) (0.355) (0.364) (0.617) (0.591) (0.596) (0.591)
NL 0.224 0.687* 0.649 0.747* 0.533 0.609 0.922 0.440
(0.319) (0.371) (0.402) (0.384) (0.636) (0.709) (0.667) (0.807)
FL 0.655*** 1.813*** 1.719*** 1.962*** 0.160 0.344 1.099 -0.064
(0.214) (0.431) (0.523) (0.593) (0.367) (0.712) (0.934) (0.995)
Instrument(s): - LP/EW LP EW - F̂L/EW F̂L EW
OverId - 0.730 - - - 0.408 - -
UnderId - 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exporter and importer FEs are using to control for Yi/Ωi and Ej/Φj (respectively) in (15).
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10 , ** p < .05 , *** p < .01 .
For further confirmation, in Table 2.4, I also repeat the specifications shown in 2.3 us-
ing OLS and 2SLS as alternate estimators.85 As noted in Section 2, these estimates should
85Here, I have used the same instruments for both IV-T and 2SLS. As discussed in Mullahy (1997), how-
ever, the validity of a given set of instruments under the nonlinear model’s moment condition (E [ω|Z] = 1)
need not imply validity under the corresponding moment condition for the linear model (E [lnω|Z] = 0).
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be interpreted with caution, because of the special assumptions required for the log trans-
formation of the error term to be valid. Nonetheless, the linear results offer a revealing
comparison, for a number of reasons. For one thing, the OLS estimates (columns 1 and
5) differ substantially from the corresponding PPML results in Table 2.3, with OLS gener-
ally assigning less importance to shared languages.86 At the same time, given these initial
differences, the 2SLS estimates (columns 2-4 and 6-8) are strikingly similar to their IV-T
counterparts. I again observe that using an IV strategy identifies a strong causal effect
for FL for manufacturing trade (with NL rising in sympathy) and a lack of an effect for
services trade. I also note that the magnitudes of the other non-language covariates are
generally much more similar across the two IV estimators than across OLS and PPML.
Collectively, these comparisons suggest that omitted variable bias may be a larger issue
for obtaining consistent estimates of language effects than the issues commonly associated
with log-linearization.
2.5 Total Language Effects
An important, related question—besides “does language communication promote trade?”—
is “which language promotes trade the most?” Much other work in this area has raised the
question of whether English and/or other European languages might be superior at re-
ducing trading frictions between countries.87
Really, though, a more fundamental question is: given that communication through
any shared language should serve more or less the same purpose, which language in gen-
eral can promote the largest overall global trade gains? To answer this question, we must
consider how the estimates for language effects obtained above would function within the
context of a general equilibrium trade model. It is important to clarify that a reduction in
bilateral trade barriers through closer language ties can also have large multilateral effects
on trade through effective increases in national incomes as well as reductions in national
The fact these instruments lead to very similar conclusions under both estimators seems to be a noteworthy
coincidence.
86Nonetheless, it is still possible to show that OLS estimates adhere to the same pattern illustrated in Table
2.2, only with smaller magnitudes.
87For the case of English specifically, see Ku & Zussman (2010). Melitz (2008) and Melitz & Toubal both
investigate whether European languages reduce trade barriers more than other languages.
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price levels.
To illustrate these linkages, I re-introduce the structural gravity notation described in
(14), with some slight alteration. Specifically, let piij = Xij/Ej denote country j’s expendi-
ture share on goods shipped from country i. Furthermore, let tˆij = t′ij/tij denote a change
in trade barriers from tij to t′ij (due to language acquisition) and, likewise, let pˆi (= p
′
i/pi)
denote a corresponding change in the supply price in i and pˆiij the resulting change in the
trade share.88 One can then describe the general equilibrium change in trade flows as
pˆiij =
pˆθi tˆ
θ
ij
∑k pikj pˆθk tˆ
θ
kj
. (23)
In general equilibrium, any increase in a given tθij (that is, a decrease in tij) not only directly
“creates” additional trade between i and j, but also has the indirect effect of “destroying”
some of i and j’s trade with outside partners by increasing i’s seller price (i.e. pˆi > 0)
and by decreasing the average buyer price in j (i.e. ∑k pikj pˆθk tˆ
θ
kj > 0). Intuitively, it is
as though sellers in i experience an increase in world demand for their products while
buyers in j effectively experience an increase in the supply of imports. From an outsider’s
perspective, however, obtaining goods from i is now more expensive; likewise, shipping
goods to j’s import market is now more competitive.
Naturally, the more a country is able to increase its overall level of communication
with world markets in general, the more trade is created versus destroyed and, in turn,
the larger the net effect on trade overall from language acquisition. From this perspective,
an obvious hypothesis emerges: English should clearly be the language that promotes
global trade the most in general equilibrium, simply because of the number and size of the
economies that already possess English as a major spoken language. Indeed, my results
will confirm this hypothesis; I will also show, however, that the relative appeal of other
world languages turns out to be highly dependent on the present of other, non-language
barriers to trade.
To perform the necessary calculations, one can solve directly for price changes in all
88This “hat algebra” notation, and the related method for solving for changes in equilibrium, is generally
credited to Dekle, Eaton, & Kortum (2007).
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countries using the following competitive equilibrium condition:
Yi pˆi =∑
j
piij pˆθi tˆ
θ
ij
∑k pikj pˆθk tˆ
θ
kj
Ej pˆj. (24)
Once changes in seller prices (pˆi’s) have been determined, calculating all changes in trade
shares is straightforward, using (23).
Lastly, changes in the overall openness of the world to trade due to language acquisi-
tion will be measured using a “globalization index”, G, formally defined as
G ≡
(
∑
i
∑
j
Xij
)
/
(
∑
i
Xii
)
.
Intuitively, G indexes the ratio of total world production to total internal trade, such that
G is increasing as countries collectively trade more with each other and less with them-
selves. The criterion I consider for “Total Language Effects” (TLE) is the change in G due
to language acquisition—or more simply, Gˆ—which can be calculated directly, using the
fact that Xˆij = pˆiij · Eˆj = pˆiij · pˆj.89
Modeling the rest of the world. To this point, I have ignored the importance of trade
flows between the countries that are explicitly included in the trade data and the “Rest of
the World” (RoW). Since RoW is actually an important trade partner in the WIOT data, I
have tried to incorporate how changing trade costs due to language acquisition will affect
trade to and from RoW.
To do this, I proceed in two steps. First, I estimate trade frictions for trade with RoW
using a set of additional pair-wise fixed effects for trade with RoW; for example, tθAUS,RoW
can be directly estimated using a fixed effect term that is specific to Australia-RoW trade.90
Second, I use Melitz & Toubal’s data to construct measures of aggregate spoken language
knowledege for the 20 largest countries not included in the WIOT data. The resulting
language knowledge values for this aggregate are: Arabic, .10; Chinese, .02; Dutch, .02;
89Here, I have followed prevailing approaches to calculating GE trade effects in assuming that tˆii = 1, for all
i. That is, language acquisition is assumed to affect international trade costs only, and does not reduce barriers
to internal trade.
90Note that this approach does not change the original estimates, since incorporating fixed effects for RoW
trade in this way adds exactly one additional degree of freedom for each additional observation.
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English, 0.20; French, .02; German, .01; Malay, .03; Russian, .04; Spanish, .16; Turkish, .02;
and Urdu: .01. I then treat RoW as an additional country in the simulations that follow.
Simulation exercises. The basic experiment I conduct is the following: let every country in
the WIOT sample, including the “Rest of the World” region, experience an increase of 10%
in the percentage of its population that speaks language l (that is, let Sli → max(Sli + 0.1, 1),
∀i.) Counterfactual values for FLij and SLij for all trading pairs can then be calculated us-
ing (21), the same formula used to construct the original regressors. I then in turn calculate
the resulting change in trade costs, tˆθij, by combining the constructed changes in language
covariates with the estimates obtained for δFL (as well as δSL2 , if diminishing returns are
assumed). I then simulate the resulting changes in prices and trade shares under the as-
sumption that θ = −4.91 Repeating this same exercise for different languages then permits
for a general comparison of each language’s TLE impact on overall globalization.
Table 2.5, Panel A shows Total Language Effects based on my PPML estimates for lan-
guage effects and other trade costs. For completeness, I include calculations for both man-
ufacturing and services.92 I also consider TLEs for manufacturing both with and without
the assumption of dimishing returns. The seven major world languages considered are
Chinese, English, French, German, Italian, Russian, and Spanish. Unsurprisingly, English
is the clearly the language that have the largest GE impact on world trade. The ranking of
the other languages depends on the specification and the type of trade. For manufacturing
without diminishing returns, Chinese places a relatively distant second, with three of the
five continental European languages (Spanish, French, and German) not far behind. For
manufacturing with diminishing returns, the results are similar, only with more disper-
sion. The results for services are more muted, reflecting the relatively large non-language
barriers that affect cross-border services trade, with English now inducing roughly double
the effect of any other language.
91Simonovska & Waugh (2014) demonstrate strong evidence in favor of using a trade elasticity of around
−4 for manufacturing trade. This value also turns out to be reasonably standard for modeling services trade
as well; see Donnelly, Johnson, Tsigas, & Ingersoll (2004).
92For simplicity’s sake, I model each type of trade as a independent system. In principle, one might also
wish to incorporate GE linkages across sectors by explicitly modeling consumer budgeting decisions over
manufacturing consumption versus services consumption. The same could be said for allowing for mobile
factors of production. I refrain from introducing these additional complexities.
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Table 2.5: Total Language Effects (%∆ Total Trade / Internal Trade)
Chinese English French German Italian Russian Spanish
A. Globalization effects of language shocks based on estimated trade costs (%∆G)
Manuf. (w/o d.r.) 1.90 3.21 1.77 1.78 1.59 1.62 1.86
Manuf. (w/ d.r.) 3.19 4.51 2.84 2.84 2.66 2.74 3.08
Services 0.37 0.77 0.42 0.42 0.36 0.37 0.42
B. Globalization effects of language shocks when other trade barriers are removed (%∆G)
Manuf. (w/o d.r.) 8.50 11.15 5.68 5.74 5.45 5.47 6.32
Manuf. (w/ d.r.) 14.52 16.69 9.54 9.57 9.24 9.33 10.51
Services 5.12 13.41 5.05 4.82 4.71 4.60 5.82
“Total Language Effects” shown here are the %-changes in a globalization index, G,
defined as the ratio between total world trade vs. total internal trade, resulting from
a 0.1 increase in the number of speakers of a given language in every country.
In Panel B of Table 2.5, I consider an additional experiment where I first remove all
non-language trade barriers between countries (that is, I first set all β’s in (22) equal to zero.)
In prosaic terms, this exercise is meant to capture the idea of a counterfactual “Pangea”-
type world where neither geographical factors (e.g. distance, borders, etc.) nor historical
relationships (e.g. colonial ties) have any incidence on trade barriers. Instead, all trade
frictions are assumed to be driven by the degree to which two countries share common
spoken languages.
Under this alternate scenario, I first note that the changes in G for each language are
larger, since language barriers now comprise 100% of all trading frictions. It still holds that
English serves as the most valuable lanuage for promoting global trade overall. We also
see that English becomes even more dominant at promoting global services trade. Most in-
terestingly, however, the relative appeal of other languages for promoting manufacturing
trade is now very different. In particular, Chinese emerges as a reasonably close competi-
tor to English relative to other languages, especially under the assumption of diminishing
returns.
This last result is particularly striking since, unlike the European languages, Chinese
serves as a major spoken language in only two countries in the sample, China and Tai-
wan.93 Noting the relatively small size of Taiwan, the obvious reason for this increase in
93As a point of fact, Chinese is also spoken in several other nations across the Asia Pacific Region, including
Singapore, Malaysia, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The broad term “Chinese” can also refer to sev-
eral different dialects. For simplicity’s sake, I am assuming Mandarin is the common tongue of speakers of
different dialects, as is often the case.
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the relative appeal of Chinese is increased opportunities for trade with China specifically.
Since China is the world’s second largest manufacturing economy in the sample (behind
only the U.S.), the exercise of making China less “distant” as a trading partner for the
Western hemisphere seems to work heavily in favor of making Chinese more viable as a
global language for manufacturing trade. This same effect would not be present for ser-
vices trade, however, since China’s production of services only makes up only 5% of world
output for services, versus 15% for manufacturing.
Notably, the narrowing of the gap between Chinese and English for manufacturing
is especially pronounced under the assumption of diminishing returns. Intuitively, as
the (large) existing communication linkages between countries that already speak at least
some English realize smaller returns, an equivalent increase increase in Chinese, which has
not been widely adopted outside of mainland Asia, becomes relatively more valuable.
In sum, if language learning does indeed facilitate trade, it also seems to follow that op-
portunities for trade may be an important motivation for the language acquisition choices
we observe in the world today. It likewise seems highly possible that language education
policy could be a potentially important determinant of the path of future globalization.
While the immediate future will likely tend towards continued investment in English and
other European languages, the longterm outlook may depend on the length of the shadow
cast on trade by geography and history.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Foreign language communication is likely an important omitted variable in gravity esti-
mations of international trade costs. If spoken language ties really do drive increased trade
through the facilitation of communication the omission of this variable should lead to un-
derestimation of the importance of communication in general, not just foreign language ties
in particular. My PPML and IV estimations both generally confirm this logic: the measured
effect of native language ties grow substantially for both manufacturing and services trade,
especially for manufacturing trade when the possibility of translation effects (diminishing
returns) is taken into account. It similarly follows that, as these more specific ways of
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thinking about shared common language effects are introduced, the importance assigned
to the traditional “common official language” variable diminishes.
Interestingly, the effect of foreign language ties on services trade behaves very differ-
ently than its effect on manufacturing trade, across several different specifications. Trade
in services generally does not exhibit diminishing returns with respect to language ties;
I also observe some evidence that the measured effect of common language ties on ser-
vice trade is more likely to reflect the importance of omitted cultural biases for trade—and
therefore less likely to reflect the practical importance of communication.
Performing some basic general equilibrium counterfactuals confirms that English is the
most effective language for promoting increased global trade, and especially for promoting
global services trade. Interestingly, however, removing all estimated non-language barri-
ers to trade reveals that China’s geographical and historical remoteness from the major
Western economies has greatly diminished the relative appeal of Chinese as a competing
global language for promoting manufacturing trade.
Projecting the future of language acquisition based on these latter results requires weigh-
ing competing considerations about the future path of globalization versus the probable
development of China as a more services-related economy. In all likelihood, current efforts
to liberalize world services trade (a prominent goal of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership, for example), would, if anything, only re-inforce English’s status as the
most desireable language for promoting world trade. On the other hand, as the general in-
cidence of geography and history on trade barriers fades with time, and as China becomes
equally prominent as a producer of services as it is a producer of manufactured goods, it
does not seem unlikely that Chinese might one day be equally prized as an international
language.
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Part 3
The Problem of Peace: A Story of Corruption,
Destruction, and Rebellion94
3.1 Introduction
Every government that faces the prospect of civil war has a fundamental choice to make:
push for a peaceful settlement or engage the rebel forces in destructive war. Since the de-
struction associated with war has devastating economic consequences that could in princi-
ple be avoided by settlement, one might expect that the private interests of these actors—
governments and rebellion leaders alike—would normally be best served by avoiding war.
Yet that is not what we observe. On the contrary, the empirical civil war literature often
links the onset of war all too closely with indicators of self-interest, such as the corrup-
tion of state finances, the presence of natural resource wealth (and other rent sources),
and/or the low incomes of potential rebel recruits (see, for instance, Collier & Hoeffler,
2004; Fjelde, 2009; Besley & Persson, 2011; Dube & Vargas, 2013). The question arises:
if civil war is so closely associated with incentives for economic gain, then what are the
economic incentives that drive the emergence of civil war itself?
General theories of conflict have been put forward in answer to this question, starting
with Fearon’s (1995) argument that the emergence of war reflects an inability to commit
to a mutually beneficial peace.95 Recent refinements of Fearon’s “commitment problem”
reasoning, beginning with Garfinkel & Skaperdas (2000), have emphasized how victory in
war today may be the only way to secure a peace that does not involve continued costly
investments in arming in the future. McBride & Skaperdas (2006) and Powell (2013) have
each drawn on Garfinkel & Skaperdas’s essential argument as a way of explaining the
emergence of civil war in particular. Otherwise, as documented in Blattman & Miguel
94With Constantinos Syropoulos.
95Fearon also formalizes “imperfect information” as an alternative explanation for war. Powell (2006) dis-
cusses the advantages and disadvantages of each approach.
76
(2010), relatively little theoretical work in this area has considered how motivations for
civil war may be fundamentally distinct from motivations for other types of war. We, how-
ever, isolate an overlooked source of potential inefficiency which draws more narrowly on
the specific nature of civil war: the fact that one side is a “government” who may use state
fiscal institutions to manipulate (and prey on) its rival’s source of recruits.
Specifically, we explore an otherwise standard model of armed conflict over rents from
an insecure resource (e.g. Tullock, 1980) that has three main distinguishing features. First,
in order to stake a claim to these rents,96 both sides must each hire armies from a common
pool of labor (as in Garfinkel, Skaperdas, & Syropoulos, 2008). Second, the two play-
ers may resolve their competing claims by one of two ways, “conflict” (which destroys
resources, including labor) or “settlement” (which preserves them). Settlement is not cost-
less, however. All settlements are conducted in the “shadow of conflict” (see Anbarci,
Skaperdas, & Syropoulos, 2002; Esteban & Sa´kovics, 2007), such that productive resources
must be diverted towards arming under both conflict as well as settlement. Third, one of
the players (the government) can directly influence the common pool of labor via the use
of fiscal instruments: it may either prey on labor’s income using “taxes” or it may sup-
plement it by issuing “subsidies”.97 Importantly, labor may evade taxation by joining the
rebel group. Higher taxes thus reduce both the size of the government’s tax base and its
control over rents by swelling the ranks of the rebel group’s forces.
Our main findings regarding conflict and settlement follow directly from this central
role given to fiscal policy. The government does not grant subsidies out of benevolence
(it has none) nor does it always extract maximal taxes (no one would pay them.) Rather,
its desire to amass both rents and tax revenues requires a delicate balancing act. In the
case where the value of rents is very large, it prefers to issue generous subsidies in order
to dissuade the population from siding with its rival. On the other hand, when rents are
less valuable, it would rather ignore them altogether and focus on taxing workers. But
subsidizing a large labor force is expensive. And even the smallest presence of rents can
96These “rents” may stem from either natural resource wealth (e.g. oil, timber) or more generally the privi-
leges of power (e.g. diversion of foreign aid efforts). Recent empirical evidence (respectively, Dube & Vargas,
2013 and Besley & Persson, 2011) supports either interpretation.
97Our arguments may be generalized to include other policies which directly impact welfare, however, e.g.
the production of public goods.
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incentivize the recruitment of labor from the government’s tax base towards predatory
activities. Perversely, the destruction of productive resources associated with conflict can
resolve both of these issues. Allowing citizens to be killed and/or displaced makes buying
allegiance from the remainder more affordable.98 And setting oil fields ablaze may be a
useful way to minimize interference with the extraction of tax revenues.
Opportunities for bargained settlements tend to hold the government’s incentives for
choosing destruction in check, but not always. Logically, conflict can never be preferred ex
post (i.e. once arming is determined) if avoiding destruction creates a positive surplus that
can be shared. Nonetheless, the government’s control over fiscal institutions grants it dis-
cretionary power over both the size and sign of the eventual surplus. Accordingly, it may
intentionally induce a negative surplus, and therefore conflict, by choosing a large enough
subsidy such that its savings on subsidizing a reduced labor force outweigh the benefits
from preserving non-labor resources. This scenario only arises when the value of contested
rents is large enough that the government finds labor destruction to be advantageous; oth-
erwise, settlement always dominates conflict ex post. Preferences for conflict may emerge
under more general circumstances, however, if we allow the government to pre-commit
to conflict ex ante in order to influence subsequent arming choices. Conflicts that mainly
destroy the contested rents themselves can only be preferred ex ante, for example.99
Broadly speaking, our explanations for the emergence of conflict are in tune with Fearon’s
(1995) rationalization of war as a “commitment problem”, but differ in important ways. In
Fearon’s original framework, war emerges because strong players will not find promises
of future concessions by weak players to be credible if the balance of power is expected
to shift exogenously in later periods. Our reasoning is more compact. In our analysis, the
goverment prefers conflict because conflict itself is a useful tool for shifting the balance of
power, whether it is by permitting larger subsidies (when the value of rents is large) or by
directly reducing rebel incentives to recruit soldiers (when it is small). To phrase these re-
98Even if governments take an active role in violence against the population they still may be successful at
obscuring the public record using misinformation, as discussed by Lowi (2005) in the case of Algeria.
99As we discuss, this particular result requires that the division of the surplus under “settlement” introduces
additional incentives for arming, as in the bargaining process proposed by Esteban & Sa´kovics (2007). The
Esteban & Sa´kovics framework is not sufficient by itself for destruction to become appealing; the role of fiscal
policy is still crucial.
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sults as a “commitment problem”, war occurs because the rebel leader (the weaker player)
cannot commit to restrain his recruitment of labor for a given level of taxation.
Interestingly, the logic of commitment problems can actually work both ways in our
setting, since commitments to conflict ex ante are not always credible ex post. This feature
of our model is notable. When conflict arises in Garfinkel & Skaperdas’s (2000) multi-
period model, for example, it is always unambiguously preferred both ex ante and ex post.
Other theories which generate preferences for conflict in a static, complete information set-
ting (e.g. Bevia´ & Corcho´n, 2010; Chang & Luo, 2013) require that commitments to conflict
ex ante are credible and irreversible. Our analysis, however, shows that not being able to
credibly commit to conflict (as opposed to Fearon’s concept of not being able to commit
to peace) can itself be an important commitment problem with its own negative conse-
quences both for private payoffs and for welfare. Giving the government the opportunity
to set fiscal policy at the beginning of the game may help resolve this latter commitment
problem.
In addition, the fact that we allow for both the balance of power (i.e. the build-up of
arms) and the mode of interaction (i.e. conflict vs. settlement) to be endogenously deter-
mined allows us to capture the notion of an “armed peace”: just because the two sides
avoid war does not mean they cease trying to outmanuever one another for rents. Our
model therefore permits analysis of novel trade-offs between “peace” and (socially waste-
ful) increases in both arming and taxation. Strikingly, we find that both overall national
income and total labor income may be higher under conflict than under settlement.100
Distinguishing in this way between incentives for arming and incentives for conflict,
especially in the context of conflict within a small open economy, also grants a unique
opportunity to explore how both peace and efficiency respond to external shocks and in-
terventions. We focus specifically on how these incentives respond to changes in the prices
of tradable goods. The formation of armed groups in response to trade shocks has been
explored previously in Garfinkel, Skaperdas, & Syropoulos (2008) and Dal Bo´ & Dal Bo´
(2011), but we add to these perspectives in two important ways. First, we show that shocks
100The concept of what is best for “welfare” here beyond pure income considerations is beyond our scope,
however. We do not intend to deny or minimize the terrible human costs of war. Rather, our intent is to
illustrate how a “peace” between corrupt elites may be inherently problematic in its own right.
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that favor increases in arming do not necessarily favor conflict (and vice versa). Second,
we also consider the implications of allowing players to import weapons as part of their
arming technologies. Surprisingly, restricting the supply of these imported weapons can
have the indirect effect of making conflict more likely.
In addition, because we place state institutions at the heart of the interactions, the
model provides many opportunities to explore how limits on the institutional capacity
of the state matter in this context. We focus on two. First, we show that limiting the
government’s capacity to tax can tilt the balance towards peace. Intuitively, making the
government relatively more dependent on contestable rents eliminates the appeal of de-
stroying them.101 Second (and perhaps more surprisingly), we find that limits on the abil-
ity to subsidize the rewards to labor may likewise favor peace. That is to say, restricting the
government’s ability to “bribe” its rival’s source of recruits with gifts of land, food, work
projects, and other transfers may be an effective way to promote peace, because of how it
may use these instruments strategically in combination with conflict.102 Obviously, how
state institutions interact with the power dynamics of civil war is a much more complex
issue than we depict it here.103 Nonetheless, the powerful incentives we identify in our
analysis suggest they may not only be important for understanding the nature of civil war,
but for understanding its genesis as well.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 of our paper summarizes the model,
starting with the basic conflict game and then introducing the possibility of negotiated
settlement. In section 3.3, we establish the main result that situating both players within
a common policy environment makes it possible for the player who controls policy to
prefer conflict over peace, under several different variations of the model. Section 3.4 then
discusses the novel dynamics of peace, arming, and taxation in this framework in response
101This perspective resembles that of Acemoglu (2010), who argues that a highly capable predatory state
would not hesitate to exploit conflict as a means to gain tighter control over its tax base. It would also seem
consistent with the empirical findings of Fjelde (2009), who shows that civil war is closely linked with mea-
sures of state corruption (which arguably reflect the state’s capacity for corruption), but only when natural
resource wealth is low.
102For an example of how government forces have obviously and deliberately combined generous fiscal
transfers with acts of violence in this way during civil war, see Schirmer’s (1998) account of the “Beans and
Bullets” strategy employed by the Guatemalan government during the 1980s. Section 3.3.4 touches on other
examples as well.
103See Acemoglu & Robinson (2001, 2006), Besley & Persson (2011), and De Luca, Sekeris, & Vargas (2011)
for other recent perspectives examining this subject.
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to external shocks and interventions. Section 2.6 adds concluding remarks.
3.2 Model
In a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy, there are L
ordinary individuals—each endowed with one unit of labor—and two key actors/players
at center stage: a kleptocratic governing elite, which we personify as “the ruler”, and a
self-serving leader of a rebel group. These agents are indexed by 1 and 2, respectively.
Actor i securely controls Ki ≥ 0 units of a resource which, for convenience, we refer to as
“capital”. The ruler also possesses K0 additional units of capital; however, its ownership
of K0 is contested by the rebel group.104 Their competing claims can be resolved in one of
two ways: through destructive “conflict” or through peaceful “settlement”. Under conflict
a fraction δK ∈ [0, 1) of the contested resource K0 and/or a fraction δL ∈ [0, 1) of the labor
force are “destroyed”,105 whereas under settlement all endowments are preserved.106 It
would appear then, by preempting destruction, settlement ought to dominate conflict.
As we will show, however, both conflict and settlement are socially costly in this set-
ting because they divert resources away from useful production. Furthermore, we will
illustrate that, when power is endogenously determined, conflict may actually enhance
the advantages the government derives from controlling the levers of policy.
3.2.1 Overview of the Game
The central innovation in our framework is our assumption that the rival groups differ
fundamentally in the following respect: the ruler has the capacity to extract wage taxes
from ordinary labor whereas the rebel leader does not. The ruler’s capacity to obtain such
revenues is limited, however. First, he can only tax (at a rate τ) workers employed in legal
sectors. Furthermore, his capacity is limited by the presence of an institutional ceiling τmax
104Even though the rebels may securely “own” a portion K2 of this resource, we can still think of all de facto
legal claims to this resource as belonging to the government. K2 then is the amount of appropriation that the
ruler is unable to contest.
105The “labor destruction” we are considering here is not so much the killing of soldiers in battle, but rather
the death (and/or dislocation) of citizens that occurs in civil wars.
106In general, conflict may also result in the destruction of K1 and/or K2. We focus on the destruction of K0,
as in Garfinkel & Skaperdas (2000), in order to preserve comparability with the existing literature.
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(i.e., τ ≤ τmax), as in Besley and Persson (2011), as well as a lower bound τmin < 0, such that
the feasible interval of wage tax/subsidy rates is T := [τmin, τmax]. More figuratively, since
a civil war-prone state may not explicitly be able to collect “income taxes” in this way, τ
may alternatively be thought of as the degree to which the government preys on economic
activity via corrupt practices.107 As we will see, the ability to wield such policies is valuable
to the ruler not only as a source of payoffs, but also as an instrument for influencing the
balance of power.
A second key feature of the game we consider is the build-up of each side’s military
capabilities, which we denote by Si for i = 1, 2. It is this measure of military strength that
matters for power and the resolution of conflict and settlement. Each player acquires Si
units of strength in order to increase his share φi of the contested “capital” K0 in the event
of conflict. We assume φi is given by a standard contest success function (CSF),
φi(Si, Sj) =

fi(Si)
fi(Si)+ f j(Sj)
if ∑h=1,2 Sh > 0
1 if ∑h=1,2 Sh = 0
, for i 6= j = 1, 2, (25)
where fi(·) ≥ 0, fi(0) = 0, f ′i (·) > 0, limSi→0 f ′i (Si) = ∞, and f ′′i (·) ≤ 0.108 Thus, by
definition, the ruler will control the insecure resource K0 if the rebel group does not contest
it. It is easy to verify that φi is increasing in Si (φiSi ≡ ∂φi/∂Si > 0) and decreasing in Sj
(φiSj ≡ ∂φi/∂Sj < 0, j 6= i). A particular functional form for fi(·) is
fi(Si) = ξiSmi , m, ξi ∈ (0, 1], (26)
where ∑j ξ j = 1, such that ξi is the “relative power” of agent i, and m captures the return
to arming. This functional form is widely employed in the literatures on rent-seeking,
tournaments, and conflict. We, too, will make use of it to obtain sharper results.
Naturally, military strength will depend in part on the number of soldiers each side has
107Without loss of generality, we could have also described τ as a tax on production, since the ruler already
lays claim to all legal returns to capital and since firms are perfectly competitive. Even τ < 0 may therefore be
associated with some degree of “corruption” since the ruler can still draw on the state’s capital wealth for his
private consumption.
108This way of modeling rent competition is attributed to Tullock (1980). For a detailed discussion of this
class of models, see Hirshleifer (1989) and Skaperdas (1996).
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at its disposal. But workers and soldiers alike must be hired from the same pool of labor.
Explicitly speaking, each worker has the following occupational choices: (i) get employed
in the production of consumption goods in the legal economy; (ii) serve in the military
(controlled by the government); and (iii) join the rebel group (controlled by its leader).109
The sequence of actions/events is as follows:
1. The government announces a per unit wage tax/subsidy rate τ ∈ T in the legal
sectors.
2. The government and the rebel leader determine non-cooperatively and simultane-
ously the size of their respective security forces (i.e., S1 and S2), each taking the ac-
tions of its rival as given.
3. Once arming commitments are declared, the contenders announce their respective
preferences over “conflict” and “settlement”. If at least one side chooses conflict,
a contest ensues in which player i wins a fraction φi of (1− δK)K0. However, if
both sides choose settlement, they go on to negotiate a mutually agreeable and non-
destructive division of the relevant surplus (see below).
4. Private production, consumption and trading decisions take place.
In the context of the above game, we wish to identify circumstances under which the ruler
(and/or possibly the rebel leader) may prefer conflict over settlement in Stage 3. As we
will demonstrate, the emergence of conflict is wholly dependent on how the government’s
discretion over tax policy shapes the strategic landscape in which both players make their
arming decisions. We will also show, by considering other timing structures, that having
the ability to set τ in advance provides the government with a useful way to credibly
commit to conflict “ex ante”, i.e. before arming decisions are made. Such commitments
may not be credible otherwise.
A related modeling choice we should underscore here is that we only allow one player
(the ruler) to set tax policy. What happens if, by contrast, we were to assume complete
109Conceptually, an individual worker or household could be employed in all three activities simultaneously.
The key point here is that the allocation of the labor endowment across these tasks depends on the tax rate.
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symmetry, such that both players may “tax” the population? We show in the Appendix
that our essential results regarding conflict flow through under the timing structure de-
scribed above. We stick to the case where only one player controls tax policy in our main
presentation both because the adherence to symmetry is limiting and because it seems rea-
sonable to assume that controlling the state grants the ruler a significant advantage in the
ability to exercise such policies.
Put succinctly, an equilibrium in our model will be summarized by a tax policy (τ), non-
cooperatively chosen military strength levels (S1,S2), and the mode of interaction (“con-
flict” or “settlement”). Actions by both players will be determined by backwards induc-
tion. That is, the government decides taxes in the first stage by internalizing how taxes
will shape arming decisions and, ultimately, the mode of interaction. These decisions will
be based on the other parameters of the model, most notably the size of the labor force,
the size of the insecure resource, international prices, and the degree and incidence of de-
struction in the event of conflict. We now describe each of the key decision points in detail,
starting with the allocation of productive resources.
3.2.2 Production and Employment
The production technology for each consumption good j (= x, z) is described by the unit
cost function cj ≡ cj(w, r), which is increasing, concave and linear homogeneous in factor
prices. cjw = ∂cj/∂w and c
j
r = ∂cj/∂r then serve as the conditional demand functions
associated with one unit of good j. We assume that production technologies can be ranked
in terms of factor intensities and factor intensity reversals are absent. Due to competitive
pricing in the output markets, we have the following invertible system
pj = cj(w, r), for j = x, z (27)
when both goods are produced. In less technical terms, rewards to both labor (w) and cap-
ital (r) in the model are pinned down by international trading prices, which (by our “small
open economy” assumption) cannot be affected by changes in domestic production.110
110This price linkage, which is known in the literature as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Stolper & Samuel-
son, 1941), simplifies the analysis of a small open economy considerably. We could relax this assumption by
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To examine how incomes and payoffs are determined we must also describe the pro-
duction of military strength, Si. We view this strength as a composite good that de-
pends on the size of one’s forces and the degree of armament. More specifically, we sup-
pose Si is a linear homogeneous function of the number of troops Li and the quantity of
guns/weapons Gi bought internationally (i = 1, 2). Let ψi ≡ ψ(wi, q) be the cost function
associated with the purchase of one unit of military strength by group i, where wi and q
capture the costs of hiring one soldier and purchasing one gun respectively.111 The total
cost to group i of securing Si units of military force is ψiSi.112
To keep the analysis compact, we mainly assume a Cobb-Douglas production function
for Si. Furthermore, as labor is an essential input for strength, we define θiLS ≡ wiψiw/ψi ≥
θiLS ∈ (0, 1] as the share of labor (troops) in the cost of producing security. Under the
Cobb-Douglas assumption, this share is constant. For more general production functions,
the rebel leader’s expenditure share will depend on τ. Specifically, θ2τ > 0 if guns and labor
are substitutes; θ2τ < 0 if they are complements.
Recall K(δK) ≡ (1− δK)K0 + K1 + K2 and L(δL) ≡ (1− δL)L give the effective endow-
ments of capital and labor. Letting Qj denote the aggregate output of good j (= x, z), the
conditions for full employment of resources can be written down as
cxr Qx + c
z
r Qz + ψ
1
r S1 + ψ
2
r S2 = K(δK) (28a)
cxwQx + c
z
wQz + ψ
1
wS1 + ψ
2
wS2 = L(δL), (28b)
where, again, δJ ∈ (0, 1) under conflict (J = K, L) and δJ = 0 under settlement. To keep
the analysis simple and compact we will assume these endowments are sufficiently large
considering the possibility of complete specialization in production or by introducing specific factor inputs.
These extensions would alter the analysis by restoring the sensitivity of factor prices to factor endowment
changes and, therefore, to arming decisions.
111This cost function for Si is unique in its usage of tradable weapons; other work (see, for instance, Garfinkel,
Skaperdas, & Syropoulos, 2008) tends to assume instead the contested resource is itself involved in the pro-
duction of military force. In principle we could likewise allow Si to involve capital, without affecting our
main results. We could also asssume the two players face different costs of acquiring weapons, without loss
of generality.
112For simplicity we assume that both groups face the same technology ψ(·) but we could amend the analysis
to capture the possibility that rebels may have access to an inferior technology. We could also consider cases
where the two players face different constraints on their abilities to raise revenues through taxes and/or where
q1 6= q2.
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so that the country’s aggregate production of consumption goods remains diversified.113
A crucial determinant of the endogenous asymmetry that underlies our main results
is the allocation of labor. Let w be the pre-tax wage rate paid by employers (including
the state) to employees in formal/legal markets. In the presence of a wage tax τ, workers
in these sectors will obtain the after-tax rate (1− τ)w. In contrast, members of the rebel
group can evade taxation.114 Nonetheless, because occupational choice is based on the
reward to productive labor, the effective opportunity cost (to a self-serving rebel leader)
of recruiting an additional rebel will be w2 = (1 − τ)w. Clearly, the rebel leader’s cost
function of building/maintaining a force of S2 will be ψ((1− τ)w, q)S2, where again q is
the price per gun paid to international suppliers of weapons. The ruler’s opportunity cost
of arming differs, however. Each soldier he hires not only costs him the compensation
owed, (1− τ)w, but also reduces his tax collection from the productive workforce by an
amount wτ. The cost to the state of securing a force S1 will then be ψ(w, q)S1; in other
words, his cost of hiring soldiers w1 is not (1 − τ)w but rather the full before-tax wage
w.115 His choice of fiscal policy therefore not only serves as an instrument for extracting
revenues from his tax base, but also directly affects the balance of power by influencing his
opponent’s cost of arming (without affecting his own). We pay special attention to how τ
shapes the nature of equilibria in our characterization of payoff functions below.
3.2.3 Conflict
We are now ready to derive the equilibria that hold in the event of conflict, and in turn
serve as “threat points” in the bargaining game. Let all agents’ consumption preferences
be identical, homothetic, and risk-neutral. Payoffs for all agents are then given by the
113In principle, if either endowment is sufficiently small, the economy will completely specialize in the pro-
duction of one of the two goods. In this case, the relative reward to capital, r/w, will no longer be held fixed
by world prices, but instead will vary endogenously with the amount of labor employed in legal production
as well as the amount of destruction.
114This assumption is consistent with the observation that in developing nations the state’s ability to tax the
informal sector is woefully inadequate (Marcouiller & Young, 1995).
115The analysis could be extended to consider conscription that bestows the state the right to recruit soldiers
at below the market wage rates. The state and the rebel leader may also face different prices for guns perhaps
because the suppliers of guns in the world market treat them differently. We also may consider cases in
which solders require additional compensation for disutilities associated with fighting. At any rate, our main
results still hold so long as these additional considerations concerning compensation are not related to the
government’s tax choice.
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following indirect utility function
vi = µ(px, pz)Yi, (29)
where Yi denotes individual i’s income, pj the price of good j, and µ(·) the marginal utility
of income.116 Then, because world relative trading prices are taken as given, µ(·) can be
treated as a constant, and utility maximization becomes isomorphic to income maximiza-
tion.
Incorporating these model elements into the indirect utility functions in (29) delivers
the following payoff functions for players 1 and 2 and for aggregate welfare under conflict:
Payoffs under Conflict:
U1 = µ
[
rK1 + Aφ1 − ψ1S1 + τ(w(1− δL)L− wψ2wS2)
]
(30a)
U2 = µ
[
rK2 + Aφ2 − ψ2S2
]
(30b)
U ≡ µ(1− τ)w(1− δL)L +∑
i
Ui, (30c)
where A ≡ r(1− δK)K0 is the value of the contested rents (the “prize”). Several observa-
tions are in order here. First, by virtue of the fact that the ruler has exclusive access to tax
revenues, the size of its tax base (the expression inside the parentheses in the third term
in (30a) is important to him. Clearly, the larger the tax base the larger his tax revenues.
Second, by reducing the price of a recruit in the rebel group relative to the price of guns,
higher taxes erode the tax base due to substitution effects. Third, by reducing the rebel
leader’s opportunity cost ψ2 of building additional military capacity (but not the ruler’s
cost ψ1), higher taxes also generate an adverse scale effect that would further erode the
tax revenue base.117 Fourth, as noted above, higher taxes also reduce the ruler’s share of
rents in the appropriative contest (φ1), again via the effect on ψ2. Naturally, a self-serving
116Note that, because prices are fixed, introducing risk aversion would not alter our anlysis substantially
unless we consider a “winner-take-all”-type contest.
117Erosion of the tax base may also arise in the presence of labor-leisure choice that gives rise to a Laffer-
type curve in revenues. Though our analysis has interesting implications for the shape of the Laffer curve, it
differs from standard analyses in that the diversion of labor into distributive conflict further undermines the
tax authority’s ability to appropriate resource rents and is, of course, socially wasteful. Clearly, the higher the
death rate under conflict the lower the tax base.
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kleptocrat will aim to balance these effects at the margin.
In terms of overall welfare, two additional points deserve some emphasis here. First, it
is plain from (30c) that aggregate income in the economy decreases when more resources
are diverted from production into arming. This relationship has important implications for
welfare throughout the paper: to the extent that peace is associated with more extractive
tax policy, the resulting increase in arming can mitigate, or even offset, the benefits of
avoiding destruction.
Second, however, measuring “welfare” in this way has the disadvantage of ignoring
considerations that should be given towards loss of human life in the event of labor de-
struction (δL > 0). We can motivate this simplified perspective by noting that much of the
disruption of the labor endowment that occurs during civil wars is via dislocation—rather
than death—though we admittedly do not model additional human costs that may be asso-
ciated with this latter channel either. Nonetheless, we do think it worthwhile to highlight
the amount of income that is captured specifically by labor—(1− τ)w(1− δL)L—as an al-
ternative welfare criterion to focus on since it is naturally easier to be more sympathetic to
the welfare of the “powerless” in this kind of setting.
Keeping in mind that A ≡ r(1 − δK)K0 captures the value of contested rents (the
“prize”), the first-order conditions (FOCs) for interior solutions for arming are:
UiSi = Aφ
i
Si − ψi = 0, for i = 1, 2. (31)
It is straightforward to show that our general assumptions on the nature of the CSF imply
the above system of equations has a unique solution.118 Moreover, the simplifying func-
tional form (26) (which requires fi(Si) ≡ ξiSmi , m ≤ 1) allows us to present an analytical
solution to (31). Let a tilde “˜” over variables describe their noncooperative equilibrium
118As noted above, this solution will qualify as equilibrium only if the associated quantities of factor input
demands are sufficiently low (as compared to the economy’s effective factor endowments noted in (28) so that
production of consumption goods remains diversified. To avoid unnecessary complications that may cloud
the clarity of our arguments, we continue to maintain the assumption of sufficient slack in factor endowments
so that the possibility of complete specialization is not a concern. The Appendix touches on some of the
complications that may enter otherwise.
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values under the contest. One can show that:
φ˜1 =
1
1+ γ
, φ˜2 =
γ
1+ γ
, S˜i =
Amφ˜1φ˜2
ψi
=
Amγ/ψi
(1+ γ)2
, (i = 1, 2). (32)
where
ξ ≡ ξ2/ξ1, ρ ≡ ψ2/ψ1, and γ ≡ ξρ−m. (33)
Parameters ξ and m capture the technology of conflict, whereas ρ (which is really a function
that depends on the wage tax/subsidy rate τ, the wage rate w, and gun prices qj) captures
the rebel leader’s relative cost of arming.
Again, what is important to note here is the role of τ in determining equilibria via its
effect on relative unit costs (ρ). As Fig. 3.1 illustrates, an increase in τ shifts the distribution
of power towards the rebel leader by making it cheaper for him (but not the ruler) to hire
soldiers. Furthermore, if we assume ξ < 1 (as in Fig. 3.1), such that the ruler has an
inherent military advantage, increases in τ also have the effect of increasing the overall
level of arming because they make the contest more competitive.
To preface any consideration of how taxes may be used strategically, it is useful first to
address the following question: How does an increase in the value of the contested prize
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A (which may be due to a fall in the rate of destruction, an increase in K0, or a rise in
the rental price of capital r) affect agent payoffs and efficiency? Inspection of (32) readily
reveals that both agents will expand their military strengths in proportion to A without any
resulting change in shares (power). Applying this observation to the rebel leader’s payoff
function in (30b) readily implies (after invoking the envelope theorem) that the increase
in A proves unambiguously beneficial to him because the direct (and positive) effect of
the prize on the payoff dominates the strategic (and negative) effect of its rival’s increased
strength. But this is not necessarily the case for the ruler nor for overall welfare. Inspection
of (30a), for example, indicates the presence of effects similar to those experienced by the
rebel leader. However, there is a new adverse effect here: the resulting increase in the
rebel leader’s military capability S˜2 (effected by hiring more troops and purchasing more
weapons) reduces the ruler’s tax collections by eroding his tax base. The intensity of this
adverse effect varies in proportion with the size of the tax, thus generating the possibility
that the ruler’s payoff and overall efficiency may fall if the tax rate is sufficiently high.
For clarity we collect these observations in Proposition 3.1 below.
Proposition 3.1 For any given wage tax/subsidy rate τ, payoffs under conflict are related to the
value of the contested rents A as follows:
(a) There exists a tax rate τ ∈ (0, 1) such that dU˜1/dA T 0 if τ S τ.
(b) The rebel leader’s payoff function is increasing in A.
(c) Aggregate welfare may fall as A rises if the tax rate is sufficiently high.
The prediction in part (a) that the ruler’s payoff may fall with the value of the contested
rents is interesting. As noted earlier, this relationship is due to the rebel leader’s increased
willingness to recruit more soliders when the size of the contested pie increases, thereby
eroding the state’s tax base. The fact that this effect dominates when τ is large suggests the
ruler will prefer lower taxes for larger values of A.119
Part (b) is due to the fact that the direct (and positive) effect of an increase in A on
the rebel leader’s payoff dominates the strategic (and negative) effect of the ruler’s ex-
pansion of military capacity. The prediction in part (c), that aggregate welfare may fall
119In the proof of part (a) in the Appendix we also examine the dependence of τ on the technologies of
conflict and arming.
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when the value of the contested resources rises is also interesting because it suggests, at
least in part, the possibility that negotiation and settlement may help improve efficiency.
We will address this issue in subsequent discussion. Still, it is worth noting that we may
view this welfare finding as an example of “immiserizing growth” (Bhagwati, 1958) due
to internal conflict and suboptimal fiscal policy. Even closer may be its relationship to
the more recent literature on the “resource curse” problem—see Sachs & Warner (1995);
Ross (2003); Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik (2006); Robinson, Torvik, & Verdier (2006); among
others—which identifies a negative link between resource abundance and rates of growth
or, more liberally, welfare. While our work resembles the strand that attributes ineffi-
ciency to rent-seeking and domestic conflict—see Torvik (2002); Garfinkel, Skaperdas, &
Syropoulos (2008)—it differs in that the tax plays a pivotal role here. In particular, if τ = 0,
an increase in the value of rents benefits both contenders, as would be the case in a stan-
dard contest over a fixed prize.120 For clarity and added emphasis we summarize a more
general version of this observation in
Corollary 3.1 If the tax rate on labor is sufficiently low or negative (specifically, if τ < τ), then
an increase in the value of the contested rents A is Pareto improving under conflict.
Several questions arise at this juncture. Going to an earlier stage of the game, if the ruler
uses fiscal policy to further his own interest what are the salient features of his optimal
policy? Does this policy benefit the rebel leader? And, what are its consequences for
economic efficiency? Moreover, how does the optimal tax/subsidy, and the payoffs it gives
rise to, depend on the value of contested rents? Clearly, the ruler’s discretion over τ is a
key strategic consideration in this setting and thus we need to examine it in more detail.
3.2.4 Optimal Tax Policy under Conflict
To address the above issues let us first derive explicitly the effects of taxes on conflict
payoffs. Starting with the ruler, differentiation of his payoff U˜1 with respect to τ (while
120Since taxes are still being considered exogenously here, at this point it would be fair to point out that the
fall in income comes purely from the change in the government’s payoff. We will see later, however, that
under certain conditions ordinary citizens (labor) can also be negatively affected by increases in A because of
associated changes in taxes and/or destruction.
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normalizing µ = 1 for simplicity) yields
U˜1τ = w
[
(1− δL)L− ψ2wS˜2
]
+ τw2ψ2wwS˜
2 +
(
Aφ1S2 − τwψ2w
)
S˜2τ. (34)
What (34) says is that while taxes have the direct, positive effect of increasing revenues
extracted per worker, the ruler must also balance this benefit against several other negative
effects at the margin. These effects largely occur because S˜2τ > 0: making it less expensive
for the rebel leader to hire soldiers will not only erode the ruler’s tax base, but also diminish
his share of the contested capital (by Aφ1S2 < 0).
121 The increase in rebel soldiers can
be worsened further by for the ruler by an additional “substitution effect” (captured by
ψ2ww < 0), since when labor becomes cheaper relative to guns, the rebel leader will hire
relatively more labor.122
Turning to the rebel leader, differentiation of his payoff U˜2 with respect to the wage/tax
subsidy gives
U˜2τ = Aφ
2
S1 S˜
1
τ + wψ
2
wS˜
2. (35)
The direct effect of a marginal increase in the tax rate on the rebel leader’s payoff (the
second term in (35)) is positive and it is due to the reduction in the opportunity cost of
recruiting rebels. The first term is a strategic effect that is associated with the ruler’s re-
sponse to the rebel leader’s action when τ ↑. This effect is positive or negative depending
on whether S˜1τ < 0 or S˜1τ > 0. In this case, it is straightforward to show that S˜1τ S 0 if γ T 1.
Regardless, however, in Lemma 3.1 below we show that the direct effect dominates; there-
fore U˜2τ > 0.
Naturally, higher taxes affect labor adversely because they reduce the after-tax wage
rate. Therefore the question that remains is: how do taxes affect overall welfare? Differen-
tiation of (30c) yields
U˜τ = Aφ2S1 S˜
1
τ + Aφ
1
S2 S˜
2
τ − τwψ2wS˜2τ + τw2ψ2wwS˜2. (36)
121One can show that, even when τ < 0, Aφ˜1S2 − τwψ2w < 0.
122This effect is actually positive when τ < 0, however, since a shrinking tax base has the opposite effect in
this case.
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All terms in (36) are negative, except perhaps the first. Yet, even that term is negative if the
ruler has a sufficient advantage in the contest (i.e., when ξ is sufficiently lower than 1 and
τ is not too high). In short, the overall impact of taxes on welfare is negative; therefore,
the optimal policy of a (hypothetical) benevolent leader is a subsidy that hits the institu-
tional bound τmin. It is easy to verify that this fiscal policy coincides with the policy that
minimizes ψ1S˜1 + ψ2S˜2 + τψ2wS˜2.
With this in mind, let us consider the optimal policy of a kleptocratic ruler. To deepen
our understanding of this policy, it is useful to temporarily abstract from fiscal capacity
constraints. To this end suppose the admissible tax interval T is sufficiently wide. In
addition to summarizing our discussion on the impact of wage taxes/subsidies on payoffs,
the following Lemma describes several key features of the optimal tax/subsidy rate under
conflict, including its dependence on the value of the contested rents.
Lemma 3.1 The higher (lower) the wage tax (subsidy) rate the higher the conflict payoff to the
rebel leader (dU˜2/dτ > 0) and the lower overall welfare (dU˜/dτ < 0). However, there exists a
unique optimal tax/subsidy rate under conflict τ∗C(A) ∈ T that is negatively related to the value
of the contested rents (i.e., dτ∗C/dA < 0). Moreover, there exist levels A
0 and A of the contestable
rents such that
(a) τ∗C(A) T 0 if A S A0; and
(b) τ∗C(A) = τ.
In the Appendix we prove: (i) U˜1 is concave in τ (i.e., U˜1ττ < 0 which implies unique-
ness of τ∗C), and (ii) a marginal increase in the value of the resource rents A reduces the
net marginal benefit of a tax/subsidy increase to the ruler (U˜1τA < 0). This explains why
dτ∗C/dA < 0 in Lemma 3.1. The lesson is clear. The higher the value of resource rents, the
lower the ruler’s need (and incentive) to rely on fiscal policy for revenue purposes. Part
(a) takes this observation one step further: it establishes that the optimal tax turns nega-
tive (i.e., it becomes a subsidy) when the value of resource rents is sufficiently high. This
interesting finding suggests that resource abundance may not only temper the ruler’s ap-
petite for tax revenues, but also induce him to subsidize labor! However, this incentive is
not based on altruistic motives or a concern for labor’s fortune. Rather, purely a reflection
93
of the ruler’s calculation that wage subsidies, by raising the opportunity cost of recruiting
rebels, curb the rebel leader’s willingness to expand his military capacity.
Part (b) utilizes the monotonicity of the kleptocratic ruler’s optimal fiscal policy in the
value of resources to establish that τ∗C(A) will cross τ once at some level A, as depicted in
Fig. 2a. This result proves helpful in our analysis of equilibrium payoffs when taxes are
endogenous.123
Let us index all variables, including agents’ payoffs, with a star “∗” when the tax/subsidy
is endogenous. How might resource abundance affect payoffs in this case? First, we ad-
dress this question under the assumption that the capacity constraints on fiscal policy is
not binding. Later, we examine how these constraint matter.
Once again, as in the case of a fixed tax rate, increases in the value of contested rents
induce both contenders to expand their military capacities. However, there is a difference:
the rebel leader’s incentive to produce more guns is now tempered (but not entirely offset)
by a negative effect due to the accompanying fall (rise) in the tax (subsidy) rate. This
induced policy effect generates another effect as well: it increases the ruler’s share of the
contested resource rents, and thus his power. Proposition 3.2 below summarizes our key
findings on the dependence of equilibrium payoffs under conflict on the value of rents A.
Proposition 3.2 In an unconstrained subgame perfect equilibrium in which the ruler uses fiscal
policy optimally, conflict payoffs are related to the value of the contested resource A as follows:
(a) The ruler’s payoff function is quasi-convex in A and is minimized at a level A > 0.
(b) The rebel leader’s payoff function and labor’s welfare are increasing in A.
(c) Abundance in resource rents may reduce efficiency if A is sufficiently small initially.
Part (a) of Proposition 3.2 is an outgrowth of Proposition 3.2(a) and Lemma 3.1(a),
and Fig. 3.2 illustrates it. Its key message is that the endogeneity of the tax rate tends to
generate a U-shaped relationship between the ruler’s payoff U1∗ and contested resource
123We have expressed the optimal tax/subsidy τ∗ as a function of A to highlight the importance of the value
of the contested rents in the design of optimal policy. But this policy also depends on the technology of conflict
(parameters ξ and m), the contenders’ arming technologies (ψi), the prices of guns in the world market (q), and
the bounds of fiscal capacity (the endpoints of T). The implied relationships between τ∗ and these parameters
can be studied with the help of standards comparative statics methods. The same methods can also be used
to study the determinants of A0 and A.
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rents. As shown in Fig 3.2a, the tax policy curve τ∗C starts out at the institutional constraint
τmax, because the ruler’s tax decision is not disciplined by the threat of rebel arming when
A = 0. The position of τmax relative to τ is thus what determines the monotonicity of
U1∗. The lower level of τmax in Fig. 3.2, for example, which is below τ corresponds to
the upward-sloping tangent line in the bottom panel. If τmax > τ on the other hand, by
Proposition 3.1, U1∗ will be non-monotonic. We will explore this relationship in more
detail later when we discuss the role fiscal capacity plays in the emergence of conflict.
Part (b) affirms that increases in resource rents enhance labor’s well-being. The reason
for this is the reduction in tax policy that such rent increases give rise to. Similarly, the
rebel leader’s payoff also rises because the possibly adverse strategic effect due to the
ruler’s response (which is dominated by the favorable direct effect when the tax rate is
fixed) is ameliorated by the falling tax rate. (See Fig. 1.)
The validity of part (c) hinges on the reasoning that in societies where resource rents
are small initially (and, therefore, where the politically optimal tax τ∗C is high), the fall in
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the ruler’s payoff may not be offset by the payoff gains of the rebel leader and labor, for
reasons similar to those outlined in connection with Proposition 1(c). It should be noted
though this possibility is less likely to arise when τ is endogenous (because τ∗C falls as A
rises).
The U-shape of the ruler’s payoff with respect to the value of contested rents is a novel
feature of our analysis that is entirely dependent on the endogenous determination of tax
policy. In similar settings which lack this added dimension (e.g. Garfinkel & Skaperdas,
2000; Garfinkel, Skaperdas, & Syropoulos, 2008), all agents’ payoffs are always positively
related to the value of the contested spoils. This distinction is notable mainly for what
it says about the potential strategic utility of destruction in this setting: if the ruler had
a choice, he might wish to destroy as much capital as possible in order to maximize his
total payoff. Intuitively, for low enough values of A (specifically, A < A), the presence of
insecure capital becomes a detriment to the ruler because he begins to care more about the
revenues he extracts from his tax base, τ(w(1− δL)L−wψ2wS2), than he does his winnings
from the contest. Destroying capital directly diminishes his rival’s incentive to arm in (31),
reducing his choice of S2 and thereby mitigating the erosion of the ruler’s tax base due to
rebel arming. Note, however, that the ruler cannot increase his payoff simply by “giving
up” his “rights” to some of the contested capital; he can only benefit if some or all of K0 is
destroyed. The problem with “consensual” transfers of capital in this context is that they
are not credible so long as the transferred rents can still be contested in a later stage.
Similarly, it is also important to observe that labor is not immune to strategically mo-
tivated violence in this setting either. This incentive enters specifically when the optimal
tax is negative (i.e. a subsidy), since any given τ < 0 will be less expensive to the ruler
when there is less labor. We formalize the implications for conflict payoffs in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 3.3 In an unconstrained subgame perfect equilibrium in which the ruler uses fiscal
policy optimally, the ruler’s conflict payoff is quasi-convex in the size of the labor endowment L and
is minimized at some level L > 0.
For formal explanation, we refer to the ruler’s first order condition for τ in (34). De-
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stroying a fraction of the labor force reduces the ruler’s optimal tax policy (that is, dτ∗C/d(−L) <
0) by making positive taxes less valuable and negative taxes (subsidies) less expensive.
However, by (30a), this type of violence enhances the ruler’s payoff if and only if the tax is
negative; that is, dU1∗/d(−L) T 0 if τ∗C S 0.124 In short, U1∗(L) attains a minimum at the
(positive) value of L that solves τ∗C(L) = 0, which we call “L” in the above Proposition.
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These observations pave the way to the central question we wish to address: Will a
“deal” with the rebel leader, conducted in the “shadow of conflict”, always be able to
circumvent incentives for destruction of capital and/or labor? To begin answering this
question, we turn to describing how payoffs and tax policies differ under settlement.
3.2.5 Settlement
Our basic treatment of settlement assumes that, for any given arming and tax choices im-
plemented in earlier stages, the two sides use the Nash bargaining solution to settle their
claims over the surplus. More specifically, let β be the share of K0 received by agent 1
(which implies agent 2’s share is 1− β) and let Vi denote i’s payoff under settlement. Not-
ing that Vi depends on β, the agents solve the following problem:
max
β
[V1(β)−U1]λ1 [V2(1− β)−U2]λ2 ,
where λi ∈ (0, 1) are the relevant Nash bargaining weights (λ1 + λ2 = 1) and Ui is
agent i’s (disagreement) payoff under conflict. Keeping in mind that, in the presence
of trade, the marginal utility of income, µ(·), remains the same under conflict and set-
tlement the “surplus” due to settlement, for given military strengths, is defined as B ≡
1
µ
(
V1 +V2 −U1 −U2). One can show that
B(τ) ≡ rδKK0 + τwδLL. (37)
124This result only requires applying the envelope theorem to the ruler’s payoff function: dU1∗/d(−L) =
dU˜1/d(−L) = τ(w(1− δL)).
125Statements about how destroying labor may affect other agent’s payoffs—in particular the implications
for labor’s own “welfare”—are reserved for Section 3.4.
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Thus, the value of the surplus to agent i is the market value of the contested rents/resource
and the tax revenues that would have been destroyed under conflict (but are not under set-
tlement). Note that if conflict is not destructive (i.e., if δJ = 0 for J = K, L), then B(τ) = 0
and so there is no essential distinction between conflict and settlement. Thus, the condi-
tions for the surplus to be positive are: (i) conflict must destroy a fraction of the contested
resource or of labor (i.e., δK + δL > 0), and (ii) τ > τ˘ ≡ − rδKK0wδL L if δL > 0. This latter require-
ment points to circumstances in which conflict will clearly dominate settlement. We will
take up the importance of this condition when we discuss optimal taxation.
The solution to the above bargaining problem defines the following payoffs and aggre-
gate welfare under settlement:
Payoff Functions under Settlement:
Vi = λiµB(τ) +Ui, i = 1, 2 (38)
V ≡ µ(1− τ)wL +∑
i
Vi = µB(τ = 1) +U, (39)
For any given tax rate τ > τ˘ and a pair of military strengths (S1, S2), the surplus B(τ) will
be positive and thus the contenders will prefer settlement over conflict for all λi ∈ (0, 1).
Similarly, all else equal (i.e., holding taxes fixed), the labor force collectively will also prefer
settlement over conflict because settlement involves no destruction. Thus, under the noted
circumstances, settlement improves overall efficiency as compared to conflict. This is a
standard, unsurprising result: when conflict involves destruction of resources, settlement
should always Pareto dominate conflict.
How is it possible then that one side might choose conflict when settlement is clearly
more efficient? The key consideration here is the relationship we have noted between τ and
the balance of military power, not just because τ shapes the threat points for settlement (the
Ui’s) but also because the incentives for taxation themselves may depend on the expected
mode of interaction (i.e., conflict vs. settlement). We formalize how tax policy under Nash
bargaining resembles tax policy under conflict in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.2 Assuming Nash bargaining, the ruler’s optimal tax policy under settlement (“τ∗S ”)
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relates to his optimal tax policy under conflict (“τ∗C”) in the following two main ways:
(a) dτ∗S /dA = dτ
∗
C/dA < 0
(b) τ∗S > τ
∗
C.
Intuitively, tax policy under settlement should be decreasing in A because conflict
payoffs still figure directly into bargaining solutions. Explicitly speaking, V1τA/V
1
ττ =
U1∗τA/U
1∗
ττ implies part (a). Furthermore, as we observe from the ruler’s objective func-
tions in (30a) and (38), if conflict reduces the size of the labor force (δL > 0), then we have
that B′ (τ) > 0, such that the government has an added incentive to charge higher taxes
in the event of settlement in order to increase the value of the eventual surplus. That is,
τ∗S > τ
∗
C, as stated in part (b).
The endogeneity of tax policy thus creates an indirect link between the expectation of
settlement and the determination the balance of power. Higher taxes under settlement
enhance the rebel leader’s ability to build strength—thus reshaping the division of A—but
also in turn introduce problematic welfare effects via the intensification of arming. As we
will show in the following section, the cost to the government of the concession of strength
associated with settlement may outweigh the benefits of peaceful surplus-sharing under
settlement. We also explore the implications of allowing the expectation of settlement to
influence arming incentives more directly.
3.3 Conflict vs. Settlement
The goal of this section is to illustrate the potential limits of surplus sharing agreements
that arise in our setting. Since conflict involves the destruction of productive resources, the
natural expectation is that settlement will dominate conflict by creating a positive surplus
that can be shared. As we will see, however, allowing state institutions (in our case, fiscal
policy) to play a central role may enhance the value of “conflict” in this context. Under
the noted assumptions regarding timing and bargaining, for example, we find that the
ruler may choose conflict when the value of contested rents is relatively high because the
higher taxes associated with settlement hurt his position in the contest over rents. We also
find that varying the timing of the game generally does not affect this result, with one
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important caveat: Under the original timing, the ruler’s tax policy can serve as a credible
mechanism for committing to conflict “ex ante”, i.e. before arming decisions are made.
When we explore alternate timing structures, where tax policy is chosen later in the game,
there exist cases where the ruler would find it advantageous to commit to conflict ex ante
even though he does not continue to prefer conflict “ex post”, i.e. after arming decisions.
In each of these cases, conflicts that predominantly destroy capital (as opposed to labor)
are always dominated by settlement. This result changes when we allow arming decisions
to affect the division of the surplus. In a variation of the model where bargaining weights
(λi’s) are endogenously determined, we observe that conflicts that destroy mainly capital
become appealing if the value of contested rents is sufficiently low. Again, however, while
commitments to conflict in this last case may be optimal ex ante, they are not necessarily
credible ex post. We then add further remarks focusing more specifically on the role that
contraints on institutional capacity may play in determining the preferences for conflict,
both ex ante and ex post.
3.3.1 When does settlement fail?
Consider first a simplified setting without either taxes (i.e., τ = 0) or labor destruction (i.e.,
δL = 0). The surplus in (37) then reduces to a fixed (positive) quantity B = rδKK0 and it is
obvious the two sides will find a mutually agreeable way to divide it via settlement. This
result is standard; see discussion of “The One-Period Model” in Garfinkel & Skaperdas
(2000). Generally, settlement always dominates conflict in this setting unless either payoffs
in future periods are taken into account (as in Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2000) or settlement
introduces additional incentives for arming (as in Chang & Luo, 2013, where destruction
is endogenous).
Introducing tax policy alone does not change this standard result, despite the noted “U-
shape” of the ruler’s payoff U1∗ with respect to the value of contested rents. Even on the
downward-sloping portion of U1∗, the ruler has no reason to turn down the opportunity
to share a positive surplus. That is not to say he does not still prefer larger values of capital
destruction asssociated with conflict (i.e. larger values of δK).126 Rather, the opportunity
126As shown in Fig. 3.3, the ruler’s payoff under settlement is also U-shaped with respect to A.
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for settlement provides him with a way of avoiding destruction that does not incentivize
increased arming by his rival, since by assumption each player receives a fixed share λi of
any surplus (we relax this assumption in section 3.3.3.)
When conflict destroys some of the labor force (i.e. δL > 0), however, settlements can-
not always compensate the ruler completely for the benefits he derives from destruction.
As established in Proposition 3.3, under conflict, the ruler prefers a smaller labor force
whenever the optimal tax is negative (i.e. a subsidy). A smaller labor force allows the ruler
to use larger subsidies, which in turn increase his advantage in the contest over rents. The
ruler may then induce conflict in order to retain the opportunity to use larger subsidies,
even in cases where a settlement would have resulted in a positive surplus.
When specifically does settlement fail? To answer this question, we first refer to the
simple case where conflict emerges even when taxes are held fixed. This is the case where
tax policy (in this case, a subsidy) is fixed at a value less than τ˘ (≡ − rδKK0wδL L ), the value at
which the surplus becomes negative. In Fig. 3.3a, τ˘(A) is the dotted line, shown as a func-
tion of the (modified) value of rents A = r(1− δK)K0 (such that τ˘(A) ≡ − δK1−δK AwδL L ). If
the ruler adopted a wage subsidy below this line, the subsidy would be so costly to the
ruler that destroying some of the labor endowment would become attractive (as it would
reduce the overall bill). This case is not especially interesting, since we are simply noting
that conflict would be preferred to settlement when there is no positive surplus to be bar-
gained over. This boundary on the overall appeal of settlement is nonetheless important
for explaining what can happen when tax policy is endogenously chosen prior to recruit-
ments. As we now demonstrate, conflict may be preferred even when there would have
been positive surplus under settlement.
Proposition 3.4 Suppose taxes are endogenously determined. If both the relative incidence of la-
bor destruction resulting from conflict ( δLδK ) and the ruler’s capacity to issue subsidies (|τmin|) are
sufficiently large, there will exist a range of values of contested rents A ∈ (AD, A˘S), for which con-
flict will emerge in equilibrium even though settlement generates a positive surplus. Furthermore,
AD > A, such that this range occurs on the upward-sloping portion of the ruler’s conflict payoff
U1∗.
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Figs. 3.3a and 3.3b together illustrate the key details behind Proposition 3.4. To explain
these results we need to reiterate the salient facts unveiled in Lemma 3.2: (i) B′(τ) >
0, and (ii) dτ∗J /dA < 0 for J = C, S. Together, these two points explain the behavior
of optimal taxes under conflict and under settlement, as shown by the τ∗C(A) and τ
∗
S (A)
curves (respectively) in Fig. 3.3a.
Existence of the point AD, where the ruler begins to reject surplus sharing, is guaran-
teed if both τ∗C(A) and τ
∗
S (A) cross the zero-surplus line τ˘(A) depicted in Fig 3.3a.
127 For
this to occur, we require that δL/δK is sufficiently large such that the slope of τ˘(A) is not
too steep and that τmin permits the ruler sufficient flexibility to choose levels of τ < 0 (i.e.
subsidies). We can then define (A˘S, τ˘S) as the point where the τ∗S (A) curve intersects τ˘(A)
in Fig. 3.3b. At (A˘S, τ˘S), even though the government optimizes its tax policy in anticipa-
tion of settlement, both sides will be indifferent between conflict and settlement because
τ = τ˘S implies the surplus under settlement is zero. But, because τ∗C < τ
∗
S , τ˘S is not the
127Existence may also hold under other conditions, as we explain in the Appendix.
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optimal tax the ruler would choose under conflict for A = A˘S. Thus, the government’s
payoff under conflict for τ = τ∗C(A˘S) must then be strictly greater than its payoff under
settlement for τ = τ˘S (the best it can do under settlement).
The rebel leader for his part will also prefer conflict for τ = τ∗C(A˘S), because the surplus
under settlement would be negative at that tax rate. More generally, however, he prefers
settlement for all values of contested rents up until A˘S since—unlike the ruler—he always
prefers higher taxes and since settlement is associated with a positive surplus for A < A˘S.
Both players would then continue to opt for conflict for values of A > A˘S up until an
upper bound A˘M (shown in Fig. 6), beyond which tax policies are sufficiently constrained
by τmin to the point where τ˘(A) ≤ τmin and surpluses become positive again.128
Similarly, let (A˘C, τ˘C) be the point at which the τ˘(A) and τ∗C(A) curves intersect, with
A˘C < A˘S following directly from τ∗C < τ
∗
S . Now suppose that at A˘C, the government
chooses τ˘C to be its tax rate and the two sides then proceed to considering conflict versus
settlement. Obviously since τ˘C lies on the τ˘(A) line, both sides will be indifferent between
conflict and settlement at that particular tax policy. But the government’s best payoff under
settlement will actually be secured when it charges the higher tax policy τ∗S (A˘C) > τ˘C
. Since τ˘C was defined as the government’s optimal tax under conflict for A = A˘C, the
government can do better under settlement in this case. Furthermore, since both tax policy
functions are greater than τ˘ to the left of A˘C, the ruler will prefer settlement for all values
of A ∈ (0, A˘C).
It remains to be shown then there will be a point on the A axis between A˘C and A˘S at
which the ruler will begin to prefer conflict. But this last piece follows directly from the fact
that the ruler’s payoff functions under conflict and settlement are both continuous in A.
If the ruler strictly prefers conflict for values of A in the neighborhood of A˘C and strictly
prefers settlement for points in the neighborhood of A˘S, then there must be a point in
between where his tax policy switches. On Fig. 3.3b, this is point F, the point where the U1∗
curve (the ruler’s payoff under conflict) begins to exceed the V1∗ curve (his payoffs under
settlement). The presence of this switching point (“AD”) to the left of A˘S is noteworthy
128To simplify the analysis, we abstract from the possibility that one or both tax policy functions crosses back
above ˘τ(A) before being constrained by τmin. We discuss these possibilities in the Appendix.
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because it means there exist cases where the ruler will prefer conflict even if the surplus
under settlement would have been positive. Lastly, note that F must be on the upward
sloping portion of U1∗: τ˘C < 0 < τ implies that AD > A (by AD > A˘C > A).
The implications are troubling. Bear in mind that the principal difference between
conflict and settlement here, under the stated restrictions on destruction, is that some of
the labor force is destroyed.129 When the government is choosing tax rates that will be
in the neighborhood of the τ˘ line, as occurs when A ∈ (A˘C, A˘S), then the τ∗C curve will
definitely be negative. The role of labor destruction is key here: by reducing the labor
force, conflict gives the ruler the budgetary freedom to issue a larger subsidy than would
be possible under settlement. The larger subsidy helps subdue rebellion and in turn gives
the ruler sufficient advantage in the contest over resources to make conflict viable. In other
words, a self-interested government may deliberately allow its population to be decimated
in order make controlling the remainder more affordable.
A notable feature of this explanation for the emergence of conflict is that the ruler uses
his choice of tax policy ex ante (i.e. before arming decisions are made) to induce a situation
where both players prefer conflict ex post (i.e. after arming choices). In other words, tax
policy serves as a credible mechanism for the ruler to signal his commitment to conflict to
the other player. As we show in the following section, this ability to make credible com-
mitments to conflict should not be taken for granted. In settings where either the timing
of the game is changed (such that tax policy is no longer chosen first) or the division of
the surplus is endogenously determined (such that settlement itself introduces additional
arming incentives), there will exist cases where the ruler would find it advantageous to
commit to conflict ex ante, but may not be able to do so credibly.
3.3.2 Alternate Timing
Our assumption that the ruler chooses his tax rate before militaries are formed has impor-
tant consequences for the model because it allows him to anticipate how his tax rate affects
129For simplicity’s sake thus far we have regarded “labor destruction” as being equivalent to the “death”
of some of the potential working population, but it could also be thought of as due to dislocation. In the
current Syrian conflict, for instance, 100,000 civilians have died but another 2 million have fled to neighboring
countries (U.N. Refugee Agency, 2014). Nonetheless, violence against non-combatants is an all-too-common
feature of civil wars; see Eck & Hultman (2007).
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the formation of military power. In this section, we discuss how varying the timing of the
game may affect the emergence of conflict.
Suppose, for instance, that instead of being chosen first, τ is chosen simultaneously
with Si’s. To characterize how this timing structure affects our findings, we focus on how
the government’s first order condition for τ changes. First, consider the government’s
tax/subsidy choice in the event of conflict under our original timing assumption, charac-
terized in (34).
On the one hand, increases in tax revenues draw higher revenues per worker, a positive
effect. But this positive effect must be balanced against resulting reductions in the tax base,
which occur via two different channels: (i) increased utilization of labor by the rebel leader
for a given S˜2 (a “substitution” effect, induced by ψ2ww < 0), and (ii) increased arming in
equilibrium by the rebel leader (i.e. S˜2τ > 0) as the increase in taxes causes a shift in the
balance of power (a “strategic” effect).
The effect of varying the timing of the game such that the ruler cannot anticipate his
rival’s arming response in making his tax decision is equivalent to removing the strategic
effect from (34). Since w
[
(1− δL)L− ψ2wS˜2
]
> 0 and w2ψ2wwS˜2 < 0, τ∗C will always be pos-
itive when taxes are decided simultaneously with arming. Obviously, since the potential
optimality of negative taxes plays a key role in the explanation for the emergence of con-
flict described above, this alternate timing assumption has a material effect on our results.
Conflict then will never be preferred to settlement ex post under this alternate timing.
Instead, however, we now have the new result that—for sufficiently large values of
A—conflict may be preferred ex ante, but not ex post. The intuition for why this new result
emerges would seem to help justify our original timing assumption. Suppose that before
arming decisons are made, the ruler has the opportunity to declare a binding commitment
to choosing conflict at the end of the game. Furthermore, suppose this commitment is
considered credible; we will discuss potential means for ensuring credibility later. When
the ruler cannot internalize the effect of his tax choice on its rival’s arming decision, he
instead may wish to declare a commitment to conflict ex ante in order to convince his rival
he will choose the lower tax rate associated with conflict and thereby cause him to be less
aggressive in his arming. In this case, the opportunity to pre-commit to conflict is directly
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analogous to the implicit choice the ruler makes between the τ∗C(A) and τ
∗
S (A) curves
under the original timing. Only here, instead of using taxes to signal his preferences about
conflict, he effectively must use pre-commitment to conflict to signal his preferences about
taxes. In either case, his ultimate goal is to use the linkage between taxes and arming to
influence the balance of power.
Interestingly, this same result can also hold even when the tax is chosen after arming
decisions are made, i.e. even when taxes are decided on jointly as part of any settlement.
In this latter case, both sides have every incentive to agree on as high a tax as possible in
the event of settlement, which would seem to enhance its appeal. Again, however, that
high tax will in turn be anticipated by the rebel leader and he will arm aggressively to take
advantage ahead of time. The ruler’s prerogative again may be to prefer to pre-commit to
conflict in order to curb his rival’s aggression in the earlier stage.130
These examples also reveal that even under the original timing, the tax decision it-
self can serve as a means of committing to conflict. By intentionally inducing a negative
surplus the government effectively ensures that conflict will prevail in the later stage. Fur-
thermore, these experiments also reveal the common thread that underlies the emergence
of conflict in this setting: the rebel leader cannot credibly commit to restrain his arming
for a given level of taxation. If his choice of arms were somehow contractible, he would
realize that he and the ruler together could enjoy much larger spoils if neither armed and if
labor were taxed up to the maximum amount τmax. Without perfect contracting, however,
the absence of arms is unsustainable: either player would regard the lack of arming by the
other as an opportunity to seize the entire pie of rents.
A related alteration to the game tree we should consider is what happens when both
players can tax (or subsidize) labor. We show in the Appendix that even when both players
are symmetric in every way, including the ability to use tax policy, preferences for conflict
still emerge because each player internalizes how his use of taxes will affect labor supply
for the other player.131 This finding is important to keep in mind since it reveals that, for the
130In this latter case, the threat that the rebel leader will substitute some of his guns for more labor is what
prevents the government from charging the maximum possible tax in the event of conflict. That is, even
though the rebel chooses what level of strength (S2) to finance in the second stage, he still retains discretion
over how to allocate that expenditure until the tax is ultimately decided.
131Intuitively, for large enough A, the marginal benefit of using negative taxes to drive up the other player’s
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most part, it is not any fundamental asymmetry in the model that generates conflict, but
rather the added layer of strategic interdependence provided by the effect of one’s policy
choices on a common pool of labor. It is also important to note, however, that a symmetric
model can only generate preferences for conflict under the baseline timing and does not
generalize to the alternate timing cases we have just described. Furthermore, avoiding the
need for symmetry facilitates our discussion of equilibrium dynamics—which we turn to
in Section 3.4—and can be justified on the grounds that official state institutions may be
significantly less constrained than those of rebel groups.132
3.3.3 A Variation on the Model: Endogenous Bargaining Weights
Thus far, our main result has relied heavily on the idea that conflict eliminates workers
who would have provided productive labor in the event of settlement. But what if in-
stead the destruction from conflict is characterized more so by destruction of the contested
resource than by destruction of labor? Is it still possible that the endogeneity of the tax
rate can cause the government to prefer conflict to settlement in certain cases? The an-
swer is yes. However, we would need to introduce an alternate bargaining framework in
which bargaining weights (λis) depend endogenously on one’s military strength, as in the
“agreements in the shadow of conflict” (ASC) bargaining concept formalized by Esteban
& Sa´kovics (2007).
In the simplest implementation of the Esteban & Sa´kovics framework, the bargaining
weights λi in Nash’s bargaining model coincide exactly with φi, the CSF that determines
the division of the prize under conflict (i.e., λi = φi for i = 1, 2). Its general appeal is
that it provides an intuitive and yet powerful link between the value of the surplus and
arming even in the absence of risk aversion or endogenous destruction.133 The key for
our purposes is that the need to compete for the negotiation of the surplus under peaceful
cost of arming grows so large that each player finds it optimal to eliminate some of the labor force.
132More general treatments of asymmetry (where each player posseses different levels of institutional capac-
ity) go beyond the scope of this chapter but should not be considered unimportant. Our essential reasoning
should still apply directly, however, in cases where one player is constrained in his policy choice and the other
is not.
133See Skaperdas & Syropoulos (2002) and Anbarci, Skaperdas, & Syropoulos (2002) for similar approaches
that rely on the presence of diminishing returns; also see Chang & Luo (2013) for a model that demonstrates
similar frictions when destruction is endogenous.
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settlement generates additional arming incentives that are not present under conflict.134
It is important to emphasize at the outset, however, that endogenous bargaining weights
by themselves are neither necessary nor sufficient for obtaining conflict in equilibrium.135
The main result still depends on the differential effects of tax policy on payoffs, although
here the linkage between destruction and the balance of power is more direct. In addition,
the mechanism by which conflict is chosen may be different than under fixed bargaining
weights (i.e. Nash bargaining). Once again, the emergence of conflict will require that the
ruler is able to make a credible promise that it will refuse to settle at the end of the game.
Because preserving capital always adds to the size of the eventual surplus, conflicts that
destroy mainly capital are still dominated ex post as before. From an ex ante perspective,
however, the opportunity to commit to an outcome where capital is destroyed may be very
appealing for the ruler.
For a simple example, take the case where τ is held fixed at some positive level (as
would be the case, for example, if taxes are tightly bound by the capacity constraint τmax).
As the following Corollary formalizes, the anticipation of settlement by the rebel leader-
ship leads to more aggressive arming, which can have further negative consequences for
the ruler via the effect on his tax base:
Corollary 3.2 Suppose bargaining weights are endogenously determined. Then for a given tax
rate τ, the ruler will prefer conflict ex ante (but not ex post) if τ is sufficiently large (specifically,
if τ > τ , with τ the tax rate that minimizes the ruler’s conflict payoff U˜1). Otherwise he strictly
prefers settlement.
The logic behind Corollary 3.2 follows from Proposition 3.1, but requires some further
explanation. When bargaining weights are endogenous, one of the effects of “settlement”
is to change the relevant value of “A” in the first order condition for arming (31) from
“(1− δK)rK0” (the value of the undestroyed rents) to simply “rK0” (the full value of rents).
134Even if we stayed within the confines of the Nash bargaining model and treated λi as constant, the size of
the surplus will impact upon arming incentives if the rental rate r in (38) is endogenous (as when either the
“small” economy assumption is relaxed or when the economy completely specializes in producing one of the
two consumption goods).
135See (for example) the section entitled “A Comparison with the Nash Bargaining Solution” in Esteban &
Sa´kovics (2007) for an example of a model analogous to ours with tax revenues removed from the analysis.
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Settlement thus is associated with higher overall arming and, by extension, a reduction
in the size of the tax base. For lower taxes, the loss of tax revenues due to this distortion
is minimal and settlement will dominate. For high enough taxes, however, the option to
commit to conflict ex ante becomes an appealing way to restrain incentives for arming. In
other words, the ruler prefers to destroy rents when his they are negatively associated with
his payoff. By Proposition 3.1, this relationship holds when τ > τ.
Clearly, however, the role that taxes play here in incentivizing conflict is different from
before. Instead of tax policy being used to influence the outcome from conflict, ex ante
commitment to conflict is being used to enhance the return to tax collection. Furthermore,
unlike the cases outlined above, preferences for conflict only materialize when the value of
rents is sufficiently low; under fixed bargaining weights, conflict only emerges when the
value of rents is sufficiently high. This sharp distinction between how the value of con-
tested rents relates to conflict decisions with variable bargaining weights and fixed taxes
versus with fixed bargaining weights and variable taxes begs the question: what happens
when both taxes and bargaining weights are allowed to be endogenous? Proposition 3.5
explains.
Proposition 3.5 When both taxes and bargaining weights are determined endogenously, conflict
can emerge under the following scenarios:
(a) If the incidence of labor destruction (δL) is sufficiently small, and the ruler’s capacity
to tax is sufficiently large (specifically, if τmax > τ), the ruler will prefer conflict ex ante
(but not ex post) over settlement for a range of values of contested rents A ∈ [0, A1),
with A1 < A (and A still defined as the value of rents that minimizes the ruler’s conflict
payoff U1∗)
(b) If both the relative incidence of labor destruction resulting from conflict ( δLδK ) and the
ruler’s capacity to issue subsidies (|τmin|) are sufficiently large, then there exists a range
of values of contested rents A ∈ (AD, A˘S), with A < AD < A˘S, for which the ruler will
prefer conflict (both ex ante and ex post) even though settlement generates a positive
surplus.
The full details of Proposition 3.5 are described in the Appendix. We also defer until
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the next section a more focused discussion of the how state capacity constraints (here, τmax
and τmin) may limit the appeal of war. The main point to make at this juncture is that
the two different conditions specified for the emergence of conflict—on labor destruction
(δL) in part (a) and on relative destruction (δL/δK) in part (b)—are not mutually exclusive.
That is, there can be cases where conflict could be preferred solely ex ante (for sufficiently
low values of the contested rents) or both ex ante and ex post (for sufficiently high values).
Fig. 3.4 illustrates such a case.
Overall, the intuition is straightforward given the relationships we have already dis-
cussed. First, consider what happens when the value of contested rents is very small (i.e.
when A = 0). In this case, there will be virtually no incentive to arm unless there is
settlement—in which case a prize of size wδLLτ∗S effectively comes into play. Thus (absent
constraints on taxation), the government will never choose settlement in this region unless
δL is large enough that the damage to its tax base from conflict is too costly to bear. So long
as we can identify some point A1 > 0 on the downward-sloping portion of U1∗ where con-
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flict is preferred, it will always be the case that conflict is preferred everywhere between 0
and A1, by the continuity of payoffs. The left-hand side of Fig. 3.4b demonstrates such a
case.
The logic behind part (b) unsurprisingly flows from our discussion of Proposition 3.3.
As A increases in size, it can be shown that τ∗S (A) begins to be strictly larger than τ
∗
C (A),
as in the fixed bargaining weights case.136 Then so long as τ∗S (A) and τ
∗
C (A) each cross the
τ˘(A) line, which occurs under familiar restrictions on δLδK and τmin, the reasoning behind
the existence of AD is the same as before.
The potentially non-monotonic relationship between contested rents and conflict high-
lighted this setting illustrates how allowing for an endogenously chosen mode of interac-
tion complicates the analysis of civil war. Much of the empirical literature on rents and
civil conflict has looked for straightforward correlations between resource rents and civil
war, but our theory suggests rents may affect incentives for peace and incentives for war in
different ways. These issues have been touched upon in Le Billon (2003) and Fjelde (2009),
but merit further theoretical and empirical investigation.
Finally, one last interesting consideration that arises is the question of how exactly the
ruler can credibly “pre-commit” to conflict ex ante in situations where settlement is pre-
ferred ex post.137 Even if the government announces ahead of time it will not negotiate for
peace, the rebels may not necessarily find these promises to be credible.138 So what can the
state in this case do to convince its adversary otherwise? It may, for instance, antagonize
its rival by stoking political, ethnic, and/or social divisions. Alternatively, if enforcement
of settlement is known to be contingent on the efforts of external powers such as the U.N.,
the ruler may deliberately sabotage those efforts.139 In sum, even if the exact mechanism
for how the ruler might credibly influence the beliefs of its rival is not immediately clear,
136For proof, see the Appendix.
137This is a common issue in game scenarios where one player has the opportunity to “pre-commit”. Dixit
(1980), for instance, features an analogous situation where an incumbent firm commits to “fight” potential
entrants, even though fighting would be suboptimal if entry occurred. Explanations for the emergence of war
described in Bevia´ & Corcho´n (2010) and Chang & Luo (2013) also require that such pre-commitments are
possible.
138The U.S. government, for instance, which famously “does not negotiate with terrorists”, does in fact ne-
gotiate with groups it had previously labeled terrorists on occasion.
139Walter (1997) presents evidence that external enforcement often plays a crucial role in securing settlements
in civil war scenarios.
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the model nonetheless indicates that embattled states may have powerful incentives to
oppose negotiating for peace.
3.3.4 The Role of State Capacity
Thus far, we have only mininally commented on the operative roles played by institutional
capacity constraints (τmax and τmin) in the emergence of conflict. Proposition 3.5 highlights
two potential roles in particular worth focusing more on. We take this opportunity now to
add some further remarks.
We also wish to place these findings within the context of the wider literature on state
institutions and civil war. What, for example, might these conditions on τmin and τmax al-
low us to say more generally about how limits on institutional capacity influence war and
peace? And how exactly should these parameters be interpreted? The outbreak of civil
war is usually found to be negatively correlated with known measures of “fiscal capac-
ity” (Sobek, 2010; Besley & Persson, 2011), contrary to our findings. Some clarification is
required.
We start by focusing on τmax. Fig. 3.5 shows a simplified scenario from our model,
drawing on Proposition 3.5b, where bargaining weights are endogenously determined
and where only capital is destroyed. We have already described how τmax determines the
monotonicity of the ruler’s payoff under conflict (U1∗) in our discussion of Proposition 3.2.
Fig. 3.5 now clarifies how this logic carries over to the question of conflict vs. settlement.
The dotted and dashed and dashed (tangent) lines illustrate the effects of different levels
of τmax on the ruler’s payoff curves. Moving from left to right, the two downward-sloping
lines depict what occurs when the ruler has sufficient flexibility to vary his tax policy on
at least some some values of rents less than the critical value A (i.e., when τmax > τ). As in
Fig. 3.2b, when the optimal tax policy under conflict (τ∗C) is allowed to exceed τ the ruler’s
conflict payoff (U1∗) is decreasing in A. The new insight here is that the same is also true
for his payoff under settlement (V1∗). In this example, “settlement” resembles “conflict”,
only over a larger pie of rents; That is, V1∗(A) = U1∗(A/(1− δK)). It follows that, for
A < A1, conflict not only dominates along the unconstrained portions of U1∗ and V1∗ (by
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Proposition 3.5a), but the constrained portion as well (by Corollary 3.2).
On the other hand, when constraints on taxation are sufficiently tight (i.e. τmax < τ), the
ruler lacks the leeway to prey more aggressively on labor when the value of rents would
otherwise be too small to be appealing to him (i.e. when A < A). As shown in Figure 3.5
(by the upward-sloping lines), the effect on payoffs is to eliminate the non-monotonicity in
both U1∗ and V1∗, such that the payoff to settlement always exceeds the payoff to conflict.
This result generalizes further to cases where labor is destroyed (by Corollary 3.2) but this
example is sufficient for illustrating the key mechanisms at work.
The idea that limits on institutional capacity to tax promote peace does not attract much
support in the literature. Civil wars by far are more prevalent in developing countries with
weak formal institutions. Thus we cannot interpret τmax literally as signifying the presence
of a well-functioning professional revenue collection service, as in Besley & Persson (2011).
Instead, we take a broader interpretation. The variable τ in our model, while it serves to
transfer income that otherwise would go to labor, need not be thought of strictly as a
“tax”. Rather, it can be thought of in more general terms as “corruption”. Le Billon (2003)
observes that corrupt practices contribute to civil war by lowering the opportunity cost of
abandoning productive work.140 This argument closely mirrors the role of τ in our model:
to the extent that governments internalize the effect their corruption has on labor’s income
140Le Billon synthesizes prior insights from Mauro (1995, 1998) and Collier (2000).
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(and to the extent they themselves can constrain it), varying the degree of corruption may
provide an instrument for influencing the supply of labor to their opposition. τmax may
then be better thought of reflecting the state’s effectiveness at extracting value from useful
production.
Under this broader interpretation of “fiscal institutions”, our model suggests that states
who are more effective at corruption, but are not especially wealthy in nonlabor resources,
should incur a higher risk of civil war. To the extent that observed corruption in the data
reflects high capacity for corruption, empirical evidence does support this prediction; see
Fjelde (2009). It remains to be seen, however, if (as our model suggests) conflicts meeting
this description involve relatively less violence against the population.
Turning to τmin, Fig. 3.6 adds the remaining details (already previewed in Propostions
3.3 and 3.5a) for how limits on subsidy policies affect the appeal of conflict. Specifically, it
shows how τmin is associated which a particular value of rents A˘M, where τmin intersects
with τ˘(A), the “zero-surplus” line. Conflict then cannot emerge for A > A˘M because
surpluses will be positive when τ is constrained to be greater than τ˘(A). The point we
want to emphasize for our discussion of τmin is that tighter limits on the ability to subsidize
labor’s welfare erode (and eventually eliminate) the appeal of conflict by shifting A˘M to
the left.
This result too needs to be put in context. In our model, the government uses nega-
tive taxes to drive up the rewards to productive labor, in order to restrict the supply of
potential recruits to its adversary. We emphasize first that even τ < 0 may be associated
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with some level of “corruption”, since labor receives no rewards from the state’s nonlabor
assets otherwise. But what form do these transfers of nonlabor wealth take? Assuming
poor formal institutions, it is again unlikely that the government is able to affect workers’
incomes through direct income subsidies. And general disbursements of wealth or goods
to the population may fail to exclude those who join the rebels.
Instead, we suggest τmin’s interpretation may be expanded to encompass the govern-
ment’s general capability to (non-coercively) influence the loyalties of a “rational peas-
antry” (Popkin, 1979). Historically, such gestures have taken a variety of different forms,
including the provision of food aid and development projects (as in Guatemala during
the 1980s), the reform of property rights and other grievances (as in El Salvador), and/or
the use of clientelism and civil service patronage (as in several African conflict-prone na-
tions).141 The key principle is that a threatened ruling elite may rather fight a smaller
rebellion than come to terms with a larger one; thus, it would have a strong incentive to
use every tool at its disposal to influence the strength of its opponent.
The role that “public goods”, more narrowly defined, may play in this context is un-
clear. As argued in Moselle & Polak (2001), the production of “localized” public goods
(that benefit only the “loyal” population) are an effective means of restraining the size
of an appropriation sector.142 General improvements in social services and/or infrastruc-
ture may not necessarily be “localized”, however, and may therefore be less valuable to
the government. Nonetheless, we could also consider extensions to the model where the
rebel leadership internalizes the linkage between its own welfare and the government’s
provision of public goods. It stands to reason that this linkage may cause them to be less
aggressive in interfering the government’s sources of income.
Obviously, there is more that can be said about what other ways “state capacity” may
influence incentives for conflict, both within and beyond the context of our framework.
Ultimately, the role of the fiscal capacity constraints in our model reflects (and adds to)
141Stoll (1993), Schirmer (1998), and Hashimoto (2009) document the strategic pairing of violence and public
good provision in the case of Guatemala. Mason (1998) reviews the role that agrarian reform played in inten-
sifying the conflict in El Salvador. Reno (1995, 1996) and Nafziger & Auvinen (2002) discuss how patronage
and clientelism were used to isolate opposition groups in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Zaire.
142Their discussion highlights public celebrations and the building of religious monuments as intuitive ex-
amples.
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the argument made by Acemoglu (2010): less accountable states will only use stronger
institutions (whatever form they may take) to more efficiently pursue the downfall of their
rivals.
3.4 Peace and Welfare
Characterizing what “welfare” means in this context requires many caveats. To simply call
the total utility enjoyed by all agents in the model a measure of total national well-being
glosses over the gross inequities implied by the model, as well as the (unmodeled) human
costs associated with violence and destruction. Nonetheless, accounting for the (otherwise
overlooked) inefficiencies that may be associated with “peace” is a primary motivation for
exploring a model where the mode of interaction is endogenously determined. We begin
our discussion of these costs by directly comparing how equilibrium payoffs under conflict
would have differed under settlement and vice versa. We then explore how these potential
trade-offs weigh on outcomes from external interventions.
3.4.1 The Costs of “Armed Peace”
Our framework highlights two main sources of inefficiency to discuss in this context, arm-
ing and taxation. The diversion of productive resources143 into arming directly reduces
overall production and therefore total national income. Taxation contributes to this in-
efficiency by incentivizing more arming. “National income” may not be the appropriate
welfare criterion to focus on in this context, however, because it includes rents paid to
criminals and kleptocrats. If we instead focus strictly on labor’s income to gauge welfare,
the negative effects of taxation are obvious.
We have already mentioned in the context of conflict payoffs (in Proposition 3.2, part
(c)) that destroying capital may increase “national welfare”. This reasoning in turn extends
to the question of conflict vs. settlement, according to the mode of bargaining explored in
Section 3.3.3. However, this increase in welfare is solely due to the non-monotonicity of the
143The resources diverted here include not just labor but also rents from (secure) capital used to purchase
weapons.
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ruler’s payoff with respect to the value of the contested rents. As far as labor is concerned,
settlements that preserve primarily capital are (relatively) desirable: destroying capital
reduces overall incentives to arm and therefore grants the ruler more freedom to extract
higher taxes.144 The rebel leader is also worse off under conflict (by not having access to as
many rents), but the increased channeling of tax revenues to the ruler (reflecting increased
overall production) dominates these effects.
When we turn to the case where conflict destroys primarily labor, we observe a more
fundamental tension: some labor is destroyed, but the remainder is awarded a higher
standard of living. As we show in the Appendix, it is indeed possible that overall labor
income will be higher under conflict than under settlement in these cases.145 Furthermore,
our risk-neutrality assumption permits an even more striking statement: there exist cases
where all labor will prefer conflict ex ante, even though ex post a share δL of them will be
destroyed. That is to say, labor would “vote” for conflict if they felt the increased sub-
sidy income associated with conflict compensated them for the risk of losing their homes
and/or lives.
Clearly, discussing the brutality of conflict in this way abstracts from important con-
siderations that should be discussed in this context. For example, we do not model how
citizens who are fortunate enough to avoid destruction may feel about the suffering of
those who are not. We also do not model how eliminating some of the population limits
an economy’s growth trajectory by affecting productivity and/or and the functioning of
formal institutions. Likewise, even though governments have been known to utilize vio-
lence for reasons similar to those we describe,146 it is limiting to assume that agents can
perceive with perfect foresight what shares of the population will suffer violence, or that
they cannot predict what parts of the population will suffer the most. In short, we iden-
tify important incentives that may exist for both violence and war, but do not claim these
incentives are justified on the basis of “welfare”.
Instead, what we can say is the unconditional pursuit of “peace” may entail important
social costs. The following subsection examines how these confounding trade-offs weigh
144Our proof of Proposition 3.5a in the Appendix includes this result.
145We also show, as a corollary, that overall efficiency may be higher in these cases as well.
146See Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004); Besley & Persson (2011).
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on possible instruments the outside world might use to influence the contest towards set-
tlement.
3.4.2 External Interventions
There are many ways to model how external agents may wish to influence peace and/or
welfare in this context. To take advantage of the small open economy structure of the
model, we focus on two in particular: general sanctions on imported goods and sanctions
on imported weapons specifically.147 For the sake of brevity, we focus on specific examples
rather than try to fully characterize how each of these interventions impacts the different
conflict scenarios we have discussed. Generally, we again find that what is best for peace
may not be what is best for overall welfare, nor for the welfare of ordinary citizens.
Consider trade sanctions. The small open economy perspective we use provides an
intuitive linkage between change in trade prices and incentives for arming via the effect
of trade prices on relative factor rewards. To add specificity, assume the capital-intensive
sector is the country’s export sector. Also assume the effect of trade sanctions is to lower
the domestic price of exports relative to that of imports. It follows that sanctions reduce the
reward to capital (r) relative to the reward to labor (w) and thereby (all else equal) mitigate
the wasteful diversion of resources towards arming.148 However, because our framework
allows both tax policy and the nature of interaction to be endogenously chosen, the full im-
plications for both conflict and welfare are more complicated. We use the fixed bargaining
weights case (Fig. 3.3) for illustration. It is easily seen from Fig. 3.3 that trade sanctions in
this case may promote settlement, by lowering the reward to contested capital (embedded
in A = (1− δK) rK0). However, as noted in our discussion of conflict payoffs, higher taxes
associated lower with lower values of A themselves generate more intensive diversion of
resources away from production. Furthermore, this increase in taxes in response to the re-
duction in A is only amplified by the discrete jump in tax policy from τ∗C to τ
∗
S that occurs
under settlement. These negative welfare effects not only come largely at the expense of
labor (through the increases in taxes) but may dominate any overall positive effects from
147We could also explore, for example, lending technological support to either side’s military.
148See Garfinkel, Skaperdas, & Syropoulos (2008) and and Dal Bo´ & Dal Bo´ (2011) for examples of other work
that has studied this linkage.
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preserving resources.
We also want to consider how equilibria might response to external influences on the
prices of imported weapons (q).149 Is it necessarily the case, for instance, that withholding
cheap imports of weapons will ward against the risk of conflict in a contested state?
The answer depends on the technology for military strength, Si: if soldiers and weapons
are substitutable in production, then there are two clear channels of effects to discuss.
First, higher prices on weapons will make acquiring strength generally more expensive
and there will tend to be less overall diversion of resources towards arming. Second, how-
ever, higher weapon prices will also make hiring soldiers significantly more attractive.
Consequentially, labor markets will only become more sensitive to the ruler’s fiscal poli-
cies and he will be more reluctant to use higher taxes. This downward pressure on taxes
also tends to reduce overall arming, but what are the implications for conflict?
Actually, sanctions on imported case in this setting would have the (surprising) effect
of promoting conflict. The reasoning is as follows. Because the value of q does not affect
B′ (τ) = wδLL (i.e the marginal effect of taxation on the size of the surplus), the difference
between the τ∗C(A) and τ
∗
S (A) curves in Fig. 3.3 is the same regardless of q. Therefore, the
downward pressure on taxes from the increased use of soldiers shifts the critical values
A˘C, AD, and A˘S to the left in Fig. 3.3. In this case where guns and soldiers exhibit sub-
stitutability, we thus observe a noteworthy paradox: trade liberalization in weapons may
actually reduce the likelihood of conflict.150 We offer this last result as a fitting note to end
on. It is only when we separate the means of violence from the use of it that we can better
understand the terms of peace against which conflict can be compared.
149It is also possible to consider separate weapons prices for the two players. The price of imported weapons
for the rebel leader is the more interesting of the two in terms of conflict vs. settlement because of how it
affects the labor market.
150Under the assumption that the elasticity of substitution equals 1 (the Cobb-Douglas case), varying q has
no effect on conflict versus settlement. It is straightforward to show increasing q promotes settlement when
this elastictiy is less than 1 (when guns and labor are complements) and promotes conflict when it is greater
than 1 (when they are substitutes).
119
3.5 Concluding Remarks
To summarize our main message, accounting for the central presence of state institutions
in civil conflict generates novel strategic scenarios that may help explain the emergence
of conflict itself. Specifically, the interdependence between the exercise of fiscal policy and
the incentive to acquire arms may lead to situations where policy may make violence more
effective (and vice versa).
While we show these results within a static political economy model under admittedly
stylized assumptions—that both state and rebel groups care exclusively about rents, for
instance—the features of our model nonetheless seem to resemble conditions commonly
cited as potential causes for the origination and continuation of civil conflicts. We summa-
rize some of the empirically relevant distinctions made possible by our analysis as follows.
First, conflict in corrupt states is more likely to occur when the value of “rents” (broadly
defined) is either very high or very low. When the value of rents is low, we would expect
to see conflicts that are less deadly in nature. When it is high, our model predicts the op-
posite. Importantly, the outbreak of conflict is conditional on different dimensions of state
capacity in either case, which may be difficult to separate in the data. We also do not take
a stand on whether or model should be applied empirically to studies of civil war “onset”
or “duration”, since we take as given the existence of an armed opposition group.
Another relevant avenue we abstract from here is the intertemporal dimension of civil
conflict, as in Besley & Persson (2011). Further work might more explicitly consider civil
war as a political competition over future control over the privileges of power. Just like
in our static model, the nature of the chosen form of political competition—destructive vi-
olence versus political dealmaking—should still depend on the realization of an endoge-
nous tax base. What could prove especially interesting in such a setting might be the state’s
potential investments in fiscal capacity. Will the ruling party incur the cost of improving its
fiscal institutions knowing that such improvements might reduce its prospects for peaceful
deals in the future should it find itself in opposition?
In addition to these questions surrounding civil conflict specifically, this framework
more generally raises the issue of how natural interdependencies between players can
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generate endogenous shifts in the balance of power which in turn can lead to the emer-
gence of conflict. Our focus here has been on how one side’s discretion over policy affects
the dynamics of power within a common economy. Other forms of interdependency that
might also be explored in the context of conflict in related work might include trading
relationships between countries, complementarities in production, and common external
threats.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Once again, we adopt the normalization µ = 1. Moreover, to
avoid cluttering, we occasionally omit the tilde “˜” from functions.
Part (a) : Differentiating (30a) with respect to A, invoking the envelope theorem and
simplifying the resulting expression gives
U˜1A = φ
1 +
(
φ1S2 − τwψ2w/A
) (
AS˜2A
)
= φ1
[
1−mφ2
(
1+
τ
1− τ θ
2
LS
)]
, (A.1)
where, again, θiLS ≡ wiψiw/ψi. Observe that none of the variables on the right-hand side of
the above expression depend on A. However, the sign of dU1∗/dA does depend on labor
taxes. Evaluating the expression at τ ≤ 0 readily implies dU˜1/dAτ≤0 > 0. By continuity,
the positive sign also arises when τ is not too big. Thus, increases in the value of the prize
always raise the ruler’s equilibrium payoff when the tax is sufficiently low or negative.
Now suppose τ is large. The extreme case of τ → 1 helps see that limτ→1(dU˜1/dA) < 0,
provided limτ→1 θ2LS > θ
2
LS, as noted in the text.151 By the continuity of U˜1A in τ, there will
exist a τ ∈ (0, 1) such that dU˜1/dA T 0 if τ S τ.
In light of the centrality of τ in the subsequent analysis, a couple of comments on its
151Allowing τ → 1 here is artificial because (i) it may violate the institutional capacity limit τmax or (ii)
induce specialization in production. Still, this is a valuable abstraction because it helps identify conditions on
parameters that imply dU˜1/dA < 0 at some value of τ and, moreover, because it will help us study how (i)
and (ii) determine the relationship between U˜1 and A when the tax is optimally determined.
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determinants are warranted here. Solving for τ in (A.1) gives
τ =
1+ (1−m)γ
1+ (1−m)γ+ mγθ2LS
.
The right-hand side of this expression also depends on the tax rate, so τ is the implicit
solution to this equation. Taking this feedback effect of τ into account, one can prove the
following relationships:
∂τ/∂ξ < 0, ∂τ/∂ψ1 < 0, ∂τ/∂ψ2 > 0, ∂τ/∂θ2LS < 0. (A.2)
In general, the sign of ∂τ/∂m is ambiguous.
Part (b) : Differentiating (30b) with respect to A, invoking the envelope theorem, and
utilizing the fact that φiSj = −mφi(1− φi)/Sj (i 6= j = 1, 2) gives
U˜2A ≡
∂U˜2
∂A
= φ2 + φ2S1
(
AS˜1A
)
= φ2
(
1−mφ1
)
> 0. (A.3)
Part (c) : Since, by its definition in (30c), U˜A = U˜1A + U˜
2
A and, as we have seen in part
(a), U˜1A ≥ 0 for all τ ≤ τ, whereas U˜2A > 0 for all τ, the possibility that U˜A < 0 may arise
if τ ∈ (τ, 1). To see this, utilize (A.1) and (A.3) to obtain
U˜A = 1+ φ2S1
(
AS˜1A
)
+ φ1S2
(
AS˜2A
)
− τwψ2wS˜2A = 1−mφ1φ2
(
2+
τ
1− τ θ
2
LS
)
and, once again, let τ → 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.1: Suppose τ ≤ τ. Then, by parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 3.1,
both the ruler and the rebel leader will benefit from an increase in A. Moreover, labor’s
welfare does not change because τ remains fixed.
Proof of Lemma 3.1: It remains to be proved that (i) U˜1ττ < 0, and (ii) U˜1τA < 0. For
both of these inequalities, we work from the first order condition for tax policy shown in
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the text:
U˜1τ = w
[
(1− δL) L− ψ2wS˜2
]
+ τw2ψ2wwS˜
2 +
(
Aφ1S2 − τwψ2w
)
S˜2τ.
The production of military strength requires both labor (soldiers) and imported weapons
and is described by a Cobb-Douglas production technology, such that 2’s cost share on
labor, θ2LS = ψ
2
ww (1− τ) /ψ2 = θ ∈ (θ2LS, 1], can be treated as a parameter.152 Note also
that, by 2’s first order condition for arming, and by φ˜1S2 = −φ˜2S2 , we have that Aφ˜1S2 =
−Aφ˜2S2 = −ψ2. The above then simplifies to
U˜1τ = w (1− δL) L +
(
−ψ2 − τ
1− τ θψ
2
)
S˜2τ +
(
− θ
(1− τ)2ψ
2 +
θ2τ
(1− τ)2ψ
2
)
S˜2
= w (1− δL) L− 1− (1− θ)τ1− τ ψ
2S˜2τ −
1− θτ
(1− τ)2 θψ
2S˜2.
It follows immediately that that
U˜1τA = −
1− (1− θ)τ
1− τ ψ
2S˜2τA −
1− θτ
(1− τ)2 θψ
2S˜2A.
Noting that S˜2A > 0 and S˜
2
τA > 0, we then have that U˜
1
τA < 0. Showing that U˜
1
ττ < 0
requires a little more work, however.
Explicitly, U˜1ττ can be written as
U˜1ττ = −
1− (1− θ)τ
1− τ ψ
2S˜2ττ −
θ +
(
1− 2θ2) τ
(1− τ)2 ψ
2S˜2τ −
(1− θ) (2− θτ)
(1− τ)3 θψ
2S˜2.
One can show that the coefficient on “ψ2S˜2τ”,− θ+(1−2θ
2)τ
(1−τ)2 , is strictly less than zero for all
values of θ between 0 and 1 (noting that τ ≤ τmax < 1 ). By inspection, the coefficients on
ψ2S˜2ττ and ψ2S˜2 are likewise negative. We have already noted that S˜2τ > 0; all that remains
to be explored is the sign of S˜2ττ, the second derivative of the rebel leader’s arming choice
with respect to taxation.
152As previously noted, assuming that limτ→1 θ2LS > θ
2
LS is meant to ensure the existence of τ < 1.
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Recall from the text that
S˜2 =
Amγ/ψ2
(1+ γ)2
.
Using the definitions of γ and ψ, we can re-write S˜2 to suit our current purposes as
S˜2 = κ · (1− τ)
−θ(m+1)[
1+ ξ (1− τ)−mθ
]2 ,
where κ is a combined parameter which incorporates elements which do not vary with τ
(explicitly, A, m, ξ, q, θ, and w). Differentiating with respect to τ, we obtain
S˜2τ = κ · θ ·
[
1+ ξ (1− τ)−mθ
]
(m + 1) (1− τ)−mθ−θ−1 − 2ξm (1− τ)−2mθ−θ−1[
1+ ξ (1− τ)−mθ
]3
= κ · θ · (m + 1) (1− τ)
−mθ−θ−1 + ξ (1−m) (1− τ)−2mθ−θ−1[
1+ ξ (1− τ)−mθ
]3
> 0.
To characterize S˜2ττ, note that S˜2ττ/S˜2τ = d ln S˜2τ/dτ. Noting that S˜2τ > 0, it follows then
that S˜2ττ > 0 iff d ln S˜2τ/dτ > 0. This condition can be written out as
(mθ + θ + 1) (1− τ)−1 + ξ 1−mm+1 (2mθ + θ + 1) (1− τ)−mθ−1
1+ ξ 1−mm+1 (1− τ)−mθ
− 3ξmθ (1− τ)
−mθ−1
1+ ξ (1− τ)−mθ
> 0.
(A.4)
Cross-multiplying, one can re-write this condition as a quadratic function in terms of
x ≡ (1− τ)−mθ . Explicitly, S˜2ττ > 0 iff
ξ2
1−m
1+ m
(θ + 1−mθ) x2 + ξ 1−m
1+ m
(
2θ + 2− 4m2θ) x + (1+ θ + mθ) > 0.
Using the fact that 0 < m ≤ 1 and 0 < θ ≤ 1, it follows that this quadratic function is
strictly positive for x > 0. In other words, S˜2ττ > 0 for all τ < 1. This completes the proof.
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Comments on Proposition 3.4: As noted, we take as given that the ratio δLδK is large
enough that it is possible for both optimal tax curves to intersect the zero surplus line
τ˘ (A) ≡ − rδKK0wδL L , and furthemore that τmin is sufficiently less than zero. For added simplic-
ity, we also assume that once each tax policy curve crosses below τ˘ it does not cross back
above it until it is constrained by τmin. These conditions are sufficient for proving existence
of equilibria where the ruler chooses conflict even though settlement would have resulted
in a positive surplus. They should not be considered necessary, however, and we discuss
more general cases below.
First, consider what happens when neither τ∗S nor τ
∗
C intersect τ˘ in Fig. 3.4, either
because δLδK is too small or the τmin constraint is too tight. Because τ
∗
C > τ˘ always in this
case, A˘C is effectively infinite. Therefore, settlement is always preferred to conflict, for all
values of A.
However, if only the τ∗C curve, and not the τ
∗
S curve, intersects τ˘, A˘C is clearly finite,
but A˘S is not. While there still may be a “switching point” such as AD in this case we
cannot guarantee its existence. If such a point does exist, then it follows that there may
also be a second switching point A˘M > A′D > AD where the government prefers conflict
for A ∈ (AD, A′D) but prefers settlement for all A > A′D.
In addition, because tax policy functions are non-linear in A, whereas τ˘ is linear, it may
be the case that τ∗S climbs back above τ˘ before it reaches the τmin constraint. Call the point
where this occurs A˘′S, noting that A˘
′
S > A˘S. Once again, it would seem possible for there
to be an additional switching point A′D > A˘
′
S where the ruler’s preferences switch from
conflict back to settlement. For A ∈ (A˘S, A˘′S) both players prefer conflict as before, but
for A ∈ (A˘′S, A′D) the rebel leader will change his preference to settlement, while the ruler
maintains his preference for conflict. One can envision further such “switching points”
deriving from more elaborate non-linearities in the tax policy functions.
Lastly, yet another possibility that may come into play as A increases in size is that
the residual tax base (net of arming) shrinks to the point where the economy completely
specializes in the production of the capital-intensive good. In this case, because the rel-
ative reward to capital, r/w, becomes endogenous, the relationships between A, τ∗C, τ
∗
S ,
and τ˘ would be harder to pin down. There are two straightforward reasons why complete
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specialization would tend to work in favor of settlement, however. First, r/w should fall
as K0 increases beyond the point of complete specialization, thereby increasing incentives
for taxation and curbing incentives for conflict. Second, the destruction of labor associated
with conflict would tend to reduce r/w even further. As we have noted in the text, how-
ever, it is relatively straightforward to choose parameters such that we can focus on cases
where production remains diversified.
Proof of Corollary 3.2: When bargaining weights are endogenous, it is useful to express
the ruler’s payoff function under settlement as follows:
V˜1 (A, τ) = U˜1 (A + B (A, τ) , τ) ,
where U˜1 (A, τ) is the payoff function under conflict, with U˜1τA < 0, U˜
1
ττ < 0, and U˜1AA = 0,
and B (A, τ) is the (linear) surplus function with BA > 0, Bτ > 0.
The proof follows directly from the definition of τ in Proposition 1: U˜1A T 0 if τ S τ.
When τ > τ the fact that A + B (A, τ) > A, together with U˜1A < 0, implies V˜
1 (A, τ) =
U˜1 (A + B (A, τ) , τ) < U˜1 (A, τ). Note, however, that U˜1 (A, τ) is the ruler’s “ex ante”
payoff from conflict—it is only achievable if he is able to convince his rival before arm-
ing decisions are made that there will be conflict in the last stage of the game. Ex post,
however—i.e. once arming decisions are made—settlement is always a dominant strat-
egy for fixed τ > τ, since τ > τ > 0 > τ˘ implies the surplus from avoiding con-
flict B (A, τ) will always be positive. The ex post payoff under conflict in such cases is
U˜1 (A + B (A, τ) , τ)− φ1B (A, τ) < V˜1 (A, τ).
Proof of Proposition 3.5, part (a): For the proof for part (a), it is first necessary to note
that conflict and settlement are always equivalent in the neighborhood of A = 0 in the
special case where δL = 0. Because there is virtually nothing to fight over under conflict,
and likewise no surplus created when there is settlement, U1∗ and V1∗ should both simply
be given by wLτmax, the maximum tax revenue 1 can extract when he is unopposed and
when the labor force stays whole. It is clear in this limiting case that conflict is weakly
preferred to settlement.
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Generalizing to allow for δL > 0 requires that we answer several questions about the
nature of preferences for conflict over the region A ∈ [0, A). First, how do payoffs for both
conflict and settlement in the neighborhood of A = 0 change when we introduce small,
positive values for δL? Second, what is the optimal tax policy associated with settlement
under this alternative bargaining protocol? Third, what can we say about preferences for
conflict in the neighborhood of A = A? Lastly, what do preferences for conflict look like
in this region when δL becomes large and/or when τmax becomes small? We address these
outstanding questions using a series of additional lemmas.
Lemma A.1 When A = 0, the ruler will prefer conflict to settlement for sufficiently small values
of δL if τmax ≥ τ.
Proof: Since we already have that conflict is weakly preferred in the neighborhood
of A = 0 when δL = 0, we can say that conflict will generally be ex ante preferred to
settlement in the neighborhood of A = 0 for at least some small values of δL if we have
that dV
1∗
dδL A=0,δL=0
≤ dU1∗dδL A=0,δL=0 . Note that this comparison is made easier by the fact that
τ∗S = τ
∗
C = τmax for A = 0 and δL = 0 as noted above. This observation, together with the
envelope theorem, allows us to write the following:
dV1∗
dδL A=0,δL=0
=
dV˜1 (0, τmax)
dδL δL=0
=
∂U˜1 (0, τmax)
∂δL δL=0
+ U˜1A
∂B (0, τmax)
∂δL δL=0
=
dU1∗
dδL A=0,δL=0
+ U˜1A
∂B (0, τmax)
∂δL δL=0
,
where again we specify the relationship between the ruler’s payoff functions as V˜1 (A, τ) =
U˜1 (A + B (A, τ) , τ), with U˜1 (A, τ) again denoting the ruler’s (ex ante) conflict payoff for
a given (A, τ).
By ∂B∂δL > 0, it follows that
dV1∗
dδL A=0,δL=0
≤ dU1∗dδL A=0,δL=0 if U˜
1
A ≤ 0. By Proposition 3.1,
U˜1A(0, τmax) ≤ 0 iff τmax ≥ τ .
Lemma A.2 When bargaining weights are endogenous, the ruler’s optimal tax policy under set-
tlement τ∗S (A) is still unique for any value of A and is still strictly decreasing as the value of
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contested rents decreases (i.e. dτ∗S /dA < 0).
Proof: Again let the relationship between the ruler’s payoff functions be expressed as
V˜1 (A, τ) = U˜1 (A + B (A, τ) , τ), with U˜1 (A, τ) denoting the ruler’s (ex ante) payoff under
conflict for a given (A, τ), with U˜1ττ < 0, U˜1τA < 0, and U˜
1
AA = 0 .
We need to show: (i) V˜1ττ < 0, and (ii) V˜1τA < 0. The first inequality follows from
Bτ > 0, Bττ = 0, such that V˜1ττ = U˜1ττ + U˜1ABττ + U˜
1
AτBτ < U˜
1
ττ < 0. Likewise, V˜1τA =
U1τA +U
1
AABτ = U
1
τA < 0. The uniqueness of τ
∗
S (A) follows from V˜
1
ττ < 0, with dτ∗S /dA =
−V˜τA/V˜ττ < 0.
Lemma A.3 Settlement is always preferred to conflict at A = A, for any value of δL.
Proof: We know by Lemma 3.1 that τ∗C(A) = τ, such that U˜τ(A, τ) = 0 and there-
fore U1∗(A) = U˜1(A, τ). We also have, as a corollary of Proposition 3.4, that V1(A, τ) =
U1(A, τ). All that remains to be shown is that τ∗S (A) 6= τ, such that V1∗(A) = V˜1(A, τ∗S (A)) >
V˜1(A, τ) = U˜1(A, τ) = U1∗(A).
V˜τ(A, τ) < 0 then follows from the the fact that U˜1τA < 0, again using the definition of
τ. Specifically,
V˜1τ
(
A, τ
)
= U˜1τ
(
A + B
(
A, τ
)
, τ
)
+ U˜1A
(
A + B
(
A, τ
)
, τ
) · Bτ < 0,
by U˜1A(·, τ) = 0, U˜τ(A, τ) = 0, and U˜1τA < 0. We already have that V˜1ττ < 0 from the above
Lemma, so there must be a unique τ∗S (A) < τ that maximizes the ruler’s payoff under
settlement. The ruler’s payoff under settlement at A is therefore strictly greater than his
payoff under conflict.
Furthermore, it must be the case that, because payoff functions are continuous, conflict
can only be ex ante preferred to settlement for values of A up to some value A1, with A1
strictly less than A as stated in the original Proposition.
Lemma A.4 Settlement may be preferred to conflict in the neighborhood of A = 0 for large enough
values of δL and will be preferred to conflict with certainty in this region if τmax < τ.
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Proof: Again we invoke that fact that settlement will be preferred in the neighborhood
of A = A. In this case, what is important to know is that τ = 1+(1−m)γ1+(1−m)γ+mγθ2LS
is not affected
by changes in δL. On the other hand, the tax policy under conflict τ∗C (A) does depend on
δL. To see this, we first repeat the expression for U˜1τ given in the discussion of optimal tax
policies
U˜1τ = w
[
(1− δL) L− ψ2wS˜2
]
+ τw2ψ2wwS˜
2 +
(
Aφ1S2 − τwψ2w
)
S˜2τ.
Note that U˜1τδL is strictly less than zero. At the same time, however, U˜
1
τA and U˜
1
ττ are
unaffected by varying δL. Thus, while δL is negatively associated with the level of the tax
policy function τ∗C (A), it does not affect its slope with respect to A (dτ
∗
C/dA). Furthermore,
if the level of τ∗C (A) falls such that τ
∗
C (A) is unconstrained by τmax in the neighborhood of
A = 0, the fact that limA→0 U˜1ττ = 0 (and limA→0 U˜1τA < 0) implies that limA→0 dτ
∗
C/dA =
−∞.
Because τ∗C(A) shifts downwards with δL, and because τ does not depend on δL, we can
say that increases in δL also cause A to move to the left. We can also say that it is possible
that A → 0 as δL gets sufficiently large, since the slope of τ∗C(A) can become vertical near
A = 0. Since, by Lemma A.3, we know V1∗(A) > U1∗(A) always, the movement of A
closer to the origin makes it more likely that settlement will be preferred to conflict in the
neighborhood of A = 0.
If on the other hand τmax is sufficiently small such that τmax < τ, we have that V1∗A=0 =
V˜1(0, τ∗S ) ≥ V˜1(0, τmax) = U˜1(B(0, τmax), τmax) > U˜1(0, τmax), from the definition of τ and
the fact that τmax constrains tax policy under conflict with certainty at A = 0, but may or
may not constrain tax policy under settlement.
Thus, we have that conflict will be ex ante preferred to settlement in the region A ∈
[0, A1), with 0 < A1 < A, for at least some sufficiently small positive values of δL so long
as τmax ≥ τ (and will be strictly preferred if τmax > τ). On the other hand, settlement will
always be preferred in the neighborhood of A = 0 if τmax < τ and may also be preferred
in this region if labor destruction is sufficiently large.
Proof of Proposition 3.5, part (b): The proof here is unsurprisingly very similar to
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the reasoning behind Proposition 3.3. Again we take as given that δL/δK is sufficiently
large and τmin sufficiently negative such that it is possible for both tax policy functions
(τ∗C(A) and τ
∗
S (A)) to intersect the zero-surplus line τ˘(A). Furthermore we require that
both curves only cross τ˘(A) once before they become constrained by τmin.
We first need to show that τ∗S (A˘C) > τ
∗
C(A˘C) = τ˘C, with (A˘C, τ˘C) defined as in the
discussion of Proposition 3.3 as the intersection between τ∗C(A) and τ˘(A) in Fig. 3.3a and
3.4a. The fact that the point (A˘C, τ˘C) generates zero surplus implies that V˜1(A˘C, τ˘C) =
U˜1(A˘C + B(A˘C, τ˘C), τ˘C) = U˜1(A˘C, τ˘C). It also follows from τ∗C(A˘C) = τ˘C that U˜
1
τ(A˘C, τ˘C) =
0. To prove τ∗S (A˘C) > τ
∗
C(A˘C) it is then only necessary to show that V˜
1
τ (A˘C, τ˘C) > 0. This
follows from V˜1τ (A˘C, τ˘C) = U˜1A(A˘C + B(A˘C, τ˘C), τ˘C) · Bτ(A˘C, τ˘C). This last expression is
positive by the fact that τ˘C < 0 < τ =⇒ U˜1A(·, τ˘C) > 0 and by Bτ > 0.
To complete the proof, we note that B(A, τ∗S (A)) > 0 and τ
∗
S (A) < τ everywhere
between A and A˘C. Thus, settlement should be preferred to conflict, both ex post and ex
ante everywhere between A1 and A˘C, provided that both A1 and A˘C exist. If A1 does not
exist (perhaps because δL is too large), then settlement is preferred for A ∈ [0, A˘C). The
remainder follows the same “continuity of payoffs” argument we have noted in the text:
there again must be some point AD ∈ (A˘C, A˘S) such that the ruler’s preferences switch
from “settlement” to “conflict” at the point AD, with A˘S defined by τ∗S (A˘S) = τ˘(A˘S) >
τ∗C(A˘S). The role of τmin in this context is the same as before.
Both players can tax labor
For the sake of precision, we want to make it clear what it is about this environment that
limits the appeal of surplus sharing. It is not necessarily the inherent asymmetric nature
of the game (i.e. that the ruler has an additional strategic instrument) that generates in-
centives for conflict. Rather it is the fact that the two players are interdependent via the
effects of fiscal policy. We show here that even, if players are symmetric in every single
way—including the ability to tax the labor force—preferences for conflict still emerge, be-
cause each player will internalize how his use of taxes will affect labor supply for the other
player.
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This particular extension—where both players collect taxes—is also appealing to study
since rebel groups themselves have been known to prey on economic activity to finance
their operations (Wennmann, 2007). How does it change things? Assume the players
are completely symmetric, such that each player i extracts an (endogenous) share τi of
the economy’s total wage bill (1 − δL)wL. The key insights are familiar. Player i’s cost
of arming ψi will be given by ψi = ψ(q, wi). The crucial point here is that wi = w(1−
τ−i), such that i will internalize the fact that increasing his own tax will make arming less
expensive for the other player, but not for himself. This follows since, for every soldier he
himself hires—at a cost w(1−∑ τi)—he misses out on the tax revenue that soldier would
have produced for him had he been employed in production.
Payoffs under conflict for each player are given by
Ui = µ
[
rKi + Aφi − ψiSi + τi(w(1− δL)L− wψ−iw S−i)
]
This expression is no different than the ruler’s payoff function from before and needs no
further interpretation. Consider then the incentives for taxation:
U˜iτi = w
[
(1− δL)L− ψ−iw S˜−i
]
+ τiw2ψ−iwwS˜−i +
(
AφiS−i − τiwψ−iw
)
S˜−iτi .
Again, the analysis is effectively the same as what we’ve seen. Without loss of generality,
we can re-use our proof from before that dτ∗i /dA < 0, by U˜
i
τiτi
< 0 and U˜iτi A < 0 (since S˜
i’s
dependence on both τi and A is also effectively the same as before, holding τ−i constant).
Furthermore, as A gets sufficiently large, each player i will find it optimal to use negative
values of τi. And, crucially, both players will still have an incentive to use higher taxes
under settlement than under conflict (for δL > 0), since (again) taxes enter the surplus that
is created by avoiding destruction.
What is interesting to note then is that, even though both players will earn the exact
same share of A under both conflict and settlement (by the symmetry of the model), there
will still be cases where conflict emerges despite the possibility for negotiating a settlement
over a positive surplus. That is to say, the marginal benefit of driving up the other player’s
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cost of arming using negative taxes becomes so large (as A becomes sufficiently valuable)
that the two players each find it beneficial to destroy some of the labor force in order to
make negative taxes less expensive, even though this tactic does not actually allow either
player to gain any ground on the other in equilibrium.153
It is also possible to show that a similar result to Proposition 3.5(a) also holds under
symmetry in the case where predominantly capital is destroyed and bargaining weights
are endogenous. Thus, we conclude that it is the additional layer of strategic interdepen-
dence created by the effects of policy choices on a common pool of labor which serves as
the main source of bargaining frictions in this setting, rather than any fundamental asym-
metry.
When does asymmetry make an important difference? Consider again the cases dis-
cussed above where tax policies are decided either at the same time as arming decisions
or afterwards. In the asymmetric game, we found that the ruler might find it optimal to
commit to conflict (ex ante) in such cases because such a commitment would signal to the
other player that he will be choosing the lower tax rate associated with conflict and would
thereby curb rebel arming. Note, however, that his preference for this option derives from
the belief that the lower tax under conflict will grant him a larger share of the contested
rents in equilibrium. That cannot be the case under symmetry!
We maintain nonetheless that placing our focus on the case of asymmetric instruments
is worthwhile because the adherence to symmetry is limiting in this context. After all, it
seems reasonable to assume that having the institutional capacity of the state on his side
grants the ruler a significant advantage in this area. This analysis by virtue of comparison
then helps clarify the key channels at work in our results.
Labor benefits from conflict
Overall income for labor increases from conflict whenever a decrease in taxes associated
with conflict (from τ∗S to τ
∗
C) exceeds the share of labor that would be destroyed in conflict
153More precisely, φ˜i = 1
1+(ψi/ψ−i)m . The marginal benefit of increasing ψ
−i (by decreasing τi) is increasing as
ψi increases (i.e. as τ−i itself decreases). ψi = ψ−i in equilibrium, therefore φ˜i = 1/2 always.
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(δL). That is to say, labor prefers conflict ex ante if
(1− δL) (1− τ∗C) > (1− τ∗S )
We show this can occur for small enough values of δL (and relative destruction δK/δL )
using a stylized example.
Assume the following: (i) no capital is destroyed (δK = 0); (ii) only an arbitrarily small
share (ε > 0) of labor is destroyed (δL = ε); (iii) producing Si uses only labor, such that
ψi = wi; (iv) A is in the neighborhood of A0, which is defined in Lemma 3.1 as the value of
rents at which τ∗C crosses 0; (v) the ruler’s “bargaining weight” λ
1 is given by λ1 = 1, such
that he claims the entirety of any surplus. This scenario guarantees, other other things,
that τ˘(A) = 0. We also note that the surplus here, δLwLτ∗S , is arbitrarily small as well. It
follows that τ∗C and τ
∗
S are each arbitrarily close to zero. When we introduce some labor
destruction at this point, we will see that (i) conflict becomes preferred to settlement at
A = A0; (ii) labor may prefer conflict; (iii) overall “welfare” (as we have defined it) may
be higher under conflict. In this stylized example, (ii) will always turn out to be true. For
(iii), we will require that the labor endowment, L, is sufficiently large.
Outcomes under conflict and settlement are arbitrarily similar for δL = 0. For δL = ε,
overall labor income is higher under conflict if
− (1− τ∗C)− (1− δL)
dτ∗C
dδL
> −dτ
∗
S
dδL
,
which simplifies down to
−
(
dτ∗C
dδL
− dτ
∗
S
dδL
)
> 1,
using the arbitrary smallness of δL. Note that V˜1ττ = U˜1ττ < 0 (suppressing the “1” super-
script usually denoting the ruler). Then, applying Roy’s identity twice, the above inequal-
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ity holds if
U˜1τδ − V˜1τδ
U˜1ττ
> 1.
Considering the ruler’s first order conditions for τ under conflict (34), we have that U˜1τδ =
−wL. Usefully, the assumption that λ1 = 1 implies that V˜1τδ = 0. We also note that in the
neighborhood of τ = 0, and with only labor used in production of arms, U˜1ττ is given by:
U˜1ττ = −wS˜2τ − wS˜2ττ.
We then need to verify if L < S˜2τ + S˜2ττ. Note, however, that—given τ—S˜2 is not otherwise
a function of L. Note also that—under the examination of the point A = A0—it must be
the case that L = S˜2 + S˜2τ (in order for the ruler to optimally choose τ = 0). The inequality
is satisfied then whenever S˜2ττ > S˜2 for A = A0. It can be shown directly that this latter
inequality, in turn, is automatically satisfied in the neighborhood of A = A0. Specifically,
S˜2ττ > S˜2 for τ = 0 if
(m + 1)(m + 2) + 4ξ(1−m2) + ξ2 (1−m) (2−m) > (1+ ξ)2.
Since m and ξ both ∈ (0, 1], this inequality always holds.
It follows then that, for arbitrarily small δL, and in the absence of capital destruction,
τ∗S (A0) = τ˘ (A0)
τ∗C (A0) < τ˘ (A0)
As we know from our discussion of Fig. 3.3, the value of rents where τ∗S (A) and τ˘(A)
intersect is the point A˘S. Conflict is strictly preferred at A˘S if τ∗C(A˘S) < τ
∗
S (A˘S). In this
case, A˘S = A0 implies conflict will be preferred at A0. Furthermore, in this case, labor will
be better off under conflict.
It remains to be seen what will happen for total welfare. The ruler’s payoff, too, is
clearly higher under conflict (otherwise, he would not have chosen it.) The question then
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is whether the increase in labor’s payoff plus the ruler’s payoff offsets the decrease in the
rebel leader’s payoff.
Another way of examining the same issue is to ask whether the total amount of arming
decreases by more than the amount of labor destruction. Capital is not destroyed, therefore
total income in the economy is rK0 (unaffected) plus w times the amount of labor used in
production. We verify if:
−
(
S˜1τ + S˜
2
τ
) dτ∗C
dδL
> 1
where we have already shown (by assumption) that dτ
∗
C
dδL
< −1. The inequality is ensured
if S˜1τ + S˜2τ > 1. Again we are free to make assumptions. In the neighborhood of A = A0,
it can be shown that S˜1τ + S˜2τ > 1 is guaranteed so long as the labor endowment, L, is
sufficiently large. This result occurs because the critical point A0 is itself increasing in L,
by our discussion of Proposition 3.3.
135
References
Acemoglu, D. (2010), “Institutions, Factor Prices and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States?”,
Working Paper 15693, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2001), “A Theory of Political Transitions”, The American
Economic Review 91(4), 938–963.
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2006), Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,
Cambridge University Press, New York.
Agama, L.-A. & McDaniel, C. A. (2002), “The NAFTA Preference and US-Mexico Trade”,
Working Paper 2002-10-A, USITC Office of Economics.
Anbarci, N., Skaperdas, S., & Syropoulos, C. (2002), “Comparing Bargaining Solutions in
the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects”, Journal of
Economic Theory 106(1), 1–16.
Anderson, J. E. & van Wincoop, E. (2001), “Borders, Trade and Welfare”, Working Paper
8515, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Anderson, J. E. & van Wincoop, E. (2003), “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border
Puzzle”, American Economic Review 93(1), 170–192.
Anderson, J. E. & van Wincoop, E. (2004), “Trade Costs”, Journal of Economic Literature 42(3),
691–751.
Anderson, J. E. & Yotov, Y. V. (2010a), “The Changing Incidence of Geography”, American
Economic Review 100(5), 2157–86.
Anderson, J. E. & Yotov, Y. V. (2010b), “Specialization: Pro- and Anti-globalizing, 1990-
2002”, Working Paper 16301, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Anderson, J. E. & Yotov, Y. V. (2012), “Terms of Trade and Global Efficiency Effects of
Free Trade Agreements, 1990-2002”, Working Paper 2012-3, Drexel University School of
Economics.
136
Arkolakis, C., Costinot, A., Donaldson, D., & Rodrı´guez-Clare, A. (2012), “The elusive
pro-competitive effects of trade”, Mimeo, MIT.
Arkolakis, C., Costinot, A., & Rodrı´guez-Clare, A. (2012), “New Trade Models, Same Old
Gains?”, The American Economic Review 102(1), 94–130.
Arkolakis, C., Demidova, S., Klenow, P. J., & Rodrı´guez-Clare, A. (2008), “Endogenous
Variety and the Gains from Trade”, The American Economic Review 98(2), 444–450.
Armington, P. S. (1969), “A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Pro-
duction (Une the´orie de la demande de produits diffe´rencie´s d’apre`s leur origine) (Una
teorı´a de la demanda de productos distinguie´ndolos segu´n el lugar de produccio´n)”,
Staff Papers (International Monetary Fund) 16(1), 159–178.
Avery, W. P. (1998), “Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining”, Political Science Quarterly
113(2), 281–305.
Baier, S. L. & Bergstrand, J. H. (2007), “Do free trade agreements actually increase members’
international trade?”, Journal of International Economics 71(1), 72–95.
Baier, S. L., Bergstrand, J. H., & Feng, M. (2014), “Economic integration agreements and
the margins of international trade”, Journal of International Economics 93(2), 339–350.
Balassa, B. (1965), “Trade Liberalisation and ’Revealed’ Comparative Advantage”, The
Manchester School 33(2), 99–123.
Behrens, K., Mion, G., Murata, Y., & Su¨dekum, J. (2014), “Trade, Wages, and Productivity”,
International Economic Review 55(4), 1305–1348.
Besley, T. & Persson, T. (2011), Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development
Clusters: The Political Economics of Development Clusters, Princeton University Press.
Bevia´, C. & Corcho´n, L. C. (2010), “Peace agreements without commitment”, Games and
Economic Behavior 68(2), 469–487.
Bhagwati, J. (1958), “Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note”, The Review of Economic
Studies 25(3), 201–205.
137
Bhagwati, J. N., Krishna, P., & Panagariya, A. (1999), Trading Blocs: Alternative Approaches
to Analyzing Preferential Trade Agreements, MIT Press.
Blattman, C. & Miguel, E. (2010), “Civil War”, Journal of Economic Literature 48(1), 3–57.
Broda, C., Greenfield, J., & Weinstein, D. (2006), “From Groundnuts to Globalization: A
Structural Estimate of Trade and Growth”, Working Paper 12512, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Brown, C. H., Holman, E. W., Wichmann, S., & Velupillai, V. (2008), “Automated classifi-
cation of the world’s languages: a description of the method and preliminary results”,
Language Typology and Universals / Sprachtypologie und Universalienforschung 61(4), 285–
308.
Caliendo, L. & Parro, F. (2015), “Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA”,
Review of Economic Studies 82(1), 1–44.
Carlberg, J. & Rude, J. (2004), “Intercambio de Comercio Agroalimentario entre Canada´ y
Me´xico bajo el Tratado de Libre Comercio”, Revista Mexicana de Agronegocios 8(15), 282–
293.
Central Intelligence Agency (2010), World Factbook, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Chaney, T. (2008), “Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of Interna-
tional Trade”, The American Economic Review 98(4), 1707–1721.
Chang, Y.-M. & Luo, Z. (2013), “War or Settlement: An Economic Analysis of Conflict with
Endogenous and Increasing Destruction”, Defence and Peace Economics 24(1), 23–46.
Cheng, I. H. & Wall, H. J. (2005), “Controlling for Heterogeneity in gravity models of
trade”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 87(1), 49–63.
Cipollina, M. & Salvatici, L. (2010), “Reciprocal Trade Agreements in Gravity Models: A
Meta-Analysis”, Review of International Economics 18(1), 63–80.
Collier, P. (2000), Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy, World Bank,
Washington, DC.
138
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2004), “Greed and grievance in civil war”, Oxf. Econ. Pap. 56(4),
563–595.
Costinot, A., Donaldson, D., & Komunjer, I. (2012), “What Goods Do Countries Trade? A
Quantitative Exploration of Ricardo’s Ideas”, Review of Economic Studies 79(2), 581–608.
Costinot, A. & Rodrı´guez-Clare, A. (2014), “Trade Theory with Numbers: Quantifying the
Consequences of Globalization”, Handbook of International Economics 4, 197–261.
Dal Bo´, E. & Dal Bo´, P. (2011), “Workers, Warriors, and Criminals: Social Conflict in General
Equilibrium”, Journal of the European Economic Association 9(4), 646–677.
Davidson, R. & MacKinnon, J. G. (1993), Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, Oxford
University Press.
De Luca, G., Sekeris, P. G., & Vargas, J. F. (2011), “Beyond Divide-and-Rule: Kleptocracy
and Civil War”, Working Paper 1102, Center for Research in the Economics of Develop-
ment.
Deardorff, A. V. & Stern, R. M. (1985), “Methods of measurement of nontariff barriers”, in
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations, Geneva.
Dekle, R., Eaton, J., & Kortum, S. (2007), “Unbalanced Trade”, American Economic Review
97(2), 351–355.
Dixit, A. (1980), “The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence”, The Economic Journal
90(357), 95–106.
Donnelly, W. A., Johnson, K., Tsigas, M., & Ingersoll, D. (2004), “Revised Armington Elas-
ticities of Substitution for the USITC Model and the Concordance for Constructing a
Consistent Set for the GTAP Model”, USITC Working Paper.
Dube, O. & Vargas, J. F. (2013), “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence
from Colombia”, Review of Economic Studies 80(4), 1384–1421.
Eaton, J. & Kortum, S. (2002), “Technology, Geography, and Trade”, Econometrica 70(5),
1741–1779.
139
Eck, K. & Hultman, L. (2007), “One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War Insights from
New Fatality Data”, Journal of Peace Research 44(2), 233–246.
Egger, P., Francois, J., Manchin, M., & Nelson, D. (2014), “Non-tariff barriers, integration,
and the Trans-Atlantic economy”, Mimeo.
Egger, P., Larch, M., Staub, K. E., & Winkelmann, R. (2011), “The Trade Effects of Endoge-
nous Preferential Trade Agreements”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 3(3),
113–143.
Egger, P. & Lassmann, A. (2013), “The Causal Impact of Common Native Language on
International Trade: Evidence from a Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design”, Discus-
sion Paper 9441, CEPR.
Egger, P. H. & Lassmann, A. (2012), “The language effect in international trade: A meta-
analysis”, Economics Letters 116(2), 221–224.
Egger, P. H. & Staub, K. E. (2014), “GLM estimation of trade gravity models with fixed
effects”, Mimeo, ETH Zurich.
Esteban, J. & Sa´kovics, J. (2007), “A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict: The
Genesis of Bargaining Power”, Theory Decis 65(3), 227–252.
Eurobarometer (2006), “Europeans and their Languages”, Special Eurobarometer 243, Eu-
ropean Commission, Brussels.
Fally, T. (2014), “Structural Gravity and Fixed Effects”, Mimeo.
Fearon, J. D. (1995), “Rationalist explanations for war”, International Organization 49(03),
379–414.
Felbermayr, G. J., Heid, B., Larch, M., & Yalcin, E. (2014), “Macroeconomic Potentials of
Transatlantic Free Trade: A High Resolution Perspective for Europe and the World”,
Working Paper 5019, CESifo.
Felbermayr, G. J. & Toubal, F. (2010), “Cultural proximity and trade”, European Economic
Review 54(2), 279–293.
140
Fidrmuc, J. & Fidrmuc, J. (2014), “Foreign Language and Trade: Evidence from Quantile
Regression”, Mimeo.
Fjelde, H. (2009), “Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil War, 1985—99”, Journal
of Peace Research 46(2), 199–218.
Fodor, F. & Peluau, S. (2003), “Language geostrategy in eastern and central Europe: As-
sessment and perspectives”, in J. Maurais & M. A. Morris (eds.) Languages in a globalising
world, pp. 85–98, Cambridge University Press.
Fontagne´, L., Gourdon, J., & Jean, S. (2013), “Transatlantic trade: Whither partnership,
which economic consequences”, Policy Brief 2013-1, CEPII.
Garfinkel, M. R. & Skaperdas, S. (2000), “Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete
Information How the Future Matters”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 44(6), 793–807.
Garfinkel, M. R., Skaperdas, S., & Syropoulos, C. (2008), “Globalization and domestic con-
flict”, Journal of International Economics 76(2), 296–308.
Ginsburgh, V., Melitz, J., & Toubal, F. (2014), “Foreign Language Learning: An Econometric
Analysis”, Working Paper 2014-21, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2009), “Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange?”,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(3), 1095–1131.
Hansen, L. P. (1982), “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Esti-
mators”, Econometrica 50(4), 1029–1054.
Hashimoto, B. (2009), “The Political Economy of Counterinsurgency Violence”, in 2009
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, American Political Science
Association, Toronto, CA.
Head, K. & Mayer, T. (2013), “What separates us? Sources of resistance to globalization”,
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’e´conomique 46(4), 1196–1231.
Head, K. & Mayer, T. (2014), “Gravity equations: Workhorse, toolkit, and cookbook”,
Handbook of International Economics 4, 131–196.
141
Head, K., Mayer, T., & Ries, J. (2010), “The erosion of colonial trade linkages after indepen-
dence”, Journal of International Economics 81(1), 1–14.
Helpman, E., Melitz, M., & Rubinstein, Y. (2008), “Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Part-
ners and Trading Volumes”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(2), 441–487.
Hirshleifer, J. (1989), “Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference
models of relative success”, Public Choice 63(2), 101–112.
Hutchinson, W. K. (2005), “’Linguistic Distance’ as a Determinant of Bilateral Trade”,
Southern Economic Journal 72(1), 1–15.
Isphording, I. E. & Otten, S. (2013), “The Costs of Babylon—Linguistic Distance in Applied
Economics”, Review of International Economics 21(2), 354–369.
Kohl, T. (2014), “Do we really know that trade agreements increase trade?”, Review of World
Economics 150(3), 443–469.
Kohl, T., Brakman, S., & Garretsen, H. (2013), “Do trade agreements stimulate international
trade differently? Evidence from 296 trade agreements”, Working Paper 4243, CESifo.
Krueger, A. O. (1999), “Trade creation and trade diversion under NAFTA”, Working Paper
7429, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Krugman, P. (1980), “Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade”,
The American Economic Review 70(5), 950–959.
Ku, H. & Zussman, A. (2010), “Lingua franca: The role of English in international trade”,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 75(2), 250–260.
Le Billon, P. (2003), “Buying peace or fuelling war: the role of corruption in armed con-
flicts”, J. Int. Dev. 15(4), 413–426.
Leromain, E. & Orefice, G. (2014), “New revealed comparative advantage index: Dataset
and empirical distribution”, International Economics 139, 48–70.
Levchenko, A. A. (2007), “Institutional Quality and International Trade”, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 74(3), 791–819.
142
Lowi, M. R. (2005), “Algeria, 1992-2002: Anatomy of a civil war”, in P. Collier & N. Sam-
banis (eds.) Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, The World Bank, pp. 221–246,
The World Bank, Wash.
Mack, A., Martı´nez-Garcı´a, E., & Martı´nez-Garcı´a, M. T. (2014), “Speaking of Trade:
Quantifying the Contribution of Multilingualism to Overcome the Language Barriers
to Trade”, Working Paper, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute.
Manova, K. (2013), “Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and International Trade”,
Review of Economic Studies 80(2), 711–744.
Marcouiller, D. & Young, L. (1995), “The Black Hole of Graft: The Predatory State and the
Informal Economy”, The American Economic Review 85(3), 630–646.
Mason, T. D. (1998), ““Take Two Acres and Call Me in the Morning”: Is Land Reform a
Prescription for Peasant Unrest?”, The Journal of Politics 60(01), 199–230.
Mauro, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(3), 681–
712.
Mauro, P. (1998), “Corruption and the composition of government expenditure”, Journal of
Public Economics 69(2), 263–279.
McBride, M. & Skaperdas, S. (2006), “Explaining Conflict in Low-Income Countries: In-
complete Contracting in the Shadow of the Future”, Institutions and Norms in Economic
Development pp. 141–161.
Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R. (2006), “Institutions and the Resource Curse*”, The
Economic Journal 116(508), 1–20.
Melitz, J. (2008), “Language and foreign trade”, European Economic Review 52(4), 667–699.
Melitz, J. & Toubal, F. (2014), “Native language, spoken language, translation and trade”,
Journal of International Economics 93(2), 351–363.
Melitz, M. J. (2003), “The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity”, Econometrica 71, 1695–1725.
143
Melitz, M. J. & Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2008), “Market Size, Trade, and Productivity”, Review of
Economic Studies 75(1), 295–316.
Moselle, B. & Polak, B. (2001), “A Model of a Predatory State”, JLEO 17(1), 1–33.
Mullahy, J. (1997), “Instrumental-Variable Estimation of Count Data Models: Applications
to Models of Cigarette Smoking Behavior”, Review of Economics and Statistics 79(4), 586–
593.
Nafziger, E. W. & Auvinen, J. (2002), “Economic Development, Inequality, War, and State
Violence”, World Development 30(2), 153–163.
Nicita, A. & Olarreaga, M. (2007), “Trade, Production, and Protection Database,
1976–2004”, World Bank Econ Rev 21(1), 165–171.
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (2014), “U.S. objectives, U.S. benefits in the Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: A Detailed View”, Press Release, USTR.
Pew Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life (2009), “Mapping the Global Muslim
Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population”,
Special report, The Pew Center.
Popkin, S. L. (1979), The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam,
University of California Press, Berkeley.
Powell, R. (2006), “War as a Commitment Problem”, International Organization 60(01), 169–
203.
Powell, R. (2013), “Monopolizing Violence and Consolidating Power”, The Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 128(2), 807–859.
Powers, W. M. (2007), “Endogenous Liberalization and Sectoral Trade”, Working Paper
2007-06, USITC Office of Economics.
Redding, S. & Venables, A. J. (2004), “Economic geography and international inequality”,
Journal of International Economics 62(1), 53–82.
144
Reno, W. (1995), “Reinvention of an African patrimonial state: Charles Taylor’s Liberia”,
Third World Quarterly 16(1), 109–120.
Reno, W. (1996), “Ironies of post-cold war structural adjustment in Sierra Leone”, Review
of African Political Economy 23(67), 7–18.
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., & Verdier, T. (2006), “Political foundations of the resource
curse”, Journal of Development Economics 79(2), 447–468.
Romalis, J. (2007), “NAFTA’s and CUSFTA’s Impact on International Trade”, Review of
Economics and Statistics 89(3), 416–435.
Ross, M. L. (2003), “The natural resource curse: How wealth can make you poor”, in I. Ban-
non & P. Collier (eds.) Natural resources and violent conflict: options and actions, pp. 17–42,
The World Bank, Washington, DC.
Sachs, J. D. & Warner, A. M. (1995), “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”,
Working Paper 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Santos Silva, J. M. C. & Tenreyro, S. (2006), “The Log of Gravity”, Review of Economics and
Statistics 88(4), 641–658.
Santos Silva, J. M. C. & Tenreyro, S. (2011), “Further simulation evidence on the perfor-
mance of the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator”, Economics Letters 112(2),
220–222.
Schirmer, J. G. (1998), The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press.
Shikher, S. (2012a), “Predicting the effects of NAFTA: Now we can do it better!”, Journal of
International and Global Economic Studies 5(2), 32–59.
Shikher, S. (2012b), “Putting industries into the Eaton–Kortum model”, The Journal of Inter-
national Trade & Economic Development 21(6), 807–837.
Simonovska, I. & Waugh, M. E. (2014), “The elasticity of trade: Estimates and evidence”,
Journal of International Economics 92(1), 34–50.
145
Skaperdas, S. (1996), “Contest success functions”, Econ Theory 7(2), 283–290.
Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C. (2002), “Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange”,
The Economic Journal 112(476), 133–146.
Sobek, D. (2010), “Masters of their domains: The role of state capacity in civil wars”, Journal
of Peace Research 47(3), 267–271.
Spomer, M. (2014), “World Christian Database”, The Charleston Advisor 15(3), 58–61.
Stoll, D. (1993), Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala, Columbia University
Press.
Stolper, W. F. & Samuelson, P. A. (1941), “Protection and Real Wages”, The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 9(1), 58–73.
Summer Institute of Linguistics (2009), Ethnologue: Languages of the World, International
Academic Bookstore, Dallas, TX, 16th ed.
Terza, J. V. (1998), “Estimating count data models with endogenous switching: Sample
selection and endogenous treatment effects”, Journal of Econometrics 84(1), 129–154.
Timmer, M. (2012), “The World Input-Output Database (WIOD): Contents, Sources, and
Methods”, WIOD Working Paper no. 10.
Tinbergen, J. (1962), “An analysis of world trade flows”, in Shaping the World Economy, pp.
1–117, Twentieth Century Fund, New York.
Torvik, R. (2002), “Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare”, Journal of Development
Economics 67(2), 455–470.
Tullock, G. (1980), “Efficient Rent Seeking”, in J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison, & G. Tul-
lock (eds.) Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, vol. 4, Texas A&M University Press,
College Station.
U.N. Refugee Agency (2014), “Syria Regional Refugee Response - Regional Overview”,
Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, UNHCR.
146
U.S. Department of State (2007), “International Religious Freedom”, Annual report.
Valentino, B., Huth, P., & Balch-Lindsay, D. (2004), “: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare”,
International Organization 58(02), 375–407.
Villareal, M. A. & Fergusson, I. F. (2014), “NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects”,
Federal Publication, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC.
Viner, J. (1950), The Customs Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for Peace.
Walter, B. F. (1997), “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement”, International Organization
51(03), 335–364.
Waugh, M. (2010), “International Trade and Income Differences”, The American Economic
Review 100(5), 2093–2124.
Wei, S.-J. (1996), “Intra-National versus International Trade: How Stubborn are Nations in
Global Integration?”, Working Paper 5531, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Wennmann, A. (2007), “The Political Economy of Conflict Financing: A Comprehensive
Approach Beyond Natural Resources”, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism
and International Organizations 13(3), 427–444.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
147
Vitae
THOMAS ZYLKIN
Global Production Networks Centre
National University of Singapore
Singapore 117570
Education
2015 DREXEL UNIVERSITY
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics, May 2015
2005 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics and English (Hon.), June 2005
Academic Positions
2015– Postdoctoral Fellow, Global Production Networks Centre, National University of Sin-
gapore
2009–15 Graduate Assistant, Department of Economics, Drexel University
2013 Visiting Assistant in Research, Department of Economics, Yale University
Research Interests
International Political Economy: Economics of Trade Integration and Armed Conflict
Research Publications
2015 “Firm Heterogeneity and Trade-Induced Layoffs: An Empirical Investigation” Euro-
pean Economic Review, 75, 80-97 (w/ Pinar Uysal and Yoto V. Yotov).
2014 “On the trade diversion effects of Free Trade Agreements” Economics Letters, 122(2),
321-325 (w/ Mian Dai and Yoto V. Yotov).
Honors and Awards
2014 Drexel University Doctoral Research Excellence Award
2014 Lindau Nobel Laureate Meeting in Economic Sciences Young Scientist Award
2014 LeBow College of Business Outstanding Economics Stream Research Paper Award
2013 LeBow College of Business Outstanding Economics Stream Research Paper Award
2013 Drexel University Teaching Excellence Award
2005 Award of Distinction (Honors) in English, University of Pennsylvania

